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Abstract
The present collection of essays studies some of the ways in which the
interaction of economic and political forces affects a country’s development
path. The focus of the thesis is on Colombia, which is a fertile setting for the
study of the political economy of development given its long-lasting internal
conflict, the multiple reforms to the functioning of the state that have taken
place in the last decades and the availability of high quality sub-national data.
The first two chapters explore people’s tendency to use resources differently
depending on their source. The first chapter shows how the source of public
revenue affects a government’s incentives to provide public goods and services,
while the second one studies people’s propensity to make risky choices when
playing a game with easily-gotten house money. The third chapter contributes
to our understanding of the international dimension of civil conflict by analyzing
the effects of access to territory in a neighboring country on the intensity of an
insurgent group’s activities.
The idea that governments perform better when they are funded with tax
revenue has a long history and surfaces often in debates regarding the origin
of the natural resource curse, the effectiveness of foreign aid and the benefits
from decentralization. However, the empirical evidence backing this claim is
somewhat limited. In the first chapter, I try to fill this gap by comparing
the effects of increases in internally-raised tax revenue and in royalties from
the extraction of oil on local public good provision in a panel of Colombian
municipalities. I find that tax revenue leads to an improvement in public services
while oil royalties have no effect. Furthermore, I document a negative effect
of royalties on the quality of government, as measured by the disciplinary
prosecution of local public officials.
One possible explanation for the results in chapter 1 is that taxation leads
to greater accountability because voters value tax revenue more than revenue
from an external source. The idea that people assign greater value to resources
over which they have some sense of ownership is further explored in the second
chapter. In that chapter, which is the result of joint work with Juan Camilo
Ca´rdenas, Nicola´s De Roux and Christian Jaramillo, we show that the risk
aversion displayed by participants in a lab experiment varies depending on
whether they received the endowment on the same day of the session or one
month in advance. We interpret this finding as evidence of people’s reduced
risk aversion when allocating easily-gotten resources, also known as the ‘house-
money’ effect.
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In the third chapter, I turn my attention to Colombia’s internal armed
conflict and I study the allegation that the administration of Hugo Cha´vez
provided access to territory in neighboring Venezuela to Colombian insurgent
groups FARC and ELN. I document a disproportionate increase in the intensity
of insurgent activity (mainly by FARC) in Colombian municipalities next
to the border with Venezuela after Cha´vez comes to power in 1999. This
finding is consistent with the idea that the rebels had access to a safe haven
across the border during the Cha´vez administration, but that the strategic
advantage provided by this sanctuary decreased with distance to the border.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of foreign support for insurgent
groups by developing a novel data-driven method for the detection of the usually
secretive activities of trans-national rebel groups. It additionally provides
credible estimates of the causal effect of access to foreign territory on insurgent
activities.
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Chapter 1
Sources of Revenue and
Government Performance:
Evidence from Colombia
If government revenue is not coming out of their pockets, voters may be
uninformed about it or uninterested in what happens to it, contributing to low
accountability and poor governance. This chapter provides empirical evidence
on the positive relationship between taxation and governance by comparing
the effects of increases in internally-raised tax revenue and in royalties from
the extraction of oil on local public good provision in a panel of Colombian
municipalities. I find that an increase in property tax revenue, occurring as a
result of an exogenous cadastral update, has a positive effect on several basic
public services in the areas of education, health and water. These effects are at
least ten times larger than the effects of an equivalent increase in oil royalties,
obtained as a consequence of exogenous fluctuations in the world price of oil. I
find no evidence that oil royalties contribute to improvements in public service
provision, despite being earmarked for this purpose. Differences in the timing
and in the sectoral allocation of spending across sources are unable to explain the
results. I use novel data on disciplinary prosecutions to show that additional oil
royalties increase the probability that the mayor and other local public officials
are prosecuted, found guilty, and removed from office. I also provide suggestive
evidence on the positive effect of taxation on citizen demands regarding public
services. These results indicate that accountability is crucial for the responsible
management of public funds and that taxation is an effective way of achieving
the necessary citizen involvement in public affairs.
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1.1. Introduction
Inadequate provision of public goods is an obstacle to development in
most low-income countries (World Bank, 2004; Besley and Ghatak, 2006). A
frequent way of addressing this problem in recent decades has been through the
devolution of expenditure responsibilities to local governments (Gadenne and
Singhal, 2014). These reforms have tried to exploit the increased accountability
of local public officials and they have had widespread support from international
organizations such as the World Bank (2000).1 However, despite the strong
incentives that local democracy appears to provide for good governance, this
recent wave of decentralization has met with only limited success so far.2
It is true, though, that local governments in developing countries depend to
a large extent on external sources of revenue, such as transfers from higher levels
of government and natural resource rents. Several well-identified studies have
documented how increases in revenue from these sources appear to have a very
low impact on public good provision, often leading to a worsening of corruption
instead.3 It thus seems plausible that the way in which local public finances are
organized is contributing to the suboptimal provision of public goods across
the developing world. If revenue is not coming out of their pockets, voters
may be uninformed about it or uninterested in what happens to it, failing to
hold the government accountable as a result. However, without the benchmark
provided by tax revenue, we cannot rule out that the poor governance associated
with additional resources is simply indicating that these governments have low
technical capacity or are the victims of widespread corruption, no matter what
the source of revenue is.
In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that internally-raised tax revenue has
a larger effect on the provision of public goods than revenue from an external
or unearned source. For this purpose, I compare the effects of increases in local
tax revenue and in royalties from the extraction of oil on the provision of public
goods in a panel of Colombian municipalities. I show that local tax revenue
has a much larger impact than oil royalties on several indicators of public good
provision. I argue that this difference is driven by the opposite effects of tax
1In the words of Bardhan (2002, p.185), “In matters of governance, decentralization is
the rage.”
2See Faguet (2014) and Mookherjee (2015) for recent reviews on decentralization. For
evidence on local democracy in developing countries, see Ferraz and Finan (2011); De Janvry
et al. (2012); Mart´ınez-Bravo et al. (2014); Fujiwara (2015).
3See Fisman and Gatti (2002); Reinikka and Svensson (2004); Vicente (2010); Caselli
and Michaels (2013); Brollo et al. (2013); Litschig and Morrison (2013); Maldonado (2014);
Olsson and Valsecchi (2014).
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revenue and external revenue on the misbehavior of local politicians and I use
novel data on disciplinary prosecutions to provide supporting evidence.
A comparison of this nature faces several challenges. We must first find a
setting where local governments have access to both tax and non-tax sources of
revenue and are responsible for the provision of public goods. We must also have
access to plausible sources of variation not only in external revenue, which the
previous literature has accomplished with some success, but also in internally-
raised tax revenue, which is a more daunting task and has seldom been done
before. Finally, our comparison must account for the fact that revenue can be
used for many different purposes, so a careful choice of outcomes is needed.
Colombia meets all these conditions.
Colombian municipalities are responsible for the provision of basic public
services and finance them with a mix of local taxes, transfers from the central
government and royalties from the extraction of natural resources. The royalties
received by resource-producing municipalities are formula-determined and
amount to a fixed share of the market value (at world prices) of the extracted
resources. Oil is the most important source of royalties in Colombia but the
country is a small player in the oil market and is unable to affect world prices.4
Hence, I exploit time variation in the world price of oil between 2005 and 2011,
together with cross-sectional variation in oil intensity (using average municipal
oil royalties between 2000 and 2004) to estimate the effect of royalties on local
public goods.
The municipal expenditure of natural resource royalties is heavily regulated.
Royalties must be spent on public services in the areas of education, health
and water until targets are met for five specific indicators. I show that target
achievement is low among oil royalty recipients at the start of the sample period
and that the earmarking rules were followed, making these indicators the best
place to look for the impact of royalties on public goods and services. The
four indicators for which yearly data is available are my main outcomes of
interest: the net enrolment rate in basic education, the infant mortality rate,
the percentage of poor population with subsidized health insurance and a water
quality index.
I compare the effect of oil royalties on the indicators above to that of
property tax revenue, the main local tax in Colombia. The base of the property
tax is the value of the properties in the municipality’s official property register
4In the appendix I provide very similar results for coal, which is the second most important
source of royalties. Together, oil and coal account for over 90 % of royalties in the period
2005-2011.
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or cadastre. Each year the national geography institute run by the central
government updates the cadastre of some municipalities and reassesses the
value of the included properties, which leads to a sharp increase in property
tax revenue. I argue that the timing of these updates is plausibly exogenous.
For this purpose, I provide evidence on the municipalities’ limited ability to
manipulate the timing of their update and I show that it is mainly determined
by the supply of updates from the geography institute. Furthermore, given that
municipalities have discretion over the expenditure of tax revenue, a comparison
based on the outcomes for which natural resource royalties are earmarked is
likely to be biased in favor of this latter source.
The estimates from an instrumental variables model with municipality and
department-year fixed effects indicate that an increase in property tax revenue
has a positive and statistically significant effect on educational enrolment and
on a water quality index. Additional property tax revenue also increases the
probability of achieving universal coverage of poor population with subsidized
health insurance. These effects are at least one order of magnitude greater than
(and statistically different from) the effects of an increase in oil royalties of the
same size. In fact, I find a striking result: the effect of additional royalties is
basically zero for all outcomes and the point estimates are negative in several
cases.
One potential concern regarding these findings is that different types of
municipality may raise revenue from different sources. However, I show that the
positive effects of cadastral updating and property tax revenue extend to oil-
royalty recipients. Another potential problem is that differences in expenditure
could arise because cadastral updates lead to a stable increase in tax revenue
while oil price shocks lead to temporary fluctuations in royalties. To address
this concern, I show that differences in the propensity to spend out of the two
sources (based on a higher cautiousness when spending oil windfalls) cannot
explain the results. I also show that there is no evidence of improvement in
any indicator in the medium-run (seven years) for oil-royalty recipients, which
indicates that royalties are not being spent on projects of a larger scale whose
returns require more time to materialize. I find that additional revenue from
either source is channeled almost exclusively into investment in fixed capital
but that only tax revenue leads to an increase in the number of schools in the
municipality.
I argue that the heterogeneous effects of tax revenue and oil royalties
on public goods are driven by harder-to-observe differences in the quality
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of expenditure, and more generally in the competence of local governments,
according to the source of funding. Using newly collected data on the disciplinary
prosecution of local public officials in Colombia I find that an increase in oil
royalties leads to a statistically significant increase in the probability that the
municipal mayor and top members of staff are prosecuted, found guilty and
removed from office and barred from politics by a national watchdog agency.
Increases in property tax revenue, on the other hand, appear to reduce the
probability of these events, although the difference is not statistically significant.
The findings of this chapter are consistent with the idea that taxation makes
voters either more able or more willing to hold the government accountable
(Paler, 2013). In the theoretical appendix, I provide a model of political agency
with career concerns that illustrates how both information-based and preference-
based mechanisms can explain the results from the empirical exercise. I provide
suggestive evidence on the heterogeneous response of residents to increases in
taxation relative to external revenue using data on social mobilizations. I find
that property tax revenue has a positive effect on the probability that a protest
related to local public services takes place in the municipality, while oil royalties
have a negative effect. Again, the difference is not statistically significant.
The idea that taxation improves governance is not new. It can be found in
comparative papers on the development of modern Europe (North and Weingast,
1989) or on the ‘rentier states’ of the Middle East (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi,
1990; Ross, 2001). In development economics, this idea is present in discussions
on foreign aid (Bauer, 1972; Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2006; Deaton, 2013) and
on state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2011, 2013, 2014). In public economics,
it is at the core of the ‘second generation’ approach to fiscal federalism (Oates,
2005; Weingast, 2009) and it is related to the idea of ‘fiscal illusion’ (Dollery
and Worthington, 1996). However, there is only limited empirical evidence on
this topic.
Two recent papers have studied the heterogeneous effects of tax revenue
and external revenue on public good provision, with mixed findings. Borge
et al. (2015) show that additional rents from hydro-power production reduce
the efficiency of public expenditure less than increases in other revenue in
Norwegian municipalities. In the most closely related contribution to this
work, Gadenne (2015) reports improvements in educational infrastructure for
Brazilian municipalities that enroll in a tax modernization program, while
higher transfers have no effect. The main challenge that this line of research
still faces is coming up with plausibly exogenous sources of variation in tax
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revenue, as changes in tax bases and tax rates are likely to be endogenous to
political and economic factors that can potentially affect outcomes of interest.
In this chapter I introduce cadastral updates as a plausibly exogenous source
of variation in local tax revenue.5 These updates lead to an increase in tax
revenue that is not correlated to changes in political or economic conditions,
nor in tax administration or structure. I observe cadastral updates for 60 % of
municipalities over a five-year period, which ensures the representativeness of
the results among Colombian municipalities and allows for a common support
with oil-royalty recipients. I exploit the earmarking of natural resource royalties
to target the comparison across sources of revenue and I look not only at
educational infrastructure, but also at policy outcomes in the areas of education,
health and water. This study also contributes to the existing literature by using
novel data on disciplinary prosecutions to illustrate the heterogeneous effects
of tax revenue and external revenue on local politicians’ misbehavior.
The present investigation’s main contribution is to the empirical literature
studying the relationship between public finance and governance.6 It is also
related to to the empirical literature that uses sub-national data to study
the effects of natural resource rents.7 The theoretical model I develop also
complements previous contributions on the political resource curse by exploring
the heterogeneous political effects of resource rents relative to tax revenue.8
This study contributes as well to the ‘second generation’ literature on fiscal
federalism by providing evidence on the importance of local fiscal incentives.9
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
5Sa´nchez and Pacho´n (2013) use an IV strategy based on cadastral depreciation and
find that educational enrolment and water quality improve in Colombian municipalities
that collect more taxes. I build on their work by providing the necessary evidence on the
exogeneity of the timing of cadastral updates. Additionally, while Sa´nchez and Pacho´n (2013)
focus exclusively on tax revenue, I answer a different question related to the heterogeneous
effects of tax revenue and external revenue.
6Zhuravskaya (2000) documents the negative effects of transfer offsets to increases in tax
revenue in Russian cities. Ross (2004) reports cross-country evidence on the link between
taxation and democracy. Paler (2013) and Martin (2014) provide experimental evidence on
people’s higher willingness to hold the government accountable when they are taxed. Borge
and Rattsø (2008) and Sa´nchez and Pacho´n (2013) show that property taxes improve the
efficiency and amount of public services in Norway and Colombia, respectively. Casaburi and
Troiano (2015) find that cadastral registration has positive effects on local governance in
Italian municipalities.
7See Caselli and Michaels (2013); Maldonado (2014); Ferraz and Monteiro (2014); Olsson
and Valsecchi (2014); Herrera (2014); Carreri and Dube (2015).
8See Caselli (2006); Mehlum et al. (2006); Robinson et al. (2006); Caselli and Cunningham
(2009); Brollo et al. (2013); Matsen et al. (2015)
9See Bardhan (2002); Oates (2005); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006); Faguet and Sa´nchez
(2008, 2014); Weingast (2009). Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999) explore the potential of the
property tax to act as a disciplining device for local governments.
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information on the setting for the empirical exercise. Section 3 presents the
data and discusses the empirical strategy. The main results on public goods
and the robustness checks are shown in section 4. Evidence from disciplinary
prosecutions is provided in section 5. In Section 6 I discuss the findings and
the underlying mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
1.2. Local Public Finance and Public Service
Provision in Colombia
There are two levels of sub-national government in Colombia: 1100
municipalities are grouped into 32 departments (similarly to US states and
counties). The top municipal authority is the mayor, who serves a four-year term
without the possibility of re-election. The municipal council, which is elected
at the same time as the mayor, must approve the mayor’s plan of government
as well as the annual budget and must also supervise their execution.
Following a decentralization reform in the early 1990s, municipalities and
departments became jointly responsible for the provision of basic public services
in the areas of education, health, drinking water and sanitation. The main
source of funding for related expenditures is a system of earmarked and formula-
determined transfers from the central government called “Sistema General de
Participaciones” (SGP), which accounts on average for 63 % of municipal total
revenue.10
Taxes are the second most important source of revenue and contribute on
average with 44 % of current receipts and 13 % of total revenue. The main local
taxes (and their average shares of tax revenue) are the property tax (34 %),
the business tax (17 %) and the petrol surcharge (22 %).11 The property tax
is the most important source of tax revenue for slightly more than one half
10SGP transfers must be kept in a separate account from other sources of revenue.
Municipal autonomy over the expenditure of these transfers and over the administration of
public services varies across municipalities and across sectors, with the specific responsibilities
of each level of government being somewhat blurry (Alesina et al., 2005). After an additional
reform in 2001, municipalities “certified” by the Ministries of Education or Health started
to directly manage the transfers earmarked for these areas (Corte´s, 2010; Brutti, 2015).
Otherwise, transfers are managed by the departmental government. Certified municipalities
also have greater autonomy in the management of the local education and health systems.
However, the provision of health services is highly regulated, even for certified municipalities,
and must take place through special firms called “Empresas Sociales del Estado” (ESE). In
the case of water and sanitation, municipalities manage the share of transfers earmarked for
this purpose unless they are “de-certified” by the Superintendent for Public Services.
11Other local taxes include those for car registration and for the display of billboards and
banners.
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of municipalities, but its relative importance decreases with population size
(Nu´n˜ez, 2005).12 Aggregate property tax revenue has been relatively stable
since 2000 at around 0.5 % of GDP (Sa´nchez and Espan˜a, 2013).
Municipalities have discretion over the expenditure of property tax revenue,
except for a fixed share that they are required to transfer to an environmental
agency.13 Municipalities can use own revenues (including tax revenue) for the
provision of various public services. Any municipality can supply funding for
the provision of education and can also invest in educational infrastructure
or school equipment. Regarding health-related expenses, municipalities can
provide subsidized health insurance to the population classified as poor by
the national government’s proxy-means-testing targeting system (SISBEN).
Municipal governments can also use own revenues for public health initiatives
such as vaccination campaigns (vaccines are provided at zero cost by the central
government). In the case of water and sanitation, municipalities can invest their
own resources in infrastructure or can provide subsidized access to the poor.
The property tax is levied on the cadastral value of all real estate in the
municipality. The cadastre or land register is the official record of the physical
and economic characteristics of all properties in a municipality. The cadastre
of all municipalities in the country (except for Bogota´, Medell´ın, Cali and the
department of Antioquia) is managed by the National geography institute,
Instituto Geogra´fico Agust´ın Codazzi (IGAC), an agency run by the central
government. As part of its duties, IGAC periodically updates the cadastres under
its control. Cadastral updates mainly involve reassessing existing properties but
also, to a much lesser extent, incorporating previously unregistered properties
to the cadastre.14
The third most important source of local revenue is royalties from the
extraction of natural resources. The main source of royalties between 2005 and
2011 was the extraction of oil (69 % of the total), followed by coal (23 %).15
Royalties are paid by firms to the central government according to a set of
12Glaeser (2013) reports that local public finances in the US are not very different, with
intra-government transfers and property taxes being the most important sources of revenue
for all but the largest cities. Gadenne and Singhal (2014) show that dependence on external
revenue is greater for local governments in developing countries.
13There are 34 such agencies in the country. Some cover a handful of municipalities while
others cover multiple departments. The percentage transferred must be between 15 % and
25 % of property tax revenue.
14Iregui et al. (2003, 2004) and Sa´nchez and Espan˜a (2013) provide further information
on the property tax and on cadastral updating in Colombia.
15Royalties are also paid for the extraction of precious metals, gemstones, iron, copper,
nickel and salt.
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fixed resource-specific formulae of the form
royalties = output× world price (USD)× exchange rate (COP/USD)× royalty rate ( %)
In the case of oil, between 60 % and 84 % of these royalty payments are
transferred by the central government to the municipalities and departments
where oil is extracted, with the marginal royalty transfer rate decreasing in
output. Another 8 % of the total is distributed among the port municipalities
from where oil is shipped and the remaining share (between 8 % and 32 %) is
allocated to investment projects in non-producing areas.16 The total amount of
royalties received by oil-producing and port municipalities (18 % of the country)
between 2005 and 2011 amounted to 3.5 billion USD. On average, royalties
represent 23 % of total revenue for this set of municipalities. A reform in 2012
significantly modified the way in which royalties are distributed, but data
availability prevents me from exploiting this source of variation.
By law, at least 75 % of royalties must be spent on education, health,
drinking water and sanitation until specific targets are met for the specific set
of indicators listed in Table 1.1. These indicators are the net enrolment rate in
basic education (years 1-9, ages 6-14), the infant mortality rate, the percentage
of poor population with subsidized health insurance and the percentages of
population with access to clean water and sewerage, where water is only
considered suitable for human consumption if it scores less than 5 in a water
quality index ranging from 0 to 100. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.1 show that
target achievement among oil-royalty recipients was low for all indicators at the
start of the sample period. The rules governing the distribution and expenditure
of royalties do not disincentivize target achievement, as municipalities keep
receiving royalties once targets are met and can spend them on priority projects
from the mayor’s government plan.
In order to achieve the education target, royalties can be spent on education
infrastructure, school equipment or transportation. They can only be used
to directly finance the provision of education if SGP transfers are shown to
be insufficient. Royalty recipients can reduce infant mortality through public
health policies or by setting up emergency health posts for common infant
diseases. Royalties can also be used for expenditures related to water and
sewerage projects, such as initial studies, designs and construction.
16The allocation rules are roughly similar for other natural resources.
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Table 1.1: Achievement of targets by oil-royalty recipients
(1) (2) (3)
Target1 Mean Target met
Indicator (2005) ( % in 2005)
Net enrolment rate in basic education ( %) 100 91.8 30.0
Infant mortality rate (h) 16.5 26.8 7.1
Poor population with subsidized health insurance ( %) 100 72.7 14.3
Water quality index (0-100)2 5 32.2 17.9
Population with access to drinking water ( %)3 70 63.0 62.1
Population with access to sewerage ( %)3 70 41.1 26.4
Notes: The table shows the indicators on which at least 75 % of royalties have to be spent and the
targets that royalty recipients must meet. It also shows the average of each indicator in 2005 for the
140 municipalities with positive oil royalties between 2000 and 2004, as well as the percentage of these
municipalities meeting the target. 1 Targets from Decree 1747/1995, modified by Law 1151/2007, Resolution
4911/2008 (Education) and Decree 1447/2010 (Water). 2 Information from 2007, which is the first year for
which data on the IRCA water quality index is available. 3 Data on access to drinking water and sewerage
is only available from the 2005 population census.
1.3. Empirical Strategy
I use panel data for 969 Colombian municipalities between 2005 and 2011
to test the hypothesis that tax revenue has a larger effect on public good
provision than revenue from an external source. I exploit the timing of cadastral
updates and the fluctuations in the world price of oil as sources of exogenous
variation in local property tax revenue and in royalties from the extraction of
oil, respectively, and I compare the effect that revenue from these two sources
has on the local public goods for which royalties are earmarked. In the following
sub-sections I explain the details of this empirical exercise. First, I introduce
the data employed. Secondly, I present the outcomes of interest. Finally, I
discuss the identification strategy.
1.3.1. Data
Data on municipal public finance comes from the yearly balance sheets
reported by each municipality to the Office of the Comptroller General for the
purpose of fiscal control. These balance sheets have disaggregated information
on all sources of revenue, including tax revenue (by type of tax), transfers and
royalties. Information on expenditure is also available in these balance sheets,
disaggregated between current expenditure (operating costs) and investment.
I express all money values in tens of thousands of 2004 Colombian Pesos
(COP) per capita (unless otherwise stated), using the Consumer Price Index
and population estimates from the National Statistical Agency, Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estad´ıstica (DANE).
Data on the local public goods for which royalties are earmarked (Table 1.1)
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comes from various sources: the net enrolment rate in basic education and the
infant mortality rate are provided by the Ministry of Education and DANE,
respectively.17 The source for the yearly percentage of poor population with
access to subsidized health insurance is the Ministry of Health.18 The water
quality index, Indice de Riesgo de la Calidad del Agua (IRCA), is calculated by
the National Health Institute, Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS). All indicators
are available at the municipality-year level for the period 2005-2011, except for
the water quality index, which is only available since 2007. In the following
section I explain why I choose these indicators as the main outcomes of interest.
IGAC has yearly data on the number of properties, the total property value
and the year of the last cadastral update for both the urban and rural areas of
each municipality under its supervision. Municipalities with their own cadastral
agencies (Bogota´, Medell´ın, Cali and Antioquia department) are dropped from
the sample. This leaves me with 969 municipalities (86 % of the total). In the
empirical exercise I do not distinguish between urban and rural updates, but
the results are robust to the exclusion of rural updates (available upon request).
Data on oil royalties comes from the state-owned Colombian oil company,
Ecopetrol, for the period 2000-2003 and from the National Hydrocarbons Agency,
Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH), for the period 2004-2011. I use the
average petroleum spot price from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS).
I provide summary statistics for the main variables that I employ in Table
1.2. The average municipality has 30,000 inhabitants (the median is 13,000), of
which 60 % live in rural areas.19 The average levels of total revenue, property
tax revenue and natural resource royalties are 540,000, 21,000 and 55,000 COP
per capita, respectively. On average, municipalities experience fiscal deficits
during the sample period, with total expenditure at 580,000 COP per capita.
Most expenditure (almost 500,000 COP per capita) goes to investment.
17The net enrolment rate is calculated by dividing the number of children with ages 6 to
14 enrolled in school years 1 to 9 by the number of children in this age group. Since data
on enrolment and data on population come from different sources, the resulting figure can
actually exceed 100 %. I censor enrolment rates above 100 % but the results are robust to
using the original data.
18Poor is defined as belonging to categories 1 or 2 of the Colombian proxy-means-testing
system SISBEN.
19However, Colombia is a predominantly urban country. In 2005, 45 % of the country’s
population lived in the 20 largest cities, where only 7 % of the population is considered rural.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of main variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
A. demographics
Population (thousands) 30.03 75.55 0.88 1193.67 6,704
Rural share of population 0.58 0.24 0 0.98 6,704
B. cadastral updating
Cadastral update (dummy) 0.13 0.34 0 1 6,704
Cadastral valuation (millions) 3.59 4.19 0 83.16 6,704
Number of properties (thousands) 9.10 20.26 0 304.51 6,704
C. oil price and royalties
Oil royalties 2000-2004 2.36 16.4 0 348.47 969
Oil price (per barrel) 12.8 1.70 10.5 15.3 7
D. public finance
Total revenue 54.35 43.21 8.88 637.52 6,704
Current revenue 13.93 11.97 1.59 212.96 6,704
Tax revenue 6.52 8.67 0.04 169.94 6,704
Property tax revenue 2.08 2.76 0 60.52 6,704
Capital revenue 40.42 35.61 3.29 567.87 6,704
Natural resource royalties 5.45 26.28 0 506.55 6,704
Transfers 35.89 23.26 5.02 553.46 6,704
Total expenditure 58.23 49.74 1.14 972.04 6,704
Current expenditure 8.46 10.98 0.08 776.33 6,704
Investment 49.78 45.02 0.66 931.36 6,704
E. development indicators
Net enrolment rate in basic education ( %) 88 17.18 18.7 244.4 6,704
Infant mortality rate (h) 22.81 8.51 9.24 64.09 6,704
Poor population with subsidized health insurance ( %) 87.15 15.66 0 100 6,704
IRCA water quality index (0-100) 29.38 23.82 0 100 4,472
F. disciplinary processes
Mayor prosecuted (dummy) 0.19 0.39 0 1 2,985
Mayor found guilty (dummy) 0.14 0.34 0 1 2,985
Mayor banned from office (dummy) 0.08 0.28 0 1 2,985
Top staff prosecuted (dummy) 0.06 0.24 0 1 2,985
Top staff found guilty (dummy) 0.04 0.2 0 1 2,985
Top staff banned from office (dummy) 0.03 0.17 0 1 2,985
Council member prosecuted (dummy) 0.05 0.22 0 1 2,985
Council member found guilty (dummy) 0.04 0.2 0 1 2,985
Council member banned from office (dummy) 0.03 0.17 0 1 2,985
Notes: The sample includes 969 municipalities for the period 2005-2011. Political characteristics in panel F are calculated using
results from local elections in 2000, 2003 and 2007 and from national elections in 2002, 2006 and 2010. The variables related
to disciplinary processes in panel E contain information from the local political periods 2001-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008-2011.
All money variables are expressed in tens of thousands of 2004 Colombian pesos per capita, unless specified otherwise.
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1.3.2. Indicators of Local Public Good Provision
As mentioned above, Colombian law stipulates that at least 75 % of royalties
must be spent on the improvement of basic public services until targets are
met for the set of indicators listed in Table 1.1. The targets are displayed in
column 1, while column 2 shows the average value of each indicator in 2005 (the
first year for which data is available) among oil-royalty recipients. At the start
of the sample, the average municipality receiving oil royalties does not meet
any of the targets. Column 3 further shows that the percentage of oil-royalty
recipients reaching each target is less than or equal to 30 % for all indicators
except access to drinking water (62 %).
The low levels of compliance imply that the targets were binding constraints
during the sample period and that royalties had to be spent on the improvement
of the indicators in Table 1.1. Figure 1.1, which is based on administrative
data on the expenditure of royalties for 2010 and 2011, shows that almost
80 % of royalties were allocated to the attainment of the targets, mainly in
education and water. Even though royalties could crowd out own expenditure
in the earmarked sectors, total investment in these sectors must rise with
royalties (though not necessarily at the margin) since the ratio of royalties to
own revenues among oil-royalty recipients is 1.58 on average during the sample
period.
Hence, the indicators in Table 1.1 are the best place to look for the impact
of natural resource royalties on public goods and I use them as the main
outcomes of interest for the empirical exercise. Yearly municipality-level data
is not available on the percentages of population with access to drinking water
and sewerage, forcing me to leave these two indicators out of the analysis.20
Therefore, the four main outcomes of interest are the net basic education
enrolment rate, the infant mortality rate, the percentage of poor population with
subsidized health insurance and the IRCA water quality index. Nevertheless,
there is a strong cross-sectional correlation between the baseline score of the
water quality index in 2007 and the values of the two omitted indicators from
the 2005 population census, which suggests that the water quality index could
potentially capture improvements in access to drinking water and sanitation.21
My choice of indicators of local public goods leads to a particularly stringent
20Sa´nchez and Pacho´n (2013) find a positive cross-sectional effect of local taxation on
access to drinking water using data from the population census of 2005.
21Sa´nchez and Vega (2014) report for Colombian departments a strong positive correlation
between access to drinking water on infant mortality, so this latter indicator could also
capture improvements in access to water and sanitation.
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Figure 1.1: Royalties spent on targets for public services
Note: The graph shows the percentage of royalties spent on the attainment of each target (and the
total) among 94 oil-royalty recipient municipalities in 2010 and 2011 (unbalanced panel). The graph
shows percentages of the total expenditure but the results are very similar for average expenditure across
municipalities.
test because municipalities have full discretion over tax revenue while they are
required to spend the vast majority of natural resource royalties on the outcomes
of interest. The higher required propensity to spend revenue from royalties on
these outcomes should lead to the effect of natural resource royalties being
mechanically larger than the effect of tax revenue. Therefore, the comparison I
carry out is biased, but the bias works against the hypothesis that I want to
test.
An additional reason to study the four chosen indicators of local public good
provision is because they are a valuable source of information on local living
conditions. In fact, the specified targets are closely related to the attainment
of some of the United Nations’ Millenium Development Goals (MDG), such
as achieving universal primary education, reducing under-five mortality by
two thirds and halving the share of people without access to clean water and
sanitation.
Panel E. in Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the four main outcome
variables, while Table A1 in the appendix uses data from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) to compare Colombia’s social indicators with those of eleven
other Latin American countries around the start of the sample period.22
22The countries I consider are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
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This comparison reveals that the country was lagging in primary educational
enrolment and had intermediate results in health and water.
Table 1.2 shows that the net enrolment rate in basic education (five years
of primary plus four years of secondary) is 88 % on average in the sample.
According to the WDI from 2004 (column 2 in Table A1), Colombia ranked last
in net primary enrolment (tied at 92 % with Bolivia and Venezuela). However,
column 3 in Table A1 shows that net secondary enrolment was tied for third
place at 63 %, outperforming Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela.
Regarding health, Table 1.2 shows that the average infant mortality rate
in the sample is 22.8 per 1,000. Column 4 in Table A1 reveals that for this
same indicator Colombia ranked sixth out of the twelve countries considered
with 19 deaths per 1,000 infants in 2004. Going back to Table 1.2, 87 % of the
poor population is covered by subsidized health insurance on average. Although
there is no comparable data in the WDI, female life expectancy can provide us
with a sense of where Colombia stands in terms of health within Latin America
(without being biased due to the negative effects of internal armed conflict).
Female life expectancy in Colombia is the seventh highest in the region (tied
with Venezuela) at 76 years.
Finally, the average value of the IRCA water quality index in the sample
is 29.38 (where less is better and below 5 is considered suitable for human
consumption). Looking at the percentage of urban population with access to
improved water sources in column 6 of Table A1, Colombia was sixth with 97 %.
The country also ranked sixth (tied with Brazil and Mexico) in the percentage
of urban population with improved sanitation facilities. However, data from
the 2005 population census indicates that there is a substantial urban-rural
disparity in water provision, with 91 % of the urban population having access
to drinking water but only 46 % of the rural population having so, on average.
1.3.3. Identification Strategy
The objective of the empirical exercise is to estimate the causal effect
of property tax revenue and oil royalties on the indicators of public good
provision discussed above. I exploit the availability of panel data to estimate a
series of models that include as controls both municipality and department-
year fixed effects. I am thus able to control for persistent heterogeneity
across municipalities as well as for common shocks affecting all municipalities
simultaneously, allowing for these time effects to be potentially heterogeneous
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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across departments.
Still, OLS estimates of the parameters of interest could be affected by
reverse causality or omitted variable bias. For example, an increase in the
demand for social services within a municipality over time may induce the local
government to raise more taxes in order to be able to finance them. Similarly,
the observed variation in oil royalties may reflect changes in other factors that
can potentially affect the outcomes of interest, such as the discovery of new oil
fields or an improvement in security conditions.
To address these concerns, I employ a source of plausibly exogenous variation
for each source of revenue and I obtain instrumental variables (IV) estimates of
the parameters of interest. More specifically, I exploit the timing of cadastral
updates and the fluctuations in the world price of oil as sources of plausibly
exogenous variation in property tax revenue and in oil royalties, respectively.
The following two sub-sections discuss the choice of instrumental variable
for each source of revenue. The third sub-section presents the regression
specifications for both the reduced form and the IV models.
Cadastral Updates and Property Tax Revenue
I use the timing of cadastral updates by IGAC as a source of exogenous
variation in property tax revenue. Colombian law requires municipal cadastres
to be updated every five years, but this condition is rarely satisfied. During
the sample period, the average urban update takes place 11.4 years after the
previous one, while the average rural update occurs 12.7 years after the last
one. I address potential concerns about the endogenous timing of cadastral
updates in several ways. I provide evidence against selection on observables and
unobservables and I show that the timing of updates is driven for the most part
by IGAC’s supply, whose main criterion is the age of the current cadastre. I also
provide suggestive evidence on an exogenous shock to the supply of updates,
which led to a significant increase in the number of updates during the sample
period. Furthermore, I provide evidence on municipalities’ limited ability to
manipulate property tax revenue following a cadastral update.
As a first validation exercise I check that the timing of a cadastral update
is not correlated with changes in other observable municipal characteristics. I
do this by estimating a series of bivariate regressions:{
D(update)i,j,t+1 = αi + δj,t + βkX
k
i,t + i,j,t
}K
k=1
(1.1)
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where Xki,t is a time-varying characteristic indexed by k and D(update) is a
dummy equal to one the year before the update comes into effect. I define the
dependent variable in this way to account for the fact that updates that take
place in year t only come into effect on January 1st of year t + 1. I include
municipality (αi) and department-year (δj,t) fixed effects to ensure that I look
at the variation that I will exploit in the main regressions.
I study thirty observable characteristics, which are listed in the left-most
column of Table 1.3. I test for disproportionate increases in births, migration and
urbanization around the time of an update using the natural log of population
and the share of rural population. I look at other sources of revenue (other
taxes, transfers, royalties) to check whether cadastral updates try to offset or
to complement other changes in revenue. For instance, if municipalities were
updating the cadastre to be able to exploit a good investment opportunity in
social services, we would expect them to also try to raise more revenue from
other sources. Similarly, if cadastral updates were caused by an unobserved
improvement in public administration, we would also expect to observe increases
in revenue from other local taxes.
I also check whether cadastral updates coincide with observable changes
in local political characteristics using data from elections across all levels of
government: municipal (mayor, council), departmental (governor) and national
(president, congress). I construct indicators for political competition, such as
the number of candidates for mayor, the number of parties running for council
(per seat) and the vote shares of the winning mayor, departmental governor
and president. I also construct Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration indices for
mayor, council and congress elections. I study the party affiliation of the mayor,
including whether it is different from that of the previous incumbent, whether
it is the same as that of the departmental governor and the share of council
members that belong to the mayor’s party.
I consider the possibility that update years coincide with changes in the
implementation of some national policies, such as the number of families enrolled
in the conditional cash-transfer program Familias en Accio´n and the value of
new loans made by the central government’s agricultural bank, Banco Agrario.
I also examine if cadastral updates are correlated with visits to the municipality
by President Alvaro Uribe. During his eight years in office, President Uribe
held a government meeting in a different municipality every week and these
visits led to significant policy commitments (Trib´ın, 2014). Finally, I look at
indicators on crime, illegal armed group presence and cultivation of narcotics
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to test for the possibility that conflict intensity or criminality improve around
the time of an update.
Estimates of equation (1.1) for each of the variables mentioned above are
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3. Only one of the thirty variables
considered, the number of parties participating in council elections, has a
statistically significant correlation with the timing of cadastral updating.23
Although this correlation can be explained as a result of sampling error, I
verify that the results below are robust to including this or any other variable
as a control (available upon request). Columns 3 and 4 show results from an
expanded specification that includes dummy variables for the first five years
after urban and rural updates as controls. The results are essentially unchanged,
which indicates that the point estimates are not attenuated by the very low
probability of a new update in the years right after the last one.
Although I am unable to definitely rule out that variation in unobservables
is affecting the decision to update, it is not easy to think of changes in
unobserved characteristics that would not be picked up by the observable
characteristics studied in Table 1.3. Additionally, I show below that the main
results are robust to the substitution of municipality fixed effects for the
more stringent municipality-term fixed effects, which capture any unobserved
within-municipality heterogeneity across local political terms.
One potential driver of cadastral updating is growth in the housing market.
As property values increase, municipal governments may find it more attractive
to update the cadastre in order to capture some of these higher values in
the form of property tax revenue. I test for this possibility by comparing the
implied yearly growth rates of property values of updates that occur close to
the previous one, which are unusual and more suspicious of selection, to those
that occur later.
23Sa´nchez and Pacho´n (2013) and Sa´nchez and Espan˜a (2013) report results from similar
regressions using a logit model. Although these authors find significant correlations with
transfers, income and some political characteristics, the difference is probably driven by the
lack of municipality fixed effects in those estimations.
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I first illustrate the time path of cadastral updates by regressing an update
year dummy on a full set of indicators for the number of years since the previous
update, leaving the year immediately after an update as the omitted category.
The results from this regression (which includes municipality and department-
year fixed effects) are shown in panel (a) of Figure 1.2. The probability of a
new cadastral update is very low in the five years following the last one, it then
jumps by more than thirty percentage points between the fifth and seventh
year and it rises smoothly from the eight year onwards.
Figure 1.2: Probability of cadastral updating and growth in property values
(a) Probability of Update (b) Growth in Property Values
Note: Panel (a) shows results from a regression of the cadastral update dummy on a
full set of indicators for the number of years since the previous update. The regression
includes municipality and department-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way
by municipality and department-year. Omitted category is one year after last update. Panel
(b) shows results of a cross-sectional regression including only observations with a cadastral
update. The implied growth rate in property values (based on the last update or year 2000)
is regressed on a full set of the number of years since the last update. The regression includes
department-year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by province. The omitted
category is five years after last update.
I use the total property values revealed by the cadastral updates for each
municipality to construct the implied yearly growth rate in property values.24
I then use the cross-sectional sample of cadastral updates and regress the
growth rate on the dummies for the different number of years since the previous
update, leaving the fifth year after an update as the omitted category for ease
of interpretation. The results from this regression are shown in panel (b) of
Figure 1.2. The estimates indicate that with the exception of updates occurring
one or two years after the last one, which are truly exceptional, the growth rate
24For municipalities for which I do not observe at least two updates after 2000, which is
the first year for which I have data on property values, I use the property values from 2000
as baseline.
31
in property values is not heterogeneous by the number of years since the last
update, despite the large underlying differences in the probability of updating.
In other words, a cadastral update that takes place four years after the last
one, which is very unusual and hence suspicious of selection bias, reveals the
same yearly growth rate in property values as a much more likely update that
takes place ten years after the last update.
The previous exercises suggest that municipalities have a limited ability to
manipulate the timing of cadastral updates. I now provide additional evidence
that indicates that cadastral updating is mainly determined by the supply of
updates from IGAC. The first piece of evidence comes from the pre-selection
of municipalities for cadastral updating that is done by IGAC at the start of
every year. This information is not publicly available but I had access to the
lists of municipalities prioritized by IGAC in 2011 and 2012. Matching these
lists with the actual updates that took place each year, I find that 80 % of
updaters were in IGAC’s initial list and that 68 % of those pre-selected actually
updated. These numbers indicate that although there is room for selection
into and out of updating at the margin, the bulk of updates are determined
by IGAC. Furthermore, when I estimate equation (1.1) with a dummy for
inclusion in the list as dependent variable, I find that the only robust predictors
of inclusion are the number of years since the last urban and rural updates
(results available upon request). This is consistent with IGAC’s objective of
keeping the cadastres as up-to-date as possible.
The second piece of evidence on IGAC’s authority over the timing of
cadastral updates is based on the effect that the incentives provided to IGAC
by the central government during the sample period had on the number of
updates and their type. Alvaro Uribe included as part of his official government
goals for his first term as President (2002-2006) to have the urban cadastres of
all municipalities up to date (updated in the last five years). For his second
administration (2006-2010), Uribe set as goals for IGAC to have 90 % of urban
cadastres and 70 % of rural cadastres up to date. As Figure A1 shows, these
targets were binding constraints for IGAC throughout the sample period.
Additionally to these incentives, the central government used an IDB loan to
provide funding for the cadastral updates of the urban areas of 145 municipalities
in 2007.
Figure 1.3 shows the number of updates per year and their type. The graph
indicates the president in office each year, bearing in mind once again that
there is a one-year lag in the validity of updated cadastres. The graph shows
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that the number of updates, particularly urban ones, increased dramatically
between 2004 and 2007, which coincides with the introduction of incentives for
this type of update by the first Uribe administration. After 2007, the number
of updates per year remains relatively high, but we observe a shift towards
rural updates, which coincides with the introduction of incentives for this type
of update by the second Uribe administration.
Figure 1.3: Cadastral updates per year and presidential term
Note: I assign to each administration its first full calendar year (since presidential terms always start on
August 7th) and the three following ones. Each term is then pushed back by one year to account for the fact
that updated cadastres only come into effect the 1st of January of the following year.
As a result of the increased supply of updates, 60 % of the municipalities in
the sample had a cadastral update between the years 2006 and 2010. These
are the update cohorts that I employ for the estimations below. The map in
Figure 1.4b shows that the municipalities belonging to these update cohorts
are evenly distributed throughout the country.
I further use the yearly variation in the supply of updates to look for
evidence on selection into cadastral updating. I consider the possibility that
municipalities are intentionally updating to collect more tax revenue and I
try to get a sense of the size of this selection effect by comparing the effect of
updating on tax revenue across update cohorts. This exercise is motivated by
the large variation in number and type of updates shown in Figure 1.3, which
potentially reflects large differences in the composition of the update pool. For
this purpose, I regress property tax revenue on a set of separate post-update
dummies for each cohort between 2002 and 2011 (including municipality and
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department-year fixed effects). The results, shown in Figure 1.5, indicate that
cadastral updating leads to a 25 % increase in property tax revenue, with the
return being very homogeneous across cohorts. More specifically, I am unable
to reject the null hypothesis that the return in tax revenue is the same for all
cohorts between 2002 and 2011, despite the large differences in the number and
type of updates across cohorts illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Taken together, the available evidence indicates that municipalities have a
limited ability to manipulate the timing of the cadastral updates and that this
timing is mainly driven by the supply from IGAC. However, municipalities have
discretion over how much taxes to collect. Autonomy over tax collection could
be a problem if, for instance, only the municipalities with good investment
opportunities collect more taxes after a cadastral update. Figure 1.5 already
suggests that municipal governments do not enjoy large discretion over tax
collection conditional on updating the cadastre. I provide additional evidence on
the limited ability of municipalities to manipulate statutory tax rates using data
from Iregui et al. (2003) for 211 municipalities between 1999 and 2002. I regress
the statutory property tax rate on a dummy for the years after a cadastral
update, including municipality and year fixed effects. The estimates in Table A2
are very small and statistically insignificant, indicating that municipalities do
not adjust statutory rates in response to cadastral updates.25 Finally, in Figure
1.6 I plot the average change in property tax revenue after a cadastral update
for the 2006-2010 update cohorts (relative to the year before the update). The
graph shows that the number of “compliers” is fairly large, as roughly 75 % of
updates lead to an increase in property tax revenue.
25Sa´nchez and Espan˜a (2013) provide additional evidence from interviews with public
officials from several Colombian municipalities on the stickiness of statutory property tax
rates.
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Figure 1.5: Cadastral updating and property tax revenue
The graph shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for a regression of ln property tax revenue
per capita (2004 COP) on a set of dummies equal to one from year t onward if the municipality has a
cadastral update on year t, weighted by the share of the cadastre that was updated (depending on whether
the update was urban, rural or both). I use property values from 2000 to determine the shares. The regression
includes municipality and department-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way by municipality
and department-year.
Figure 1.6: Change in property tax revenue after a cadastral update
The graph shows the histogram for the difference between the average property tax revenue collected after
a cadastral update and the amount for the year before the update. Top and bottom 1 % removed for ease
of visualization. Property tax revenue in 2004 COP per capita. Update cohorts from 2006 to 2010. Pre-year
corresponds to the first one in the case of multiple updates.
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Oil Price Shocks and Natural Resource Royalties
The second part of the identification strategy exploits plausibly exogenous
variation in the world price of oil, the heterogeneous distribution of this resource
across Colombian municipalities and the royalty allocation formula discussed in
the background section.26 In this case, identification is based on two assumptions.
The first one is that the world price of oil is exogenous to local conditions in
Colombian municipalities. This is a plausible assumption because Colombia
is a relatively small exporter of oil. According to the US Energy Information
Administration, Colombia is the 18th largest exporter of oil with less than 1 %
of world exports.
As a measure of oil abundance I use the average amount of oil royalties
received by the municipality between 2000 and 2004 (royaltiesoili,00−04). I use
this five-year average to address potential concerns related to regression to the
mean in oil royalties. The second assumption necessary for identification is
that any systematic differences between municipalities with different levels of
oil abundance are time-invariant and thus captured by the municipality fixed
effects.
By interacting the average 2000-2004 oil royalties with the world oil price
index for a given year I obtain an indicator of predicted royalties if oil output
stays at the average pre-sample period level and the only variation is that
coming from world price fluctuations. The variation resulting from oil discoveries,
for example, is not exploited by this research design. What I exploit is the
differential impact of variation in the price of oil in municipalities with varying
levels of average oil extraction in the previous years.
Figure 1.7a provides an illustration of the identification strategy for royalties.
The black line in the graph corresponds to the world oil price index (right axis).
The price of oil increased up to 2008, crashed in 2009 as a result of the global
financial crisis and recovered in the last two years of the sample period. The
figure also shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals (left axis) from
the following regression:
royaltiesi,j,t = αi + δj,t +
∑2011
k=2006 βk [D(year = k)t ×D(oil royalties > 0)i,00−04] + i,j,t
(1.2)
where the dependent variable is royalties per capita in municipality i from
department j in year t. αi and δj,t are municipality and department-year fixed
26This type of difference-in-differences methodology has been widely used in recent studies
on Colombia. See, for example, Dube and Vargas (2013); Carreri and Dube (2015); Santos
(2014); Idrobo et al. (2014).
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effects, respectively. The coefficients of interest βk capture the average yearly
royalties among the set of oil-rich municipalities (positive oil royalties between
2000 and 2004) relative to 2005, which is the omitted year. The graph shows
that royalties in these oil-producing municipalities track the yearly variation in
the price of oil: higher oil prices lead to more royalties. The results also illustrate
the large amount of revenue provided by oil royalties to these municipalities.
For example, when the price of oil was at its peak in 2008, the average oil-rich
municipality received 100,000 COP per capita of royalties above of what it
had received in 2005. This corresponds to 20 % of the total yearly revenue per
capita of the average municipality in the sample, according to Table 1.2.
The map in Figure 1.4a shows sextiles of the distribution of (positive)
average oil royalties between 2000 and 2004. Even though oil royalties are
geographically clustered in areas where there is oil, there is still substantial
within-region variation in oil intensity. The inclusion of department-year fixed
effects in all regressions ensures that I only exploit within-department variation
in oil intensity. A comparison with the map in Figure 1.4b additionally shows
that there is substantial overlap between oil-royalty recipients and municipalities
with a cadastral update. This allows me to verify that any differential effects
across sources of revenue are not driven by systematic differences in the use of
revenue across municipalities irrespective of the source.
Reduced Form and Instrumental Variables Specifications
In what follows I use two main specifications. I show reduced-form effects
of cadastral updating and predicted oil royalties using the following model:
yi,j,t = αi + δj,t + γTD(post-update)i,t + γR
[
priceoilt × royaltiesoili,00−04
]
+ i,j,t
(1.3)
where yi,j,t is an outcome of interest and αi and δj,t are municipality and
department-year fixed effects, respectively. The standard errors are clustered
two-way by municipality and department-year following Cameron et al. (2011).
I estimate the effects of tax revenue and royalties on the outcomes of interest
using an instrumental variables model:
yi,j,t = αi + δj,t + βT ̂property tax revenuei,t + βR ̂natural resource royaltiesi,t + ui,j,t
(1.4)
where the cadastral update dummy and the predicted oil royalties are used as
instruments for tax revenue and natural resource royalties, respectively.
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Figure 1.7: Medium-run impact of oil price shocks
(a) Royalties (b) Expenditure
(c) Educational enrolment (d) Infant mortality
(e) Health insurance (f) Water quality
Note: Each graph shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals from a regression
of the variable in the caption on a set of year interactions (2006-2011) with a dummy for
municipalities with positive oil royalties between 2000 and 2004. The sample period is 2005-
2011. All regressions include municipality and department-year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by province. In panel (a), the dark line shows the oil price index (2004=1),
constructed with the average petroleum spot price (IMF/IFS), the exchange rate from Banco
de la Repu´blica and the Consumer Price Index from DANE.
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To account for the fact that there may be a lag in the expenditure of royalties,
I also show estimates of modified versions of equations 1.3 and 1.4 that include
cumulative royalties (
∑t
k=2006 royaltiesi,k) instead of its contemporary value.
This is a more flexible specification as it allows for the effect of royalties to
manifest at a later date than when they are collected. Since the municipality
fixed effect absorbs all royalties up to 2005, the cumulative is actually a partial
one since 2005. As an instrument for cumulative royalties I use the cumulative
of predicted royalties:
∑t
k=2006 royalties
oil
i,00−04 × priceoilk .
Table 1.4 shows the results from the first-stage regressions. Column 1 shows
that cadastral updating leads on average to an increase of 6,000 COP per capita
in property tax revenue. Column 2 shows that a one COP per capita increase
in predicted oil royalties leads to a 0.85 COP per capita increase in royalties.
The results for cumulative royalties, shown in column 3, are very similar. One
extra peso of predicted cumulative royalties leads to 0.8 extra pesos of actual
cumulative royalties. The three estimates are statistically different from zero at
the 1 % level.
Table 1.4: First-stage results
(1) (2) (3)
Property Royalties Royalties
VARIABLES Tax (cumulative)
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.629***
[0.126]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt 0.851***
[0.184]∑t
k=2006 royalties
oil
i,00−04 × priceoilk 0.806***
[0.0584]
Dependent variable mean 2.075 5.449 34.233
- if oil-royalty recipient (00-04) - 24.861 166.768
Observations 6,704 6,704 6,704
Number of municipalities 969 969 969
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004
COP per capita. All regressions include municipality and department-year fixed effects.
Sample period: 2005-2011. Standard errors clustered two-way by municipality and
department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.4. Results on Public Good Provision
1.4.1. Main Results
Table 1.5 shows the main results of the chapter. Panel A shows reduced-form
estimates of the effect of the instruments on the outcomes of interest. The
dependent variable is specified in the header of each column. Columns 1-4
look at the continuous variables (in logs), while columns 5-8 look at dummy
variables for the achievement of the targets from Table 1.1. Panel B shows the
corresponding IV estimates.
The results in columns 1-4 of panel A indicate that cadastral updating leads
to a 0.8 % increase in educational enrolment and to a 12 % increase in water
quality, with both effects statistically significant at the 5 % level. The effect
on the percentage of the poor with subsidized health insurance is also positive
(1.2 % increase), but not statistically significant. In the case of infant mortality,
the point estimate for tax revenue is positive, but the effect is very small and
statistically insignificant. The results in the second row show that a 10,000
COP per capita increase in predicted royalties leads to a 1 % increase in the
water quality index. This effect is significant at the 10 % level. The estimates
for the other indicators are all very small and statistically insignificant.
According to the IV estimates in columns 1-4 of panel B, which scale the
reduced-form estimates by the corresponding change in revenue, a $10,000
COP per capita increase in property tax revenue leads to a 1.4 % increase in
educational enrolment and to a 14 % increase in the water quality index. These
effects are larger than those of an equivalent increase in royalties by more than
one order of magnitude and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 %
and 10 % levels, respectively. The results for subsidized health insurance point
in the same direction but the difference is not statistically significant. Overall,
there is no evidence that natural resource royalties have a positive effect on
any of the outcomes.
41
T
a
b
le
1
.5
:
S
ou
rc
es
of
re
ve
n
u
e
an
d
p
u
b
li
c
go
o
d
p
ro
v
is
io
n
n
at
u
ra
l
lo
g
[c
ol
u
m
n
s
1-
4]
D
(t
ar
ge
t
ac
h
ie
ve
m
en
t)
[c
ol
u
m
n
s
5-
8]
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
al
In
fa
n
t
H
ea
lt
h
W
at
er
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
al
In
fa
n
t
H
ea
lt
h
W
at
er
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
en
ro
lm
en
t
m
or
ta
li
ty
in
su
ra
n
ce
q
u
al
it
y
en
ro
lm
en
t
m
or
ta
li
ty
in
su
ra
n
ce
q
u
al
it
y
P
A
N
E
L
A
:
R
E
D
U
C
E
D
F
O
R
M
D
(p
os
t-
ca
d
as
tr
al
-u
p
d
at
e)
i,
t
0.
00
88
6*
**
0.
00
29
5
0.
01
20
0.
12
3*
*
0.
01
33
-0
.0
00
55
7
0.
03
13
*
0.
07
60
**
*
[0
.0
03
34
]
[0
.0
02
10
]
[0
.0
08
50
]
[0
.0
56
0]
[0
.0
13
4]
[0
.0
10
9]
[0
.0
17
4]
[0
.0
21
9]
ro
ya
lt
ie
so
il
i,
0
0
−0
4
×
p
ri
ce
o
il
t
0.
00
01
19
1.
87
e-
05
-0
.0
00
41
9
0.
01
12
*
0.
00
13
6*
7.
26
e-
05
-0
.0
01
78
0.
00
27
5
[0
.0
00
10
1]
[2
.2
7e
-0
5]
[0
.0
00
75
1]
[0
.0
06
26
]
[0
.0
00
82
0]
[7
.7
5e
-0
5]
[0
.0
01
42
]
[0
.0
03
56
]
P
A
N
E
L
B
:
IV
p
ro
p
er
ty
ta
x
re
ve
n
u
e i
,t
0.
01
42
**
0.
00
47
2
0.
01
89
0.
14
5*
0.
02
20
-0
.0
00
85
5
0.
04
91
*
0.
08
97
**
*
[0
.0
06
16
]
[0
.0
03
57
]
[0
.0
13
6]
[0
.0
77
8]
[0
.0
20
9]
[0
.0
17
4]
[0
.0
28
8]
[0
.0
28
5]
n
at
u
ra
l
re
so
u
rc
e
ro
ya
lt
ie
s i
,t
0.
00
02
31
5.
23
e-
05
-0
.0
00
37
2
0.
01
13
0.
00
17
5
7.
99
e-
05
-0
.0
01
77
0.
00
31
7
[0
.0
00
16
2]
[3
.9
3e
-0
5]
[0
.0
00
85
1]
[0
.0
08
05
]
[0
.0
01
18
]
[0
.0
00
16
4]
[0
.0
01
89
]
[0
.0
03
76
]
1s
t
st
ag
e
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
14
.6
04
14
.6
04
14
.6
04
8.
12
6
14
.6
04
14
.6
04
14
.6
04
8.
12
6
p
-v
al
u
e
H
0:
ta
x
=
ro
ya
lt
ie
s
0.
02
2
0.
18
7
0.
15
6
0.
08
6
0.
32
5
0.
95
7
0.
07
4
0.
00
02
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
m
ea
n
in
20
05
(l
ev
el
)
86
.1
24
.2
74
.3
30
.5
0.
15
0.
16
0.
15
0.
18
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
6,
70
4
6,
70
4
6,
70
4
4,
46
7
6,
70
4
6,
70
4
6,
70
4
4,
46
7
N
u
m
b
er
of
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s
96
9
96
9
96
9
93
7
96
9
96
9
96
9
93
7
N
ot
es
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
e
h
ea
d
er
:
in
co
lu
m
n
s
1-
4
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
in
n
at
u
ra
l
lo
g,
w
h
il
e
in
co
lu
m
n
s
5-
8
it
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
ta
rg
et
ac
h
ie
ve
m
en
t.
M
on
ey
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
te
n
s
of
th
ou
sa
n
d
s
of
20
04
C
O
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a.
In
p
an
el
B
,
D
(p
os
t-
ca
d
as
tr
al
-u
p
d
at
e)
an
d
ro
ya
lt
ie
so
il
i,
0
0
−
0
4
×
p
ri
ce
o
il
t
ar
e
u
se
d
as
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
fo
r
p
ro
p
er
ty
ta
x
re
v
en
u
e
a
n
d
n
a
tu
ra
l
re
so
u
rc
e
ro
y
a
lt
ie
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
-t
er
m
a
n
d
d
ep
a
rt
m
en
t-
y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
(s
a
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
:
2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
1
,
ex
ce
p
t
co
lu
m
n
4
:
2
00
7
-2
01
1
).
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
tw
o
-w
ay
b
y
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
an
d
d
ep
a
rt
m
en
t-
ye
a
r.
**
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
**
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
42
The results on target achievement in columns 5-8 of Table 1.5 paint a similar
picture. The reduced-form estimates in panel A indicate that a cadastral update
increases the probability of having universal coverage of poor population with
subsidized health insurance by 3 percentage points. This is a relatively large
effect, given that only 15 % of municipalities met this target in 2005, and it
is also statistically significant at the 10 % level. Column 4 additionally shows
that a cadastral update leads to an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the
probability that water in the municipality is suitable for human consumption.
The IV results in panel B indicate that these positive effects of tax revenue on
target achievement in the areas of health and water are significantly different
from those of natural resource royalties at the 10 % and 1 % levels, respectively.
None of the point estimates for royalties in panel B are statistically different
from zero and they are all very small.
These results indicate that locally-raised property tax revenue has a positive
effect on public service provision in the areas of education, health and water.
I find a positive effect of property tax revenue on educational enrolment but
not on the probability of full enrolment, which indicates that the increases
in enrolment are taking place in municipalities farther away from the target.
Property tax revenue has a positive effect on the percentage of poor population
with subsidized health insurance and on the probability of universal coverage,
but the estimate is only statistically significant for the latter. This suggests
that the increases in coverage are coming from municipalities that are close to
meeting the target. The lack of an effect on infant mortality should not surprise
us, as this is a complex indicator that only partially depends on the supply of
health services by public authorities. For instance, only 1 % of deaths during
the first five months of life in 2001 were due to diseases preventable through
vaccination (MPS, 2005).
The reported effects of property tax revenue on public goods are at least ten
times larger than and statistically different from those of an equivalent increase
in royalties from the extraction of natural resources. These differences are
particularly striking as natural resource royalties are earmarked for expenditure
on the specific set of public goods that I study. Despite the resulting bias in
favour of royalties, I find no robust evidence of an effect on the indicators of
public service provision.
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1.4.2. Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In this section I explore several alternative explanations for the previous
findings. The first one is that the effect of revenue on public goods is different
in municipalities that update the cadastre and in those that receive natural
resource royalties, irrespective of the source. To address this possibility, in
Table 1.6 I explore whether the reduced-form effect of cadastral updating is
heterogeneous by average 2000-2004 oil royalties. I find no evidence of such a
heterogeneity. In all specifications the point estimates for the interaction between
cadastral updating and oil intensity are very small and never statistically
different from zero. Furthermore, I can reject the null hypothesis that cadastral
updating has no effect on educational enrolment, water quality and subsidized
health insurance for the poor at the median and mean levels of positive oil
royalties.
Table 1.6: The effect of cadastral updates in oil-royalty recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educational Infant Health Water
VARIABLES enrolment mortality insurance quality
PANEL A: NATURAL LOG
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.00897*** 0.00318 0.0127 0.122**
[0.00333] [0.00211] [0.00863] [0.0558]
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t × royaltiesoili,00−04 -4.48e-05 -7.61e-05 -0.000185 -0.00140
[0.00109] [0.000873] [0.00284] [0.0312]
p-value H0: effect for median non-zero oil royalties=0 0.009 0.174 0.163 0.040
p-value H0: effect for mean non-zero oil royalties=0 0.021 0.375 0.259 0.126
PANEL B: D(TARGET ACHIEVEMENT)
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.0149 -0.000777 0.0309* 0.0751***
[0.0133] [0.0110] [0.0174] [0.0221]
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t × royaltiesoili,00−04 -0.000611 6.54e-05 0.000257 -0.000145
[0.000837] [0.000111] [0.000515] [0.00113]
p-value H0: effect for median non-zero oil royalties=0 0.365 0.964 0.064 0.001
p-value H0: effect for mean non-zero oil royalties=0 0.792 0.978 0.057 0.008
Observations 6,704 6,704 6,704 4,467
Number of municipalities 969 969 969 937
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. The mean of non-zero 2000-2004 average oil royalties is 16.45, the median is 4.39
(tens of thousands of 2004 COP). All regressions include municipality and department-year fixed effects (sample period:
2005-2011 except column 4: 2007-2011). Standard errors clustered two-way by municipality and department-year. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I explore the possibility that the results on cadastral updates are driven
by unobservable changes in local government by checking whether the results
are robust to the inclusion of municipality-term fixed effects. The results in
Table A4 show that even with this more stringent specification there is still
a statistically significant difference between the two sources of revenue for
44
educational enrolment and for the probability of having water suitable for
human consumption.
I also consider the possibility that the extremely low return of natural
resource royalties is specific to royalties from the extraction of oil. I use data
on the royalties from the extraction of coal in 2004 and on the world price of
this resource to construct an indicator of predicted coal royalties. Table A7
shows estimates of equations (1.3) and (1.4) for coal royalties. The results are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones for oil.
Another alternative explanation is that the effect of natural resource royalties
takes more time to materialize than the effect of tax revenue. One reason why
this might happen is if royalties are not spent in the same year in which they
are received. Another reason is if royalties are spent on large-scale projects
that require more time to be completed. This latter explanation seems feasible
given the large amount of revenue that royalties represent.
Cumulative royalties allow for a lag in the effect of revenue from this source
and thus provide a solution to the problem. Table A3 replicates the analysis from
Table 1.5 using cumulative royalties instead of their contemporary value. The
results on tax revenue are unchanged while the results on royalties deteriorate
significantly. The IV estimates in panel B indicate that cumulative royalties
lead to a worsening of all the outcomes considered, except infant mortality, and
the point estimates are statistically significant in the cases of subsidized health
insurance and water quality.
I provide additional evidence against the higher return of royalties in the
medium run based on regressions similar to equation (1.2), but using the
outcomes of interest as dependent variables. The results are shown in panels (c)-
(f) of Figure 1.7. As already discussed, panel (a) shows that these oil-endowed
municipalities never receive less royalties than in 2005, and actually receive
more between 2006 and 2008. Panel (b) shows that they never spend less than
in 2005, but they do spend significantly more in 2006 and 2007. However, the
results in panels (c)-(f) are consistent with the previous findings: despite the
extra revenue and the extra expenditure there is no observable improvement
for any indicator. If anything, they seem to worsen.
I turn next to the possibility that changes in the price of oil may affect the
outcomes of interest in the municipalities where oil is extracted through other
channels besides royalties. As mentioned above, the research design only uses
variation in royalties from municipalities where oil was already being extracted
in the period 2000-2004, so the results cannot be explained by the structural
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transformation associated with oil discoveries (Michaels, 2011). Nevertheless,
panel A of Table 1.7 shows that contemporary oil-price shocks are positively
correlated with activity by the guerrilla group FARC and they are negatively
correlated with the homicide rate. These two correlations suggest that FARC
may be exercising control over other criminal activities. The results in panel
B show that cumulative royalties, on the other hand, are positively correlated
with population and with business tax revenue, which has been used before
as a proxy for municipal GDP (Sa´nchez and Nu´n˜ez, 2000). These results
are consistent with the idea that a series of positive oil-price shocks lead to
an economic boom in the municipality and that better economic conditions
generate immigration.27
Table 1.7: Additional effects of oil price shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Business Murder FARC
VARIABLES population tax rate events
PANEL A: REDUCED FORM (t)
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt -8.76e-06 0.0268 -0.146** 0.0277***
[8.93e-05] [0.0226] [0.0664] [0.00669]
PANEL B: REDUCED FORM (cumulative)∑t
k=2006 royalties
oil
i,00−04 × priceoilk 6.42e-05*** 0.00943*** -0.00354 0.00143
[1.53e-05] [0.00261] [0.0122] [0.00134]
Observations 6,704 6,704 6,704 5,743
Number of municipalities 969 969 969 966
Dependent var. mean 30,026.40 1.60 33.87 1.37
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004 COP
per capita. All regressions include municipality and department-year fixed effects (sample period:
2005-2011, except column 4: 2005-2010). Standard errors clustered two-way by municipality and
department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results in Table 1.7 suggest that increased population and armed group
presence at the time of higher oil prices may be biasing the estimates for
royalties from the previous section. I provide a first piece of evidence against
this alternative explanation by showing that the results are unaffected by the
inclusion of the variables from Table 1.7 as controls. Figure 1.8 shows point
estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for royalties from equation 1.3, next to
27Several previous studies have exploited commodity-price shocks as a source of variation
in local income (Miller and Urdinola, 2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2013a;
Asher and Novosad, 2014).
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the ones from an enlarged specification that includes controls for population
(natural log), business tax revenue, murder rate and FARC activity. The figure
shows that the estimates are remarkably robust to the inclusion of these control
variables. Although they are ‘bad controls’ in the sense of Angrist and Pischke
(2009), the robustness of the estimates indicates that these variables are not
driving the estimated effects.
I further explore the violations of the exclusion restriction for royalties by
looking at the cross-sectional variation in oil intensity, measured again as average
oil royalties between 2000 and 2004. Figure 1.9 shows yearly average total
revenue (panel A) and royalties (panel B) for each quartile of the distribution
of average positive 2000-2004 royalties, as well as for municipalities that did
not receive oil royalties in this period. The takeaway from these graphs is that
municipalities in the top quartile are much richer than all other municipalities
and that this extra revenue is clearly coming from natural resource royalties.
Municipalities in the third quartile, on the other hand, appear to be much more
comparable to the rest of the country.
In Table A5 I look at the effect of oil price shocks separately for municipalities
in the third and fourth quartiles. Column 1 of the different panels shows a
positive effect of predicted royalties on actual royalties (contemporary and
cumulative) for both quartiles. This is confirmed by panel (a) in Figure A2,
which shows results from separate estimations of equation (1.3) for each of the
top two quartiles. However, columns 2-5 provide evidence of heterogeneous
non-fiscal effects across these quartiles. The correlation with business tax
revenue and FARC activity is only present for the top quartile and the effect
on population is much stronger for this group of municipalities. Overall, the
non-fiscal effects of oil-price shocks appear to be much weaker in municipalities
belonging to the third quartile. However, the results in columns 6-9 provide no
robust evidence of a reduced-form effect on the outcomes of interest in either
quartile. The yearly averages for each outcome shown in panels (c)-(f) of Figure
A2 point in the same direction: municipalities in the third quartile of the oil
intensity distribution receive more royalties when the price of oil is high but
show no improvement in public service provision despite the weaker non-fiscal
effects.
I next exploit the geographic concentration of FARC activity to better
understand the extent to which illegal armed group presence may be driving
the very low impact of natural resource royalties on the outcomes of interest. I
calculate for each municipality the average number of FARC events per capita
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Figure 1.8: Impact of royalties with and without controls
(a) Educational enrolment (t) (b) Educational enrolment (cum.)
(c) Infant mortality (t) (d) Infant mortality (cum.)
(e) Health insurance (t) (f) Health insurance (cum.)
(g) Water quality (t) (h) Water quality (cum.)
Note: Each graph shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals from a regression of
the variable in the caption on natural resource royalties (tens of thousands of 2004 COP per
capita). Panels on the left show IV results for contemporary royalties, where the instrumental
variable is royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt . Panels on the right show the results for cumulative
royalties, instrumented using
∑t
k=2006 royalties
oil
i,00−04×priceoilk . All regressions use data from
the period 2005-2010 and they all include municipality and department-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered two-way by municipality and department-year.
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Figure 1.9: Total revenue and royalties by oil intensity
(a) Total revenue (b) Natural resource royalties
Note: The figures shows yearly averages of total revenue (panel A) and royalties (panel
B) for each quartile of the 2000-2004 positive oil royalties distribution. It also shows this
information for municipalities with no oil royalties between 2000 and 2004. All money values
in tens of thousands of 2004 COP per capita.
between 2005 and 2010, the last year for which data is available, and I estimate
an expanded version of equation (1.3) that includes the interaction between
the predicted royalties measure and this time-invariant indicator of FARC
activity.28 The results are shown in Table A6 of the appendix. Column 1 shows
that additional predicted royalties lead to more actual royalties, irrespective
of FARC presence. Columns 2-5 look at the main outcomes of interest. The
results provide two main lessons. First, there is evidence that FARC presence
attenuates the impact of additional predicted royalties on educational enrolment
and water quality in columns 2 and 5. Secondly, the estimates in the second
row of each panel indicate that even in those municipalities that receive oil
royalties but that did not have any FARC presence during the sample period
(roughly 1/3) the effect of additional predicted royalties remains very close
to zero and is always at least one order of magnitude smaller than that of a
cadastral update.
The final alternative explanation that I consider is that the results are
driven by differences in the variability of revenue across the two sources. After
all, cadastral updates lead to a stable increase in tax revenue while oil price
shocks lead to unpredictable and potentially large variation in oil royalties. The
higher variance of royalties may induce local governments to be more prudent
in the way they spend these occasional resource windfalls. If this is the case,
we should observe that the propensity to spend the marginal peso of royalties
28As before, this is most likely a ‘bad control’, so my main interest is the robustness of
the estimates of the parameters of interest to its inclusion.
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is smaller than the propensity to spend the marginal peso of taxes.
Panel A in Table 1.8 shows results from estimating equation 1.4 using total
expenditure per capita as dependent variable. I introduce a one-year lag in
royalties to account for the delay in expenditure. Separate regressions for each
source of revenue in columns 1 and 2 reveal that one extra COP of tax revenue
leads to approximately 1.3 extra COP of expenditure, while one extra COP of
royalties leads to 0.6 extra COP of expenditure. Although the point estimate
for tax revenue is more than twice as large as that for royalties, the standard
errors are quite large and I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are equal to 1. The results are similar if I look at both sources in the same
regression: even though the point estimate for tax revenue increases to 1.8,
which is three times the propensity to spend royalties, I still fail to reject the
null that the coefficients are both equal to 1. Even with this larger difference,
it would take some very high returns to scale in expenditure for total spending
patterns to explain the results on public goods. Furthermore, column 4 shows
that by using cumulative royalties instead, which impose less structure on the
timing of expenditure than the lag, the coefficient for royalties rises to 1.2. This
coefficient is much closer to the estimates for tax revenue and is, once again,
not statistically different from 1.
Panels B and C replicate the previous analysis for the two main sub-
categories of expenditure, operating expenses and investment (gross fixed
capital formation, more specifically). The estimates for investment in panel
B are very similar to the ones for total expenditure and I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the propensity to invest out of both sources is the same
and is equal to 1. The point estimates for operating costs in panel C are much
smaller and still statistically equivalent across sources. Taken together, these
results indicate that tax revenue and royalties are almost exclusively spent on
infrastructure investment. They also suggest that revenue from neither source
is being systematically employed for patronage and job creation, as this would
be reflected in higher wages and higher operating costs.
The similar spending patterns of tax revenue and natural resource royalties,
together with the heterogeneous effects of revenue from these two sources on
public service provision, suggest that the unobservable quality of spending
might be higher for projects financed with tax revenue than for those funded
through natural resource royalties. I use data on two indicators of educational
infrastructure provided by the Ministry of Education, the number of schools
and the teaching area (sq. metres), to provide evidence on the heterogeneous
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Table 1.8: Sources of revenue and public expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contemporary expenditure Expenditure
VARIABLES (cumulative)
PANEL A: TOTAL EXPENDITURE
property tax revenuei,t 1.335 1.779
[2.266] [2.014]
natural resource royaltiesi,t−1 0.629 0.646
[0.529] [0.544]
natural resource royalties (cum.)i,t 1.179***
[0.117]
p-value H0: coefficient = 1 0.882 0.482 0.127
p-value H0: tax=royalties = 1 0.645
PANEL B: INVESTMENT
property tax revenuei,t 1.165 1.593
[2.172] [1.924]
natural resource royaltiesi,t−1 0.608 0.623
[0.516] [0.530]
natural resource royalties (cum.)i,t 1.125***
[0.113]
p-value H0: coefficient = 1 0.939 0.447 0.272
p-value H0: tax=royalties = 1 0.647
PANEL C: OPERATING EXPENSES
property tax revenuei,t 0.157 0.174
[0.252] [0.254]
natural resource royaltiesi,t−1 0.0229 0.0246
[0.0206] [0.0218]
natural resource royalties (cum.)i,t 0.0535***
[0.00639]
p-value H0: coefficient = 1 0.001 0.000 0.000
p-value H0: tax=royalties = 1 0.000
Observations 6,704 6,704 6,704 6,704
Number of municipalities 969 969 969 969
1st stage F-statistic 23.999 22.725 14.047 184.161
Notes: Dependent variable is total expenditure per capita in panel A, investment in panel
B and operating expenses in panel C. Contemporary values of expenditure in columns 1-3,
cumulative in column 4. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004 COP per capita.
All regressions include municipality and department-year fixed effects. The instrument for
lagged royalties is royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt−1 (columns 2,3), and for cumulative royalties it
is
∑t
k=2006 royalties
oil
i,00−04 × priceoilk (column 4). D(post-cadastral-update) is the instrument
for property tax revenue. Sample period: 2005-2011. Standard errors clustered two-way by
municipality and department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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returns to investment across sources of revenue.
Table 1.9 shows estimates of equations (1.3) and (1.4) using these two
indicators (and their normalized version by population) as dependent variables.
The results in column 1 show that a 10,000 COP increase in property tax
revenue leads to 1.4 more schools in the municipality, while an equivalent
increase in natural resource royalties leads to a negligible 0.007 increase. The
difference between the two IV coefficients is statistically significant at the
10 % level. Similarly, the estimates in column 3 indicate that the effect of
tax revenue on teaching area is much larger than that of natural resource
royalties, although the difference is not statistically significant. There is also
no statistically significant difference for the population-adjusted indicators
in columns 2 and 4, which suggests that the improvements in educational
infrastructure brought about by additional tax revenue are not proportional to
population.
Table 1.9: Sources of revenue and educational infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Schools Schools Teaching area Teaching area
VARIABLES per 10,000 inh. per 10,000 inh.
PANEL A: REDUCED FORM
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.904** 0.198 995.3 74.22
[0.439] [0.147] [1,133] [236.9]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt -0.00184 0.00156 53.91 61.64
[0.00509] [0.00143] [56.12] [65.63]
PANEL B: IV
property tax revenuei,t 1.44* 0.317 1,210 166.2
[0.744] [0.252] [1,332] [282.1]
natural resource royaltiesi,t 0.00710 0.00387 69.28 77.21
[0.0106] [0.00364] [63.81] [66.75]
1st stage F-statistic 14.604 14.604 5.944 5.944
p-value H0:tax=royalties 0.051 0.210 0.393 0.747
Observations 6,704 6,704 3,882 3,882
Number of municipalities 969 969 871 871
Dependent variable mean 47.69 27.93 10,010.2 4,852.09
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004 COP per capita. In
panel B, D(post-cadastral-update) and royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt are used as instruments for property tax
revenue and natural resource royalties, respectively. All regressions include municipality and department-
year fixed effects. Sample period: 2005-2011 (columns 1 and 2), 2006-2011 (columns 3 and 4). Standard
errors clustered two-way by municipality and department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.5. Evidence from Disciplinary Prosecutions
In this section I provide evidence on the heterogeneous effect of increases in
tax revenue and natural resource royalties on the disciplinary prosecution of
local public officials. All else equal, more prosecutions imply more misbehavior,
so I take this as proxy evidence on the heterogeneous responses of local public
officials to increases in revenue from the two sources.
The watchdog agency Procuradur´ıa General de la Nacio´n (PGN) oversees
public employees’ compliance with a general disciplinary code. This includes
local public officials, such as the mayor, top members of staff (e.g. secretary of
education) and municipal council members. PGN may start an investigation
based on news reports, tip-offs, audit results and reports from other government
agencies such as the fiscal watchdog Contralor´ıa General de la Repu´blica (CGR).
PGN can hand out sanctions ranging from fines and short suspensions for small
offences to the removal from office and a ban from future public employment and
public office. These latter sanctions are reserved for serious offences, including
gross mismanagement of public funds, corruption and violations of procurement
and contracting laws.
I collected a new dataset on disciplinary prosecutions by PGN using publicly
available news reports from the agency’s website for the years 2004-2015.29
For each case, I recorded the names of the accused, their roles in the public
administration, the nature of the charges, the timing of the events, the stage
of the process and the outcome. Based on these characteristics I was able to
link multiple reports related to the same case. I have data on 1381 cases taking
place in 516 municipalities.
I construct a series of indicators at the municipality-term level based on the
disaggregate prosecution data and I estimate modified versions of equations
(1.3) and (1.4). I use these broader time periods because it is not always possible
to pin down the specific year in which the alleged misconduct took place. To
increase the sample size, I use data from the local political periods 2001-2003,
2004-2007 and 2008-2011. I use oil royalties in 2000 from Ecopetrol as the
cross-sectional indicator of oil intensity to construct the predicted royalties
and I also substitute the post-update dummy for the cumulative number of
cadastral updates.
The reduced-form estimates in panel A of Table 1.10 and the corresponding
IV estimates in panel B indicate that higher natural resource royalties lead
29http://www.procuraduria.gov.co
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to an increase in the probability that the mayor and top members of staff are
prosecuted, found guilty and removed from office. According to columns 1-3
in panel B, a 10,000 COP increase in royalties increases the probability that
the local mayor is prosecuted (1 pp. increase), found guilty (0.8 pp. increase)
and removed from office (0.5 pp. increase). These are not negligible effects
given that 19 % of mayors are prosecuted, 14 % are found guilty and 8 % are
removed from office. They are also statistically significant at conventional levels.
The results for top members of staff in columns 4-6 are qualitatively similar.
Additional tax revenue, on the other hand, appears to have a negative effect
on the likelihood of these events, although the estimates are very imprecisely
estimated and I fail to reject the hypothesis that the effect of tax revenue is
the same as that of natural resource royalties.
Table 1.10: Sources of revenue and disciplinary processes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Mayor D(Mayor D(Mayor D(Top staff D(Top staff D(Top staff
VARIABLES prosecuted) guilty) discharged) prosecuted) guilty) discharged)
PANEL A: REDUCED FORM
number of updates -0.000634 -0.00253 -0.00707 0.00512 -0.00247 -0.00883
[0.0370] [0.0336] [0.0258] [0.0232] [0.0178] [0.0148]
royaltiesi,2000 × priceoili,t 0.0254** 0.0220* 0.0144** 0.0151*** 0.00971 0.0109
[0.0116] [0.0119] [0.00699] [0.00576] [0.00597] [0.00663]
PANEL B: IV
total property tax revenue -0.0110 -0.0156 -0.0267 0.0102 -0.0110 -0.0309
[0.115] [0.104] [0.0789] [0.0710] [0.0544] [0.0446]
total royalties 0.0103** 0.00895* 0.00584** 0.00616*** 0.00394* 0.00439*
[0.00511] [0.00516] [0.00260] [0.00185] [0.00221] [0.00227]
p-value H0:tax=royalties 0.853 0.815 0.678 0.955 0.785 0.432
Observations 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888
Number of municipalities 964 964 964 964 964 964
Dependent variable mean 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. The dependent variables are dummies indicating if a disciplinary process involving the
official was opened, whether the official was found guilty and whether the official was discharged from office. Columns 1-3 look at
mayors, while columns 4-6 look at top executive staff. Panel A shows reduced form results, while panel B shows IV estimates,
where predicted royalties (oil royalties in 2000 x oil price index) and the cumulative number of cadastral updates (weighted by
share of cadastre updated) are used as instruments for total royalties and total property tax revenue (Hundreds of thousands
of 2004 COP per capita). The first stage F-statistic is 16.35. All regressions include municipality and department-term fixed
effects (2004-2007, 2008-2011). Robust standard errors clustered by municipality and department-term in brackets. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The findings in columns 3 and 6 are very telling, as they indicate that the
offences for which local public officials are prosecuted during periods of high
royalties are serious ones, such as corruption and embezzlement. Table A8
summarizes some of the processes that resulted in the removal from office of
the mayor of an oil-rich municipality. Most of these cases are clear instances of
mismanagement of public funds, such as the provision of spa treatments for
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city hall workers by the mayor of Yopal. Many of the cases are related to the
management and expenditure of natural resource royalties, such as the loss of 5
million USD worth of royalties in Arauca after they were given to an informal
firm to manage and it went bankrupt. Table A9 looks at the most frequent
keywords for the processes involving mayors of oil-rich municipalities. 36 % of
cases are related to irregularities in investment and procurement and 12 % of
processes are related to natural resource royalties. These are the modal keywords
for the type of misconduct and the sector among this group of municipalities.
1.6. Discussion
I have provided evidence on the larger effect of tax revenue on public goods
relative to natural resource royalties and I have shown that additional royalties
lead to a worsening of the misbehavior of local politicians. In this section, I
discuss these findings and I establish a relationship between them. I argue that
accountability underlies the relationship between taxation and governance and
I provide some suggestive evidence.
One straightforward reason why taxation may be positively related to
accountability is because voters are better informed about changes in taxation
than about changes in external revenue. This informational asymmetry across
sources of revenue arises because taxation is in itself informative about
government revenue, while information on revenue from other sources must be
acquired at a cost. In consequence, if voters do not know that the government
has more resources they have no reason to expect or demand an improvement
in public services.
In the theoretical appendix I explore this mechanism in the context of a
political agency model with career concerns.30 In the model, voters receive a
noisy signal on public revenue, the precision of which is improved by the share
of taxes in total revenue. As the revenue signal becomes more precise, voters are
more able to infer the incumbent’s ability after observing public good provision.
Hence, taxation makes the voters’ posterior beliefs on the incumbent’s ability
more sensitive to observed public goods and this leads to higher effort by the
incumbent and to more public goods. As external revenue increases, on the
other hand, voters become less well informed about revenue and this has a
30The model is an extension of the canonical career concerns model of Persson and
Tabellini (2000) that incorporates ‘signal-jamming’ a` la Holmstro¨m (1999). Alesina and
Tabellini (2007) and Matsen et al. (2015) use similar extensions to answer very different
questions.
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negative effect on the incumbent’s effort. Thus, external revenue has a smaller
effect on public goods than tax revenue.
This informational explanation is consistent with various findings from
the empirical literature. Recent studies provide evidence in support of the
idea that voters find it difficult to establish the contribution of government to
observed outcomes (Leigh, 2009; De la O, 2013; Guiteras and Mobarak, 2014).
Recent research also indicates that voters are relatively uninformed about
changes in external revenue (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Ferraz and Monteiro,
2014; Gadenne, 2015). Additionally, there is a large literature showing that
governments are generally more accountable to voters that are better informed.31
One may still wonder how can residents of resource-rich areas not be aware
of the flow of resource rents to their government. The point here is that even
if voters in these areas know about the abundance of natural resource rents,
they must still pay close attention to fluctuations in prices and output to
be well informed about the change in these rents. This is important because
the empirical exercise above was concerned with changes in revenue from
different sources, rather than with their average level, which was absorbed by
the municipality fixed effects.
One could also wonder how informative it is to pay your own taxes in
a world with significant heterogeneity in tax liabilities. Although this does
raise the question about which are the taxes that matter, it is not a major
concern for the empirical exercise on Colombia as the cadastral updates that
I study lead to a municipality-wide simultaneous increase in tax liabilities. A
related question is whether increases to taxation simply make voters, who are
already well informed about revenue, more aware of the public purse and its
use (increased salience). An explanation along these lines seems particularly
plausible for the current setting because the property tax stands out in this
respect, as it is a yearly out-of-pocket tax payment on an illiquid asset (Cabral
and Hoxby, 2015). Additionally, there is evidence that people’s response to
taxation is affected by the salience of taxes (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein,
2009).
The other main channel through which the relationship between taxation
and accountability may arise is citizens’ preferences. It is possible, for instance,
that voters simply dislike taxation and punish the incumbent for it unless he
compensates them with improved public services. Martin (2014) develops a
31See Besley and Burgess (2002); Reinikka and Svensson (2005); Ferraz and Finan (2008);
Bjo¨rkman and Svensson (2009); Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010); Banerjee et al. (2011);
Fergusson et al. (2013); Chong et al. (2015).
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model along these lines in which loss-averse voters derive utility from punishing
a corrupt government.32
In the appendix, I present an alternative version of the theoretical model
described above in which the marginal utility of public goods is decreasing
in private consumption and voters can acquire costly information on public
revenue. I show that taxation may improve incumbent effort and public good
provision, even if it is not by itself directly informative, because it induces the
acquisition of costly information on government revenue due to its negative
effect on disposable income.
There is some empirical evidence supporting these preference-based channels.
Both Paler (2013) and Martin (2014) find that participants in lab experiments
are more willing to engage in costly punishment of a misbehaving government
when the source of revenue is taxation than when it is external, even when
information is held constant across treatments. There is also a large literature on
reciprocity that has found that people are willing to incur in costly punishment
of what they consider to be unfair behavior (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
Overall, taxation may either increase citizens’ willingness to hold the
government accountable or their ability to do so (Paler, 2013). Although
the available data does not allow me to distinguish between these explanations,
all of them predict that tax revenue leads to higher accountability and to better
governance. I use data on social mobilizations from the Colombian think-tank
CINEP to provide suggestive evidence on the heterogeneous effects of tax
revenue and natural resource royalties on accountability and the demand for
better government.
Table 1.11 shows reduced-form and IV estimates of the effects of property
tax revenue and natural resource royalties on various indicators of citizen
involvement in public affairs. The results indicate that property tax revenue
appears to have a positive effect on the probability of social mobilizations of
any kind (column 1), but more specifically on the probability of demonstrations
(column 2), especially those related to public services (column 3). These are
not negligible effects. For example, I find that a 10,000 COP increase in
property tax revenue leads to a 1 percentage point increase in the probability
of demonstrations related to public services, relative to a sample mean of 2.8 %.
The effect of tax revenue on worker strikes (column 4) is negative and much
smaller, which acts as a placebo test. The effects of natural resource royalties
32In the model in the appendix, forward-looking voters cannot credibly commit to vote
against the incumbent if they believe him to be of higher ability than his opponent in the
election.
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are negative but very small for all indicators. Unfortunately, the standard errors
are large for all estimates and the difference across sources of revenue is not
statistically significant for any indicator.
Table 1.11: Sources of revenue and social mobilizations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Demonstration Demonstration Strike
VARIABLES Mobilization (Pub. Services)
PANEL A: REDUCED FORM
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.0118 0.00686 0.0101 -0.000223
[0.0138] [0.0113] [0.00882] [0.00453]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt -0.000739 -0.000344 -2.34e-05 -0.000845
[0.000845] [0.000285] [0.000116] [0.000532]
PANEL B: IV
property tax revenuei,t 0.0185 0.0108 0.0161 -0.000784
[0.0225] [0.0183] [0.0146] [0.00738]
natural resource royaltiesi,t -0.000751 -0.000336 7.58e-05 -0.000999
[0.000949] [0.000354] [0.000199] [0.000615]
p-value H0:tax=royalties 0.389 0.541 0.268 0.976
Dependent variable mean 0.078 0.048 0.028 0.005
Observations 6,704 6,704 6,704 6,704
Number of municipalities 969 969 969 969
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004 COP per capita.
In panel B, D(post-cadastral-update) and royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt are used as instruments for property
tax revenue and natural resource royalties, respectively. The first stage F-statistic is 14.6. All regressions
include municipality and department-year fixed effects. Sample period: 2005-2011. Standard errors clustered
two-way by municipality and department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I estimated the effect of locally-raised property tax revenue
on several indicators of public service provision in Colombian municipalities and
I used these estimates as a benchmark to compare the effect of revenue from
an external source, the rents from the extraction of oil. I showed that property
tax revenue has a positive impact on public services in the areas of education,
health and water, while oil royalties have no effect on local public services,
despite being earmarked for this purpose. I provided suggestive evidence on the
positive relationship between taxation and the demand for good government, as
measured by social mobilizations and protests, and on the negative relationship
between external revenue and the supply of good government, as measured by
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disciplinary prosecutions.
These results confirm previous findings regarding the very low impact of
revenue from external or unearned sources - such as natural resource rents,
intra-government transfers and foreign aid - on public good provision. But
they go further than that, as they allow us to see that this very small effect is
indeed specific to external revenue and that tax revenue has a very different and
much larger impact. Additionally, this study illustrates how the heterogeneous
response of local politicians to increases in revenue from the two sources, as
well as that of the citizens to whom they are accountable, is what drives the
heterogeneity in returns. Hence, the case for the ‘political’ nature of the curse
of ‘external’ resources is strengthened.
The findings in this chapter, insofar as they provide evidence on the positive
relationship between taxation, accountability and governance, have important
implications for policies related to the design of decentralized systems of
government, the management of natural resource wealth and the disbursement
of foreign aid. Mainly, they invite policymakers to reconsider the effectiveness of
resources that are transferred to governments, both across countries and within
countries, for projects or services that lack a locally-financed counterpart. More
specifically, the evidence in this chapter suggests that citizen involvement is
crucial for the responsible management of public funds and that taxation is an
effective way of achieving such involvement.
At present developing countries tax too little, both at the national and
sub-national levels (Gadenne and Singhal, 2014). The results in this chapter
also suggest that there may be high returns to investments in fiscal capacity in
terms of improved public service provision and higher living standards.
Future research must try to better understand the relative importance of
information and preferences as the driving forces behind taxation’s ability to
improve government performance. Another avenue for future research is related
to the study of different tax instruments with the objective of establishing
whether certain characteristics, such as salience, are particularly important for
the accountability-enhancing effect of taxation.
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Chapter 2
Is It my Money or Not? An
Experiment on Risk Aversion
and the House-Money Effect
with Juan Camilo Ca´rdenas, Nicola´s De Roux &
Christian Jaramillo. Published as Ca´rdenas et al. (2014)1
The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring
with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the
external validity of experiments in economics. We ran an economic experiment
with 122 students, who received an amount of money with which they made
risky decisions involving losses and gains; a randomly selected treatment group
received the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of
the experiment. With our preferred specification, we find a mean CRRA risk
aversion coefficient of 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Furthermore, if
subjects in the treatment group spent 35 % of the endowment (as they did, on
average) their CRRA risk aversion coefficient is higher than that of the control
group by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We interpret this result as
evidence of a small and indirect house money effect operating though the amount
of the cash in advance that was actually spent. We conclude that the house
money effect may play a small role in decisions under uncertainty, especially
when involving losses.
1We thank Glenn Harrison who commented on a previous version and greatly enriched the
analysis. Also we thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor of Experimental Economics
for their comments.
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2.1. Introduction
The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring
with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern which finds support in
incentivized experiments using real money by Thaler and Johnson (1990). Since
experiments in economics usually start by handing out money to the subjects
so that they never stand to suffer any net monetary losses, the participants’
behavior could be modified as a result of the house-money effect. This poses
questions about the external validity of experiments in economics (Guala, 2005,
p. 231), and particular questions about the incentives used: to what extent do
people behave in the experiment like they would have in a real-life situation,
given that they play with easily-gotten house money (Levitt and List, 2007)?
The experimental literature has addressed this question in the context of
altruism ((Cherry et al., 2002), public goods (Clark, 2002), auctions (Ackert
et al., 2006) and capital expenditure (Keasey and Moon, 1996). The general
idea of windfall gains has been also explored in the psychology and economics
literature (Arkes et al., 1994; Keeler et al., 1985). Most of these papers deal
with the issues arising from having people play with their own money by having
participants earn money in an initial stage and then making choices with their
earnings.
This chapter studies the effect of house money on the risk preferences of
a group of 122 undergraduate students within an age range of 16 to 28. The
students were randomly assigned to a control or a treatment group and given
money to participate in the experiment, which they were told involved risky
choices and possibly losses. As usual, the money handed out for participating
was enough to cover the potential losses. However, while the control group
received this initial money just before they made their choices, the treatment
group received the money three weeks in advance so that they had time to spend
it before making their choices. (A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests
that on average 35 % of the cash in advance was spent.) This experimental
design, inspired by (Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre, 2010), is as close as we can
get to having them gamble with their own money.
We find evidence of an indirect house money effect operating through the
money that participants had with them at the time of choosing between lotteries.
More specifically, we find that for the treatment group, each additional thousand
Colombian pesos (COP) spent ( USD$0.50) leads to an increase of 0.0019 in
their CRRA risk aversion coefficient. We interpret this finding as evidence of a
house money effect on those subjects of the treatment group who actually spent
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some of the cash provided to them in advance. In our preferred specification, the
mean relative risk aversion coefficient equals 0.34 with a standard deviation of
0.09. Therefore, our estimated 35 % expenditure of the endowment would lead
to a reduction of 0.3 standard deviations in the risk aversion coefficient. This
interpretation rests on two assumptions. First, that the money participants
had with them at the time of the experiment is a good proxy for endowment
not spent, if compared to the same measure in the control group. Second, and
more importantly, we assume that the house money effect only operates for
those people who actually spent some of their endowment. We will have more
to say about this assumption below.
The results that we report here add to a vast literature documenting risk
aversion and suggest that it would be advisable to include credible controls for
the house-money effect in experimental work in economics.2
2.2. The Experiment
Our experimental design is based on dividing the subject pool randomly
in half and giving the treatment group an endowment of cash three weeks in
advance of the actual decision-making experiment. The control group receives
the same amount of money but on the day of the experiment as is usually
done in lab experiments that involve potential losses. With that time period
in between we expect to balance between giving sufficient time for them to
incorporate the cash as part of their pocket money and not allowing for some
discounting of the endowment between the treatment and control groups. (In
the appendix we have included the translated version of the instructions to the
subjects.)
The subjects were volunteers from an undergraduate psychology course at
the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota´ (Colombia), recruited in two different
semesters of the same course (one in 2009 and another in 2012). The students
in the class were randomly assigned to a treatment (cash in advance) or control
group (cash experiment day) and then asked to consent to participate in an
2Although only partially comparable, empirical evidence from survey work from a
developing country suggests risk aversion coefficients between 0 and 5 (Azam et al., 2002).
Meanwhile, a survey on experimental studies in developed and developing countries reports
estimated coefficients for the CRRA that range from the lowest estimate of 0.05 in Ethiopia
to 2.57 in Paraguay (Ca´rdenas and Carpenter, 2008); Harrison et al. (2010) also report
coefficients of these magnitudes. However, Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) use a method quite
similar to ours on the data of Hey and Orme (1994) and find a CRRA of 0.66 with a standard
error of 0.04. In general, the estimated ranges found show also a non-negligible sensitivity to
the type of experimental procedure used.
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economic experiment that involved risky choices. Of a total of 122 students who
accepted to participate in the two sessions, 61 were assigned to the control group
and 61 to the treatment group. Within each session the random splits between
treatment and controls were 51/49 and 48/52. Students in the sessions belonged
to more than 20 different minors and majors from social, medical, natural
sciences, medicine and engineering (no more than 14 % of the participants
in any of the groups belonged to any particular major). Table 2.1 shows the
average characteristics of each group.
Table 2.1: Demographic characteristics of treatment and control groups
Variable
Mean Value p-value
Control Treatment Rank-sum test t-test
Female 0.361 0.574 0.019 0.018
Age 19.6 18.8 0.170 0.034
Single 0.967 1.00 0.156 0.156
Siblings 1.4 1.5 0.405 0.291
Semesters at university 3.3 3.0 0.261 0.371
Monthly expenses 445,080 443,440 0.840 0.968
Housing stratum 4.72 4.8 0.898 0.671
Money in pocket 41,132 67,098 0.000 0.001
Adj. Money in pocket 81,132 67,098 0.014 0.057
Notes: All money variables in Colombian pesos (COP) (1) Only two participants
(both in the control group) reported “other” as marital status. (2) Using mid-point of
reported range. (3) Housing strata in Colombia range from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest).
(4) Amount of money at time of making decisions (pocket + 40,000 for participants in
control group).
Treatment subjects were then given COP 40 000 in small change (roughly
USD 20 given an exchange rate of COP 1 971 on the initial day of the first
round. The minimum monthly wage in Colombia at the time was COP 497 000).
Three weeks later, again in class, the decision-making session took place. The
control group was given their respective COP 40,000 and everybody proceeded
then to make their choices under uncertainty.
Notice in particular the averages for the available pocket money of the
subjects in the treatment and control groups. We asked everyone at the entrance
to the room and before the control group received their endowment, how much
money they had in their pockets. Our treatment group had significantly more
cash in their pockets than the control, as expected, but the difference was
smaller than the endowment of 40 000 COP (67 000 COP — 41 000 COP ≈
26 000 COP).3 If we assume that the money brought to the session by the
3A word of caution is due at this point. As suggested by an anonymous referee, in
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control group is representative of what members of this student community
carry in their pockets, we can think that the treatment group spent on average
14 000 COP (or 35 %) of their cash in advance. For those in the control group,
we added the 40 000 COP to their pocket money and therefore we have now
a comparable variable, Adjusted pocket money, which will turn out to be an
important part of our analysis.4
Following Binswanger (1980) Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) design
(Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008, pp. 52-56), all participants were handed a
piece of paper with six different uniform-probability lotteries involving possible
losses (Figure 2.1a) depending on a coin toss. They were then asked to choose
one lottery to play. All 122 made their choice at once. At that point they did
not know they would have further choices to make.
Figure 2.1: Games and payoffs
(a) Game 1: Possible losses (b) Game 2: Gains only
Notes: In each game, both risk and expected return increase clockwise from the top. However, lotteries E and
F have the same expected return. Payoffs in thousands of Colombian Pesos (COP) (Exchange rate (USD):
COP 1,971).
After collecting their choices, they were handed a second set of six lotteries
(Figure 2.1b). None of these involved losses and they were told that the outcome
would depend on another coin toss and that their payments would be computed
using the sum of results of both lotteries. After collecting their new choices,
societies where students pay much of their expenses using debit or credit cards, the question
“how much money did you have in your pocket when you entered the class room” might
be blurred. We are confident, however, that this should not be of concern as Colombian
students rarely use electronic payments for their daily expenses in food, transportation or
entertainment, among others because most establishments have a minimum amount for
allowing such transactions, and the access to banking in general is more limited than in
industrialized countries; also, not all establishments take electronic payments around and on
campus.
4We thank two reviewers for this suggestion.
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they were asked to fill out a brief socioeconomic survey. Only then did both
coin tosses take place. The first coin toss determined the outcome in the first
game (possible losses) and the second coin toss determined the outcome for
the gains only lottery.
2.3. Results
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of choices in two different ways. In Panels
(a) and (b) we show the distributions of choices for Game 1 and Game 2
respectively. In panels (c) and (d) we compare the same data but splitting in
control and treatment respectively. From a first look at the distributions one
can infer that prospect theory is alive and well and that in general people made
riskier choices in Game 1 where losses were possible. However, there seems to
be no major difference between the treatment and control groups and therefore
a more rigorous statistical analysis is needed.
Figure 2.2: Decisions in Game 1 and Game 2
Notes: Lotteries increase in riskiness as you move from A to F. Treatment equals one for participants who
received cash in advance.
These results can be compared to data from a more comprehensive study
(Ca´rdenas and Carpenter, 2013) that included more than 3 000 subjects
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representative of several Latin American cities using this same design of the
potential losses and gains with these six lotteries. In the case of the lottery
with potential losses, the variation found in that large sample is higher with
more people choosing the more conservative lotteries than here and a smaller
fraction (17.2 %) of subjects in that sample choosing the riskiest lottery E than
in our students sample (23.8 %). In the case of the second game with gains
only, again our students showed a slightly higher level of risk tolerance with
more students choosing lottery E than in the adults sample and fewer students
choosing the safe ones.
Table 2.2 shows the means of choices in each game for the treatment (cash
in advance) and control (cash experiment day) groups. Game 1 and Game 2
indicate the choice in each game. In both games, lotteries A through F of Figure
2.1 are coded 1 through 6: Game 1 = 1 means the subject chose lottery A in
Game 1, and a larger value indicates the choice of a riskier lottery. As expected
through prospect theory, the average player moved from riskier lotteries in
Game 1 to safer ones in Game 2 creating two different distributions of choices
when comparing within subjects (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value=0.0001).
However, this result seems driven mostly by the control group and rather minor
for the treatment group both for men and women. This could mean that, if
there was a house money effect operating, it could be leading to attenuation
in loss aversion. Within games we only find a significant difference between
treatment and control groups when comparing the choices of men in Game 1
(see Table 2.2). That difference vanishes for Game 2, suggesting that the effect
is exacerbated when involving the possibility of losses.
These differences however open up more questions than answers. To assess
in more detail the effect of being treated on risk aversion, we estimate for each
game a series of structural models of choice under uncertainty, using the survey
data as explanatory variables and following closely Harrison and Rutstro¨m
(2008, pp. 69-74).
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In these exercises, each subject i is assumed to have a CRRA utility function
ui(I) =
I1−γi
1− γi (2.1)
where I denotes total wealth and γi is the relative risk aversion parameter of
that individual - a higher γi is associated with a lower level of risk tolerance,
γi < 0 corresponds to risk loving, γi > 0 to risk aversion and γi = 0 to risk
neutrality.5
For both games 1 and 2, Let EUi(j) denote the expected utility for subject
i of choosing lottery j in that game, where j ∈ {A,B,C,D,E, F} according
to Figure 2.1. Let Lj and Rj denote the payoff if the left or right outcomes of
lottery j are realized. The expected utility of choosing this lottery, with the
CRRA utility function and a probability 1/2 for each outcome, is given by:
Using this formula for the expected utility, for each individual we compute
a probability of observing the choice the individual actually made. In order to
do so and following Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008), we assume a multinomial
logit probability specification. Let h ∈ {A,B,C,D,E, F} denote the lottery
the individual actually chose. The probability of individual i choosing lottery h
is given by:
Pi(h) =
eEUi(h)∑
j e
EUi(j)
(2.2)
where again j ∈ {A,B,C,D,E, F}.6
We further assume that the risk aversion coefficient γi is a linear function
of observed characteristics Xi, i.e. γi = α+Xi · β, where α is a constant and β
is a vector of size k × 1, k being the number of variables included in the model.
Our objective is to estimate the values of α and β. The maximum likelihood
(MLE) routine that we implement finds the values of α and β that maximize the
following log likelihood function (i.e. that maximize the probability of observing
our sample of choices assuming a multinomial logit probability specification):
5Total wealth I is defined as initial wealth (w) plus the payoff of the realized outcome of
the game. For Game 1 we set w=40 000 so that there is no negative total wealth I in any
of the outcomes (note that the utility function is well defined for non negative values of I).
This assumption is grounded on the fact that all individuals were given an initial endowment
of 40 000, the only difference being one of timing. For Game 2, we set w=0.
6This statistical assumption implies a possibility of decision error, since an individual
may not choose with certainty a lottery that has a higher expected utility than all the others.
For example, among lotteries with expected payoffs [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 10], a risk neutral person
will choose the one with expected payoff equal to 10 only with probability 2/3, even though
the expected utility of this lottery is higher than that of all others. We thank an anonymous
referee for pointing this out and suggesting the above example.
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lnL =
∑
i
ln(Pi(hi)) (2.3)
Note that once the estimated values αˆ and βˆ are obtained, we can use the
characteristics of the individual i, namely Xi, to obtain a linear prediction of
γi, γˆi = αˆ +Xi · βˆ. The value of γˆi will depend on the model being estimated
(i.e. on the individual characteristics that we include in the linear function of
γi).
We estimate four different specifications of the structural model for each
one of the games. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the results for Game 1 and
Game 2 respectively.7 Each column corresponds to one specification. We report
the estimated coefficients and their respective standard errors. For example,
column (1) of Table 2.3 corresponds to a linear specification of γi given by
γi = α + β1 × Treatment + β2 × Session, where Session is a dummy that takes
a value of 0 if the experimental session is the one conducted in 2009, and a
value of 1 if it is the one conducted in 2012.
Consider Game 1 which involves the possibility of losses (Table 2.3). We
confirm our previous finding that males are more tolerant to taking risks than
females, and find that people of higher socio-economic status measured by the
variable Stratum also choose riskier lotteries.
We do not find that the treatment in itself has an effect on the risk coefficient
of the subjects (across columns the coefficient of Treatment is not statistically
significant). However, as illustrated by column (4) the interaction between the
available pocket money at the start of the experiment and the treatment does
tell a story: the less money an individual in the treatment group had in her
pocket, the more conservative her decision was. No such effect is found for the
controls.8
Our interpretation of this result rests on the following assumption: it is
necessary that subjects in the treatment group actually spent part of the
endowment for them to consider that they are actually playing with their own
money. In other words, receiving money in advance is not a sufficient condition
for the house money effect to operate. It could be the case that the treatment
7All the monetary variables enter the estimations in thousands of COP.
8To see this, denote by pi1 the estimated coefficient of Pocket Money (adj) and by pi2
that of Pocket Money(adj)*Treatment. For the cash-in-advance treatment, an increase of one
thousand COP in Pocket Money (adj) implies a change in γ of pi1 +pi2. For the control group,
it implies a change in γ of pi1 (recall that the Treatment dummy takes a value of 1 for the
cash-in-advance treatment). Nevertheless, since pi1 is not statistically different from 0, the
effect of Pocket money (adj) for the control group is pi1 = 0, and that of the cash-in-advance
treatment is pi1 + pi2 = pi2 = −0,0019.
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subjects who kept their money over this time felt an obligation to bring the
money to the decision stage session, but as a reviewer noted, we would need to
ask directly the participants about their reasons for spending or keeping their
money over the period of time. This assumption implies that in the extreme
case of a participant in the treatment group who did not spend any of his
endowment before the decision-making session, we should not observe any
difference in his behaviour relative to the control group.
Table 2.3: Maximum likelihood estimation of γ (Game 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent variable: lottery choice in Game 1
Treatment 0.070 -0.028 -0.023 0.138
[0.045] [0.078] [0.080] [0.120]
D(Session 2) 0.019 0.042 0.034 0.038
[0.044] [0.048] [0.048] [0.05]
D(Male) -0.13* -0.16** -0.15**
[0.070] [0.072] [0.070]
D(Male)*Treatment 0.164 0.149 0.131
[0.107] [0.108] [0.109]
Expenses -0.0003 -0.006
[0.009] [0.011]
Stratum -0.051* -0.05*
[0.026] [0.030]
Pocket Money (adj.) 0.0012
[0.0009]
Pocket Money (adj.)*Treatment -0.0019*
[0.0011]
Constant 0.29*** 0.37*** 0.63*** 0.54***
[0.034] [0.063] [0.15] [0.16]
Observations 122 122 122 122
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Treatment equals one for participants who
received cash in advance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
If we additionally assume that the money that the controls brought into
the room is a good proxy for the average pocket money in the population,
then the difference in means of Table 2.1 of the variable Money in Pocket
(67 000 COP - 41 000 COP = 26 000 COP) gives us an idea of how much
the treatment subjects actually spent on average of their cash in advance
(approximately 40 000 COP – 26 000 COP = 14 000 COP, which is 35 % of
the cash in advance). This already suggests that any house money effect found
should not be large. Under the assumptions just mentioned, the coefficient of
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the interaction between Treatment and Pocket money (adj) can be seen as
the effect of cash in advance that is actually spent. The higher the amount of
the endowment spent by the subjects in the treatment (i.e. the more they are
“playing with their own money”), the lower the adjusted pocket money will be.
Since the coefficient is negative, this implies a higher estimated value of γ, or
in other words, a higher level of risk aversion as participants in the treatment
group played with more of their own money.
Phrased differently, we can think of the cash in advance actually spent
as having some distribution across individuals in the treatment group, where
some of them spent all the endowment, some of them did not spend at all
and on average they spent 14 000 COP. For those that spent all the money
we would expect more risk averse behavior during the decision stage of the
experiment when compared to the controls. For those that did not spend any
amount we would expect no difference with the controls. To put numbers to
this interpretation, the linear prediction of γi using the model of column (4) in
Table 2.3 implies an average estimated γi of 0.34 with a standard deviation of
0.09.9 If the participants in the cash-in-advance treatment had spent all the
endowment they would have values of γi larger on average than those of the
controls by an amount of (-0.0019)*(-40) = 0.076 which is almost one standard
deviation.10 From our rough approximation of the average money that was
actually spent by participants in the cash-in-advance treatment, i.e. 14 000
COP, we can infer that their γi is on average greater by an amount of only
(-0.0019)*(-14) = 0.026 which is approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We
can summarize our finding by saying that the evidence suggests a small house
money effect driven by the fact that members of the treatment group spent
less than half of the cash in advance provided. Further, the fact that the effect
does not happen among the control group rules out the explanation of more
risk aversion caused by diminishing marginal utility of money.11
Let us now turn to the analysis of the second game, our control for risk
under uncertainty but with no potential losses involved. Although we already
reported that most individuals did switch from riskier to more conservative
9Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008, pp. 69-71) assume the same utility function and apply a
similar version of the MLE procedure we employ to the data of Hey and Orme (1994). In
one of the versions of this exercise they find a pooled value of γ of 0.66 with a standard error
of 0.04.
10As mentioned in Table 2.1, Pocket money (adj) is defined as money at time of play (i.e.
the money brought in plus 40 000 COP for the control group). If subjects in the treatment
group spent all their cash in advance, money brought in would have been equal for the two
groups and the adjustment would leave the treatments at -40 000 COP.
11We thank Reviewer 2 for highlighting this.
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choices, the results in Table 2.4 show similar patterns to those reported for
Game 1. Males, although not significant now, show less risk aversion, those
who with higher socio-economic levels (expenses) also show more tolerance to
risk and once again the available pocket money makes a difference but only for
the treatment group and in the same direction as before.
Table 2.4: Maximum likelihood estimation of γ (Game 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent variable: lottery choice in Game 2
Treatment -0.038 -0.129 -0.223* 0.194
[0.075] [0.125] [0.121] [0.223]
D(Session 2) 0.090 0.104 0.118 0.106
[0.077] [0.079] [0.076] [0.086]
D(Male) -0.097 -0.104 -0.098
[0.125] [0.125] [0.128]
D(Male)*Treatment 0.159 0.213 0.168
[0.164] [0.161] [0.177]
Expenses -0.057*** -0.069***
[0.0164] [0.0180]
Stratum -0.027 -0.037
[0.0446] [0.041]
Pocket Money (adj.) 0.003*
[0.002]
Pocket Money (adj.)*Treatment -0.005**
[0.002]
Constant 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.94*** 0.82***
[0.063] [0.111] [0.251] [0.254]
Observations 122 122 122 122
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Treatment equals one for participants who
received cash in advance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A few notes are worth mentioning here. Recall that Game 2 took place after
the students had made their choice for Game 1 but before the toss of the coin
for Game 1 was made. Also, they were not told in Game 1 that a second game
was going to be played later on. One could argue that the choice made for the
second game involved some kind of risk hedging between games since they did
not know the outcome of the coin toss. To control for this possibility we ran a
separate regression not reported here where the choice in Game 1 was used as
a control for the choice in Game 2 and no effect was found.
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2.4. Conclusions
The use of monetary incentives is central to the experimental methods in
economics. The code of ethics among experimentalists continues to suggest that
we refrain from using the disposable income of our experimental subjects, that
is, from having participants walk out of the lab with negative earnings and
instead it requires that we provide them with an endowment they can use to
allow for decisions involving losses. This has caused concern among skeptics of
experiments because of the so called house-money effect and the implications
it would have for external validity of laboratory or field lab experiments.
To get at this debate, some labs have introduced the notion that the
endowment is earned during a task performed at the experiment, partially
correcting for the problem of subjects thinking of the endowment as a windfall
gain. We have, however, taken a different approach, by giving the endowment
well in advance (21 days) to half of our sample and the endowment to the
other half at the day of the experiment. Further, they had to make decisions
about risk involving losses and gains. We asked everyone at the day of the
experiment what cash they had available in their pockets and confirmed that
the treatment group had in fact spent part of the endowment they had received
and kept another part, suggesting the money was incorporated as part of their
disposable income. On average there is no major statistical difference in the
distributions of the observed coefficient of risk behavior across the two groups.
However, when controlling for the available cash they had in their pockets at
the time of the experiment, we find that those in the treatment group who had
more money with them on the day of the experiment tended to be more risk
tolerant while those who had less were more risk averse during the experiment.
If we interpret the spending of the endowed money as a signal of considering it
as one’s own, our findings suggest a small house money effect.
By providing the endowment in advance we have both complied with the
ethical code of experimental economics but also introduced more realism and
external validity as the subjects seem to have incorporated some of the mental
accounting processes of their daily life into the experiment. In other words, the
more I spent part of my endowment the more it felt like “it’s my money”. The
data suggest that those who spent more of their endowment arrived facing the
experiment much like a risky decision involving losses but constrained by their
pocket money whereas those with more cash –provided by the experimenter,
felt like taking riskier decisions, in other words “it’s not my money”.
Experiments that involve studying strategic behavior with possible losses
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should take into account that when subjects receive an endowment they might
not treat it as part of their real income. Our results would suggest that
experimenters could control for available cash in the pockets of the subjects at
the time of the experiment, even if the experiment provides an endowment to
cover for losses as this would help explain variation in behavior. These factors
should be tested, using a similar design of giving an endowment to subjects
well in advance, but for other domains of interactions such as fairness and
bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, Coase bargaining), cooperation games
(trust an public goods) or labor relations (effort, gift exchange) where a subject
must decide over the allocation of her own resources and test for robustness
and potential house-money effects.
Our research opens other new questions for further experimental tests on
decisions under uncertainty.12 We are well aware that this design is based on
the same probability of 0.50 over all possible lotteries and this might impose a
strong assumption about the application of expected utility theory, although it
minimizes the potential problems of humans handling probabilities (Kahneman
et al., 1982). Nevertheless, further tests with variable probabilities would enrich
this finding, using other risk experiments available. On the one hand we could
estimate this effect in other samples with different demographics including
age, education level, financial literacy or income. On the other hand one could
explore how the magnitude of the house-money bias changes with the time delay
between the transfer of the endowment and the experimental decision. These
could all deepen our understanding of how incentives work in the laboratory
and of how income shocks may interact with behavior under uncertainty.
12A natural test of our findings could be conducted with occasional tourist casino players.
Imagine a random group of tourists that receive a voucher-like gift in cash well in advance
before their visit to the casino and another group that receives the voucher in the day of the
visit. If our hypothesis holds, the latter group would make riskier decisions in the casino.
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Chapter 3
Did Colombian guerrillas take
refuge in Cha´vez’s Venezuela?
Evidence from the Geography of
Conflict
Hugo Cha´vez always denied providing support to Colombia’s leftist insurgent
groups, FARC and ELN, during his time in office as President of Venezuela.
I show in this chapter that FARC reveal their increased ability to hide in
Venezuela following Cha´vez’s election by disproportionately increasing their
activities in Colombian border municipalities, as short-range weapons and large
distances geographically constrain the group’s ability to benefit from a safe
haven across the border. ELN activity at the border also increases early in the
Cha´vez administration but this group is crowded out by FARC in later years.
The availability of a cross-border sanctuary is shown to have a large impact
on the intensity of civil conflict in Colombia and on the homicide rate in the
border region. I dismiss alternative explanations, such as political and economic
shocks, the expansion of paramilitary groups and “Plan Colombia.”
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3.1. Introduction
Diplomatic relations between the neighbouring countries of Colombia and
Venezuela were very tense during the years of the administration of Hugo
Cha´vez in the latter (1999-2013). Most contentious were Cha´vez alleged links to
the left-wing guerrilla groups operating in Colombia (particularly to FARC, the
largest such group), with which he had a strong ideological affinity.1 Although
the Venezuelan president’s public attitude towards FARC ranged from neutral
to outspokenly supportive, with occasional criticism and calls for the insurgent
group to give up armed struggle, the Cha´vez administration always denied any
active collaboration with the insurgents.
A mounting body of evidence, ranging from intercepted FARC communica-
tions to satellite images of FARC camps inside Venezuela, suggests otherwise.
This chapter provides quantitative evidence of FARC’s increased ability to
operate inside Venezuela during the Cha´vez administration. I use data on the
geography of the conflict inside Colombia to test whether the intensity of FARC
activity increased disproportionately near the border with Venezuela when
Cha´vez came to power. The underlying assumption is that due to both the
short range of FARC’s military technology and the magnitude of distances
in Colombia, FARC’s ability to increase their activities as a result of the
availability of refuge in Venezuela should be greater in places closer to the
border.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the main result of this investigation: municipalities at
the border with Venezuela had similar levels of FARC activity to municipalities
elsewhere in the country up to 1998. Cha´vez comes to power in February 1999
and from then on we observe a relative increase in the intensity of FARC activity
at the border. The regression results, including municipality and region-year
fixed effects, suggest that during the Cha´vez administration FARC activity in
border municipalities was 0.3 standard deviations higher than in the rest of the
country. This is a large increase and corresponds to 1.16 extra FARC events
per 10,000 inhabitants, relative to a sample mean of 1.11. It is also a quite
costly increase, as it is mainly driven by FARC attacks and terrorist attacks
and it leads to a large increase in the homicide rate in border municipalities.
I also find an increase in ELN activity at the border with Venezuela in
1The other main guerilla group, though much smaller than FARC, is ELN. FARC is
the acronym for “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia). ELN is the acronym for “Eje´rcito de Liberacio´n Nacional” (National
Liberation Army).
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Figure 3.1: FARC activity near the border with Venezuela
Note: The graph shows yearly unweighted averages of the variable “FARC Events” for
municipalities located at the border with Venezuela and for all other municipalities. FARC
events is the sum of 19 activity indicators, divided by 1993 population.
the early years of the Cha´vez administration, but this effect disappears after
2004. Additional results indicate that the collapse in ELN activity is driven
by FARC expansion into areas traditionally dominated by ELN. This occurs
particularly in the department of Arauca at the border with Venezuela, where
conflict between the two organisations took place between 2005 and 2010 (Avila,
2012).
The results on FARC are robust to (i) the inclusion of a broad set of control
variables for the time-varying effect of municipality characteristics; (ii) different
ways of measuring proximity to the border; (iii) the use of different datasets
on the Colombian conflict; (iv) additional controls for both the paramilitary
expansion and the increase in US military aid (Plan Colombia) that roughly
coincided with the start of Cha´vez’s term. I also provide evidence against
alternative explanations based on changes in economic or political conditions
specific to the border region.
A similar exercise reveals a disproportionate increase in FARC activity
in municipalities at the border with Ecuador starting in 2003, when FARC
leader Rau´l Reyes is believed to have relocated in the area amid increased
military pressure from the Uribe administration in Colombia, but well before
Cha´vez’s ally Rafael Correa assumed as President of Ecuador in 2007. This
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finding is consistent with the existing evidence on FARC’s ability to exploit
weak Ecuadorian presence at the border, as well as on its inability to obtain
guarantees regarding the safety of its operatives in Ecuador from Correa or any
of his predecessors (ICG, 2004; IISS, 2011a).
This study contributes to the literature on civil conflict. It is hard to
overstate the importance of this topic, as more than half of the countries in the
world have experienced internal conflict since the end of World War II, with
conflict lasting for 10 years or more in one out of every five (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010). Colombia is a case in point, as the fight between the guerrilla
groups and the democratic government dates back to 1964. The Colombian
conflict is estimated to have caused over 200,000 deaths over its fifty year history
and to have reduced GDP growth by between one half and two percentage points
per year.2 This chapter contributes more specifically to the recent literature
that has exploited rich sub-national data from Colombia to better understand
internal conflict. 3 It is also related to the literature on Venezuela’s recent
history and the Cha´vez administration.4
This investigation is also related to recent research studying the effects of
foreign influence on political outcomes and conflict.5 It has been estimated that
60 % of post-Cold War insurgent movements relied critically on support from
foreign governments (Byman et al., 2001), while 55 % of rebel groups since 1945
are believed to have operated outside of their country of origin (Salehyan, 2007,
2008). However, little is known on the impact of foreign assistance on conflict
intensity. I contribute to this literature by using a “forensic” approach that
uncovers the geographic trail left behind by FARC’s cross-border operations
(Zitzewitz, 2012).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides
some background information on the Colombian conflict and Venezuela’s
involvement. In sections 3.3 and 3.4 I discuss the data and the empirical
strategy employed. Section 3.5 presents the results and the robustness checks.
It also provides evidence against alternative explanations. Finally, section 3.6
concludes.
2Deaths figure from GMH (2013). On the economic costs of the conflict see Ca´rdenas
(2007); Echeverry et al. (2001); Alvarez and Rettberg (2008); Riascos and Vargas (2011).
3See Angrist and Kugler (2008); Corte´s et al. (2012); Acemoglu et al. (2013b); Dube
and Vargas (2013); Camacho and Rodriguez (2013); Fergusson et al. (2013, 2014); Dube and
Naidu (2015).
4See Ortega and Rodriguez (2008); Rodr´ıguez (2008); Hsieh et al. (2011). Also see the
papers in Clem and Maingot (2011) and in Hausmann and Rodr´ıguez (2013).
5See, for example, Dube et al. (2011); Berger et al. (2013); Albornoz and Hauk (2014);
Nunn and Qian (2014).
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3.2. Background
As shown in Figure 3.2a, Colombia borders with Venezuela to the east. The
border is Colombia’s longest, at 2,219 kilometers long, and on the Colombian
side includes 41 municipalities in 7 different departments.6 Venezuela separated
from what at the time was “Gran Colombia” in 1830, but despite a history of
diplomatic disputes regarding border delimitation, there have never been any
military confrontations between the two countries (Ramı´rez, 2003; Boraz,
2007). Throughout the sample period, Venezuela was Colombia’s second
most important trade partner after the U.S., representing on average 10 %
of Colombian exports and 7 % of Colombian imports.
I will next provide some brief background information on the internal armed
conflict in Colombia. I will make particular emphasis on three events that took
place around the same time that Hugo Cha´vez became president of Venezuela
in 1999. First, the establishment of a 42,000 square kilometer demilitarized
zone, in which peace talks between FARC and the Pastrana administration
in Colombia were held. Second, the improvement in the Colombian security
forces’ military capability as a result of a 1.2 billion USD military aid package
from the U.S. government known as “Plan Colombia.” Third, the rise of right-
wing paramilitary groups under the umbrella organization AUC after 1997.
Afterwards, I will provide background information on insurgent presence in
Venezuela and on the role of the Venezuelan government in the Colombian
conflict.
6Colombia is divided into 32 departments, each of which is fully divided into municipalities.
There are 1123 municipalities, which roughly correspond to US counties, while departments
are similar to US states.
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3.2.1. A Recent History of Colombia’s Internal Armed
Conflict
Left-wing insurgent groups FARC and ELN have been trying to overthrow
Colombia’s democratic government since 1964. FARC is the largest guerrilla
group and was estimated to have up to 20,000 operatives at its peak around 2002
(Boraz, 2007; El Tiempo, 2012; Dube and Vargas, 2013). As shown in Figure
3.3, the heartland of FARC activity are the jungles and mountains of southern
Colombia, stretching from the border with Ecuador in the south-west to the
border with Venezuela in the east. ELN is believed to have had up to 5,000
operatives and its activity, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, is largely concentrated
in three areas: Arauca department, the ‘Catatumbo’ region in North Santander
department and the “Magdalena Medio” region in the departments of Antioquia
and Bol´ıvar (Boraz, 2007). The first two of these regions are at the border with
Venezuela.
Even though neither insurgent group has ever had the military capacity nor
the popular support necessary to overthrow the government, they have been
able to survive for over four decades (Pizarro, 2007). The Colombian State’s
limited presence in rural areas has allowed the insurgents to find a stable source
of income in the extortion of local businessmen, at the same time as they carry
out guerrilla warfare amid favourable geographic conditions (Rangel, 2000;
Palacios, 2012).
In the 1990s FARC were increasingly able to raise revenue through drug
trafficking as coca cultivation in Colombia soared (Boraz, 2007; Angrist and
Kugler, 2008; Otis, 2014). The additional resources allowed FARC to further
implement its ‘Strategic Plan’, which dated from the early 1980s and called for
the expansion of the guerrilla throughout rural Colombia (IISS, 2011a). Figures
3.5 and 3.3 show how FARC activity escalated during this period. ELN, on
the other hand, has always formally refused to take part in the drug business,
although compliance with this directive seems limited (El Espectador, 2014).
This has left ELN at a financial disadvantage and helps to explain the group’s
stagnation and decadence throughout the sample period, as documented in
Figures 3.5 and 3.4.
FARC’s military success led president Andres Pastrana (1998 - 2002) to seek
peace negotiations with the group, agreeing to establish a demilitarised zone
comprising 5 municipalities in the departments of Meta and Caqueta´ (DMZ).
These are shown in Figure 3.2a. The peace talks were held between 1999 and
2002, simultaneously with a dramatic escalation of the conflict, as can be seen
81
Figure 3.3: The location of FARC events
(a) 1994 (b) 1998
(c) 2002 (d) 2006
Note: The maps show the number of FARC events per 10,000 inhabitants. Events is the sum
of 19 activity indicators. Areas in grey correspond to municipalities with missing data.
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Figure 3.4: The location of ELN events
(a) 1994 (b) 1998
(c) 2002 (d) 2006
Note: The maps show the number of ELN events per 10,000 inhabitants. Events is the sum
of 19 activity indicators. Areas in grey correspond to municipalities with missing data.
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Figure 3.5: Activity by each party in Colombia’s conflict
Note: The graph shows the aggregate number of events per year for each party. For FARC,
ELN and AUC, “Events” is the sum of 19 activity indicators (axis on the left), while for the
Colombian Armed Forces it is the sum of 9 indicators of activity (axis on the right).
in Figure 3.5. The DMZ allowed FARC to keep expanding during this period in
the southern departments of Meta, Caqueta´ and Guaviare (Boraz, 2007), but
also in the border regions of Vichada, Arauca, North Santander and Cesar, as
Figure 3.3 illustrates. FARC increasingly moved into ELN territories, further
contributing to the latter’s decline (Boraz, 2007).7
The peace talks collapsed without any agreement and this contributed to
Alvaro Uribe’s victory in the presidential race of 2002. Uribe was elected (and
re-elected in 2006) with a clear mandate to fight the guerrillas. Uribe was able
to carry out a series of successful military campaigns against the rebels partly
as a result of the large increase in U.S. military aid documented in Figure 3.6b,
particularly a 1.2 billion USD aid package from the year 2000 known as “Plan
Colombia” (El Tiempo, 2004b; Boraz, 2007; Corte´s et al., 2012; Dube and Naidu,
2015). Figure 3.5 illustrates the large increase in Armed Forces activity during
the Uribe administration. Starting in 2008 FARC received a series of major
blows, such as the death of four members of the group’s top decision-making
unit, the Secretariat (three of them during attacks by government forces), as
well as the rescue of FARC’s most high-profile hostages by Colombian security
forces (BBC News, 2008b, 2011; Fergusson et al., 2014).
7This would eventually lead to war between the two organizations in Arauca in 2005 (El
Tiempo, 2005b,d; IISS, 2011a; Avila, 2012).
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Figure 3.6: FARC activity and U.S. aid to Colombia
(a) Sub-categories of FARC activity (b) U.S. aid to Colombian government
Note: Panel (a) shows the number of events per year for different categories of FARC
activity. “Terrorism” includes explosive, incendiary and other terrorist acts. “Roadblocks”
includes assaults to private property, roadblocks, terrestrial piracy and illegal checkpoints.
“Attacks” includes armed contact, ambush, siege, incursion, attacks against installations and
massacres. “Murder” includes failed and successful political assassination plus murder of
civilians. “Kidnap” includes politicians, military and civilians. Panel (b) shows the total
value of U.S. government assistance to the government of Colombia, as well as the value of
the component destined for military and anti-narcotics purposes (in millions of 2011 USD).
Source: USAid.
It was also during the Uribe administration that the paramilitary
organization AUC partially demobilized.8 The first paramilitary groups were
created in the early 1980s by land owners and drug lords who decided to organize
private armies as a response to extortion from the guerrillas (Acemoglu et al.,
2013b). These groups survived thanks to their involvement with the drugs trade
and to contributions from businesses who paid for security in their areas of
operation. In 1997 many of these groups united as the AUC, with the explicit
purpose of defeating the guerrillas. Between 1999 and 2004 the paramilitaries
expanded dramatically, as documented in Figure 3.5, and it is estimated that
they had around 15,000 combatants at their peak in 2003 (Dube and Vargas,
2013). The AUC demobilization had mixed success since not all paramilitary
groups agreed to demobilize while others kept operating under new names.
3.2.2. Venezuela’s Role in Colombia’s Armed Conflict
The presence of Colombian insurgent groups at the border with Venezuela
dates back at least to the 1980s, when ocassional skirmishes between ELN
and Venezuelan security forces contributed to the increasing militarization of
8AUC stands for “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia” (United Self-defense Groups from
Colombia).
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the border on the Venezuelan side (IISS, 2011a; Avila, 2012). A particularly
violent ELN raid on Venezuelan troops in 1995 led then Venezuelan president
Rafael Caldera (1994-1998) to create two new military units to patrol the
border. Additional measures included curtailing local population’s civil rights
and providing military tribunals with legal authority in the area (El Tiempo,
1995a, 1996a, 1997). Caldera allowed Colombian troops into Venezuela when in
hot pursuit of insurgents and demanded that the Colombian government allow
Venezuelan troops to do likewise (El Tiempo, 1995b, 1996b, 1998; Avila, 2012).
FARC’s presence at the border was less visible than ELN’s at the time due
to the groups asymmetric approaches to foreign policy. While ELN considered
foreign security forces as legitimate military targets, FARC claimed not to
carry out military operations in foreign territory, under what they referred to
as their “Border Policy” (Semana, 1995; Ramı´rez, 2003; IISS, 2011a). Still, it
is estimated that by the time of the Venezuelan presidential elections in 1998
six FARC ‘Fronts’ from the Eastern, Magdalena Medio and Caribbean ‘Blocs’
were operating at the border (Boraz, 2007; IISS, 2011a).9
This election was won by Hugo Cha´vez, a former army lieutenant, with 56 %
of the votes. Cha´vez led a failed coup attempt in 1992 and was imprisoned until
1995, apparently receiving a contribution of 130,000 USD from FARC during
that time.10 Cha´vez’s presidential campaign had strong support from the left
and from the military and was able to capitalize on popular discontent with the
traditional political parties following years of sluggish economic performance,
as shown in Figure 3.7a (Corrales, 2013).
The initial attitude of the Cha´vez administration towards the Colombian
guerrillas can be described as one of tolerance or mild sympathy (IISS, 2011a;
Avila, 2012). Shortly after coming into power in February of 1999 Cha´vez
declared Venezuela a neutral country in Colombia’s armed conflict, abandoning
his country’s traditional support to the Colombian government in its fight
against insurgent groups (Ramı´rez, 2003). He also discontinued the border
security policies implemented by Caldera in the previous years.
News reports on Cha´vez’s willingness to supply weapons to FARC started
emerging in this period, some of which were soon confirmed by former members
of the Cha´vez administration (El Tiempo, 1999, 2000b,c; Robinson, 2003). A
9Each Front can have anywhere between 100 and 500 operatives. Based on their location,
Fronts are organized into Blocs, which are FARC’s largest military unit. There are seven
such regional Blocs, each under the command of a member of FARC’s Secretariat.
10See items I.22, I.773, I.782, I.2995 and I.2997 of Raul Reyes’ personal correspondence in
(IISS, 2011b).
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Figure 3.7: Economic conditions in Venezuela and Trade with Colombia
(a) Venezuela’s economy and oil (b) Bilateral trade
Note: Panel (a) shows Venezuela’s GDP growth rate (left axis) as a percentage and the price
of oil in current USD. Source: World Bank (GDP), IMF-IFS (oil). Panel (b) shows the value
of imports from Venezuela to Colombia and from Colombia to Venezuela in billions (short)
of 1998 COP. Source: COW Trade.
document would later appear, dated August 1999, in which a senior member of
the Venezuelan government agreed to provide FARC with supplies and refuge
in exchange for moderated activities on the Venezuelan side of the border (El
Universal, 2002; Semana, 2002; Ramı´rez, 2003; IISS, 2011a).
These first years of the Cha´vez administration were characterised by swift
reforms of the country’s main institutions amid signs of economic recovery, as
shown in Figure 3.7a (El Tiempo, 2000a). New elections were held following
the approval of a new constitution in 2000 and Cha´vez was re-elected for a
six-year presidential term (2001-2006) with 60 % of the vote. But political
polarization quickly rose as Cha´vez’s political agenda radicalized. In April 2002
a failed coup attempt took place and in December of that same year employees
from Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) went on a prolonged strike,
paralysing the country’s most important industry for over sixty days.11 As
figure 3.7a shows, economic conditions deteriorated significantly in that year.
Cha´vez seems to have distanced from FARC in the aftermath of the events
of 2002 (IISS, 2011a; Avila, 2012). Political polarization remained high and
the opposition movement, highly critical of Chavez’ alleged links to FARC,
raised enough signatures for a referendum to recall Cha´vez to be held in
August 2004 (El Tiempo, 2003; Hsieh et al., 2011). Political conditions abroad
also contributed to Cha´vez’s moderated attitude, with Uribe taking office
as Colombian President in mid-2002 and the U.S. becoming less tolerant
1195 % of Venezuela’s exports (and 12 % of GDP) comes from oil revenues, according to
the CIA World Factbook.
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to insurgent groups amid its “war on terror” (IISS, 2011a). Cooperation
between the authorities of Colombia and Venezuela apparently resumed as the
Venezuelan security forces proved willing to strike against FARC (El Tiempo,
2004a,d; Boraz, 2007).
Tension between the two countries rose significantly in December 2004 after
Colombian security forces illegally captured FARC spokesman Rodrigo Granda
in Caracas and transported him back into Colombia (BBC News, 2004). The
Venezuelan government suspended diplomatic relations in response, but the
crisis was short-lived (BBC News, 2005b; Avila, 2012). FARC’s inability to
use this incident to rekindle its relation with the Cha´vez administration was
apparently related to the murder of seven Venezuelans by the organization in
September 2004 (El Tiempo, 2004c; IISS, 2011a).
Cha´vez won the recall referendum with 60 % of the votes and was re-elected
for a second six-year term (2007-2012) in 2006. The ensuing stabilisation of
domestic political conditions allowed Venezuela’s diplomacy to become more
aggressive. In December 2004, Venezuela and Cuba launched “ALBA” as
a counterpart to the US-led free-trade initiative known as “ALCA” and in
2005 Cha´vez started to characterise the political agenda of his government as
“Socialism of the 21st century” (El Tiempo, 2005a). The price of oil was on the
rise (see Figure 3.7a) and the resulting increase in government revenue allowed
Cha´vez to pursue a strategy of “petro-diplomacy” (El Tiempo, 2005c; Corrales,
2009; Ortiz, 2011). Over the next four years, candidates friendly to Cha´vez’s
agenda would go on to win presidential elections in seven Latin American
countries.12
Cha´vez regained prominence in the Colombian conflict in 2006 as the Uribe
administration and FARC tried to agree terms for a ‘humanitarian’ exchange of
prisoners (El Tiempo, 2006). While Cha´vez’s potential role as mediator to the
exchange was being discussed, representatives of the Venezuelan government
apparently re-established communication with members of FARC’s Secretariat
and in a series of meetings offered refuge, supplies, weapons and money to the
group (IISS, 2011a).
Uribe designated Cha´vez as a mediator for the humanitarian exchange in
2007, which allowed Cha´vez to publicly meet with senior FARC representatives
(BBC News, 2007b). At a parallel private meeting, Cha´vez offered to provide
12These countries are Honduras (2005), Bolivia (2006), Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua (2006),
Argentina (2007), Guatemala (2007), Paraguay (2008). Only in Mexico and Peru candidates
backed by Cha´vez failed to win the Presidency in 2006.
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FARC with 300 million USD (IISS, 2011a).13 Uribe ended Cha´vez’s involvement
in the exchange two months after his appointment, in what led to another
suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries (The Washington
Post, 2007). FARC responded by releasing several hostages through Cha´vez’s
unofficial mediation (BBC News, 2007a, 2008d).
The events of 2007 led to a dramatic deterioration in the relations between
the governments of Colombia and Venezuela. During his annual address to
the Venezuelan National Assembly in January 2008 Cha´vez claimed that
“recognition must be given to FARC and ELN, they are insurgent forces that
have a political project, that have a bolivarian project that is respected here”
(El Tiempo, 2008, own translation), in what was perhaps his most explicit
statement in support of the Colombian guerrillas.
The attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador in March 2008, in which Secretariat
member Rau´l Reyes was killed and his laptop was seized, led to another
suspension of diplomatic relations and the deployment of Venezuelan troops at
the border (BBC News, 2008c,e). The documents found in Reyes’ laptop, which
Interpol certified as legitimate, provide extensive evidence of the ties between
FARC and the Cha´vez government (The Economist, 2008; IISS, 2011a).
The documents in Raul Reyes’ laptop also indicate that FARC contributed
100,000 USD to the 2006 presidential campaign of Rafael Correa, the Ecuadorian
President at the time of Reyes’ death and a political ally of Cha´vez. However,
FARC presence at the border with Ecuador precedes Correa’s election, with
Reyes settling in the area around 2003, and the available evidence suggests
that FARC were not able to receive any guarantees regarding the safety of their
operatives inside Ecuador from Correa, nor from any of his predecessors (IISS,
2011a). In 2009, weapons captured by Colombian troops at a FARC camp
were found to have been sold by a Swedish manufacturer to the Venezuelan
Armed Forces (Semana, 2009; The New York Times, 2009a). Cha´vez denied
the allegations, suspended again diplomatic relations with Colombia and
imposed restrictions on bilateral trade (BBC News, 2009b). However, intercepted
FARC communications provided additional evidence on Venezuela acting as
intermediary in arms deals involving the insurgents (The New York Times,
2009b). A military agreement between Colombia and the U.S. in late 2009
further contributed to bilateral tension (BBC News, 2009a).
In 2010 the Colombian government divulged satellite images of alleged FARC
13See also items I.2838, I.2850, I.2866, I.2890, I.2907 and I.2929 of Raul Reyes’ personal
correspondence in (IISS, 2011b).
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camps inside Venezuela at an OAS summit (BBC News, 2010a). Colombian
intelligence reports estimated at the time that FARC could have over 1,500 of
their members distributed among 28 camps inside Venezuela (El Espectador,
2010b,a). Cha´vez denied the allegations and suspended diplomatic relations
(El Tiempo, 2010b). However, he also criticised FARC and put into question
the validity of guerrilla warfare, something he had already sporadically done
since 2008 (El Espectador, 2008; BBC News, 2008a; El Tiempo, 2010a).
Relations between the two countries improved after Uribe left office in 2010
(BBC News, 2010b). Uribe’s succesor, Juan Manuel Santos, started a new round
of peace talks with FARC in 2012, with Venezuela acting as mediator (BBC
News, 2015). Cha´vez was re-elected as president in 2012 with 55 % of the votes,
but died from cancer in March 2013.
3.3. Data
I use conflict data from two sources. The main one is CEDE at Universidad
de los Andes in Bogota´. CEDE collects information from official government
sources and provides 19 different activity indicators for each illegal armed
group (FARC, ELN, AUC) at the municipality-year level.14 The CEDE dataset
also has 9 indicators on the activities of the Colombian Armed Forces at the
municipality-year level.15 Data is available for 1,099 municipalities (98 %) from
1993 until 2008.16 Municipalities lacking CEDE conflict data are shown in
grey in Figures 3.2a-3.4. Following Acemoglu et al. (2013b) and Camacho
and Rodriguez (2013), I add the 19 activity indicators and normalize by 1993
population (or initial population for new municipalities created during the
sample period) to create an “Events” variable for each illegal armed group at
14These indicators are: terrorist act (explosive, incendiary, other), assault to private
property, road block, terrestrial piracy, illegal checkpoint, armed contact, ambush, siege,
incursion, attack against installation, massacre, political assassination (failed, succesful),
murder of civilian, kidnap (politician, military, civilians). CEDE’s sources are mainly the
National Department of Planning (Departamento Nacional de Planeacio´n - DNP) and the
Observatory on Human Rights (Observatorio de Derechos Humanos), which is managed by
the Office of the Vicepresident of Colombia. These agencies gather information from the
National Police (Polic´ıa Nacional) and from newspaper reports.
15These indicators are: arrest, explosive defusal, demobilization, destruction of cocaine
laboratory, other anti-narcotic operation, raid, seizure of weapons, hostage release, hostage
rescue.
16Although four of the illegal-armed-group indicators have no non-zero values from 2004
on, while another four are also always zero from 2007 on. It is not obvious whether this
corresponds to there actually being no events of those types in those years or if it is simply
an incorrect coding of missing values. In any case, results are robust to the exclusion of years
from 2004 on.
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the municipality-year level.17 I do likewise with the 9 activity indicators for the
Colombian Armed Forces. CEDE also provides the murder rate (per 100,000)
inhabitants, at the municipality-year level.
To check the robustness of the results to the source of conflict data employed,
I use the publicly available replication data from Dube and Vargas (2013),
which I will refer to as the DV dataset. This dataset, which is also used by
Fergusson et al. (2014), is an enriched version of the dataset from think-tank
CERAC. CERAC collects information from national and local newspapers
and complements it with reports from non-government organizations working
in remote areas.18 The DV dataset includes the yearly number of attacks,
massacres and political kidnappings by “Guerrillas” for 966 municipalities
from 1988 to 2004. I create a “Guerrilla Events” variable by adding the three
indicators and dividing again by 1993 population. For ease of comparison, all
conflict variables are standardized.
The correlation between the CEDE and DV datasets is not as high as would
be expected. For example, the correlation between “FARC Events” from CEDE
and “Guerrilla Events” from DV is only 0.33. Of course, “FARC Events” is
constructed adding 19 activity indicators while “Guerrilla Events” is the sum
of only 3, but even for a more comparable indicator, the number of political
kidnappings, the correlation is still only 0.55. This makes it all the more
important to check the robustness of results to the use of different sources of
information about the conflict, something that is not frequently done in the
expanding literature on Colombia.19
For most of the analysis that follows, I divide municipalities into three groups:
municipalities located right at the border with Venezuela, municipalities that
are neighbours of border municipalities (but not at the border themselves)
and municipalities that are none of the above. These are shown in Figure 3.2a.
I also classify municipalities with respect to the border with Ecuador using
the same criteria. To check the robustness of the results to the way in which
proximity to Venezuela is measured I also calculate the geodesic or great-circle
distance from the urban area of each municipality (Cabecera Municipal) to the
border with Venezuela.20 Figure 3.2b shows the results. The mean distance to
17Results are robust to using contemporary population instead, as well as to the exclusion
of both new and broken up municipalities.
18See Restrepo et al. (2004) for a detailed account of the construction of the CERAC
dataset.
19Albertus and Kaplan (2012), Acemoglu et al. (2013b) and Fergusson et al. (2013) are
some exceptions.
20Miguel and Roland (2011) calculate distances in a similar way in their analysis of the
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Venezuela of border municipalities is 27 km, while that of neighbours is 92 km.
Data on fixed physical characteristics (area, altitude, distance to the nearest
market) as well as on State presence (notary office, agricultural bank office, tax
collection office, health center or hospital) comes from CEDE. The source for the
Unmet Basic Needs index, total population and the share of rural population
is the National Department of Statistics (DANE), based on the 1993 census.
DANE also provides information on the creation of new municipalities.21 Yearly
information on local public finance (natural resource royalties, transfers from
central government, local tax revenue) is provided by DNP. Data on electoral
results comes from the National Civil Registry.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the main variables that I employ in
this chapter.
effect of US bombing on economic conditions in post-war Vietnam. An alternative would
be to use driving distances to the border, as in Dell (2014) and Dube et al. (2013). But the
geodesic distance I use is arguably better suited for the present study because insurgents in
Colombia do not make heavy use of the road network.
2169 new municipalities are created between 1993 and 2008. They are created from 92
existing ones in 20 different departments
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Panel-level Variables
FARC Events1 1.11 3.88 0 149.37 17338
FARC Terrorist Acts1 0.24 1.36 0 55.03 17338
FARC Roadblocks1 0.08 0.48 0 15.72 17338
FARC Attacks1 0.62 2.31 0 76.98 17338
FARC Murders1 0.09 0.6 0 33.36 17338
FARC Kidnaps1 0.08 0.39 0 7.86 17338
FARC Losses1 0.49 2.76 0 130.33 17328
ELN Events1 0.33 1.55 0 89.15 17338
AUC Events1 0.14 0.75 0 27.45 17319
Guerrilla Events1 (DV) 0.37 1.12 0 39.15 11736
Murder Rate (per 100,000 inh.) 55.93 83.72 0 2724.71 17338
Armed Forces Events1 2.21 7.67 0 340.61 17328
Winner’s vote share in last presidential election 0.46 0.22 0 0.96 17183
Left’s vote share in last presidential election 0.06 0.1 0 0.99 17183
Mayor from Liberal party (dummy) 0.36 0.48 0 1 17338
Mayor from Conservative party (dummy) 0.25 0.43 0 1 17338
Property tax revenue (Millions of 1998 COP)1 100.17 146.72 0 3072.55 17338
Business tax revenue (Millions of 1998 COP)1 67.96 228.7 0 5057.36 17338
Transfers (Millions of 1998 COP)1 1095.74 1088.64 0 25678.36 17338
Royalties (Millions of 1998 COP)1 175.19 1333.3 0 55574 17338
Panel B: Municipality-level Variables
Border with Venezuela (dummy) 0.03 0.18 0 1 1099
Neighbour of border municipality (dummy) 0.04 0.19 0 1 1099
Distance to border with Venezuela (Km) 360.07 232.36 0.24 938.79 1099
Area (Km2) 947.35 3090.58 15 65674 1099
Altitude (Metres above sea level) 1148.07 906.15 2 3087 1099
Distance to nearest market (Km) 123.46 97.61 0 926.47 1099
Unmet Basic Needs index in 1993 54.17 19.78 9.15 100 1099
Share of rural population in 1993 0.64 0.23 0 1 1099
Royalties in 1998 (million COP)1 91.62 584.04 0 10340.44 1099
Transfers in 1998 (million COP)1 1276.14 705.96 0 7806.84 1099
New municipality (dummy) 0.07 0.26 0 1 1099
Divided to create new municipality (dummy) 0.08 0.28 0 1 1099
Notary office in 1996 (dummy) 0.42 0.49 0 1 1099
Agricultural bank office in 1996 (dummy) 0.91 0.29 0 1 1099
Tax collection office in 1996 (dummy) 0.44 0.5 0 1 1099
Health center or hospital in 1996 (dummy) 0.74 0.44 0 1 1099
FARC demilitarized zone (dummy) 0.02 0.14 0 1 1099
Coca crops in 2000 (dummy) 0.17 0.38 0 1 1099
Notes: 1 per 10,000 inhabitants.
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3.4. Empirical Strategy
To test for a disproportionate increase in guerrilla activity near the border
with Venezuela after Cha´vez comes to power I implement a difference-in-
differences strategy. The identifying assumption is that guerrilla activity near
Venezuela would have been the same as in the rest of the country, conditional
on controls, had Cha´vez not come to power in 1999. Using data from the years
prior to 1999 I explicitly test this parallel trends assumption.
Two important premises underlie the ability of this design to inform us about
the causal impact of increased insurgent presence in Cha´vez’s Venezuela on the
intensity of guerrilla activity in Colombia. The first one is that the election of
Hugo Cha´vez as president of Venezuela in December 1998 was an exogenous
shock to the Colombian conflict.22 The second premise is that the possibility
to hide across the border only allows the guerrillas to increase the intensity of
their activities in areas near the border. This constraint is driven by the large
magnitude of distances in Colombia and by the military technology available
to the rebels, which consists mostly of small arms (Cragin and Hoffman, 2003;
BBC News, 2005a).23 Other types of support, like the provision of weapons or
money, are more easily transported and are less geographically constrained.
El Tiempo (2002) provides an example of the type of insurgent activity
that the empirical strategy is meant to capture. This article reports how FARC
operatives entered the Colombian municipality of Tibu´ in North Santander
from Venezuela and burnt eleven vehicles on the main road in March 2002. As
troops from the Colombian Army approached, the insurgents crossed back into
Venezuela, only to re-enter Tibu´ three days later to engage in combat with
the army. Twelve insurgents and five soldiers died as a result. The remaining
FARC combatants retreated back into Venezuela but attacked the Army with
gas cylinders filled with explosives from across the border. The following day
22As discussed in section 3.2.2, Cha´vez’s electoral victory was the result of a local political
and economic crisis unrelated to the Colombian conflict. Only in April 1998 did Cha´vez
lead the polls for the first time and over the following months there was a large degree of
uncertainty regarding both the ability of the candidates from the traditional parties to catch
up with Cha´vez and the possibility that the elections could be disrupted by violence (McCoy,
1999).
23The guerrilla’s arsenal includes mostly AK-47 rifles, M-60 machine guns, 60 mm. mortars,
hand grenades and home-made explosives (e.g. explosive-filled gas cylinders). None of these
weapons have an effective range of more than 5 or 6 km. Even the AT-4 Swedish rocket
launchers seized at a FARC camp in 2009 have a maximum range of 2 km. On average,
the urban center of border municipalities is 27 km away from the border, while for their
neighbours this distance is 92 km. These are large distances given that guerrilla units mainly
move on foot.
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the guerrillas attacked again, with nine insurgents and seventeen soldiers dying
during the fighting.
The main specification used in the empirical analysis is the following:
yi,j,t = β1(Cha´vezt ×D(Border Ven.)i) + β2(Cha´vezt ×D(Neighbour Ven.)i) + αi + δj,t + γXi,j,t + i,j,t
(3.1)
where ‘y’ is an outcome of interest (mainly FARC events) and the unit of
observation is municipality i in region j in year t. Cha´vezt is a dummy equal to
one for years ≥ 1999. The coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, estimate the change
in the difference in the dependent variable between border municipalities (or
their neighbours in the case of β2) and non-border non-neighbour municipalities
after Cha´vez comes to power, conditional on the controls discussed next.
αi is a municipality fixed effect that accounts for all persistent heterogeneity
across municipalities.24 δj,t is a region-year fixed effect that controls for events
affecting equally all municipalities within a region in the same year. For this
purpose, I divide the country into six regions, roughly corresponding to the
country’s natural geographic regions.25 For example, these region-year fixed
effects should absorb the effect that less geographically-constrained forms of
foreign support, like weapons or money, have on the intensity of guerrilla
activity.
Fixed characteristics with a time-varying effect on conflict could potentially
bias the estimates of β1 and β2 if these characteristics are correlated with
proximity to the border. For instance, estimates would be biased if border
municipalities are further away from markets and if guerrilla activity increases
in these more remote locations after 1999, as could be the case after the
implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000.
Therefore, I include a full set of year interactions with a wide range of such
characteristics: area, altitude, distance to the nearest market, UBN index (1993),
share of rural population (1993), natural resource royalties (1998), transfers from
central government(1998), presence of notary office dummy (1996), presence
of agricultural bank dummy (1996), presence of tax collection office dummy
(1996), presence of health center or hospital dummy (1996). I also interact
the year fixed effects with a dummy for the five municipalities comprising
24Buhaug and Rod (2006) find that proximity to the border was positively correlated
to separatist conflict but unrelated to political conflict in Africa between 1970 and 2001.
Buhaug and Gates (2002) report that internal conflicts taking place near an international
border tend to have a larger geographical scope.
25Results are qualitatively similar if I use department-year fixed effects instead, but these
absorb most of the variation in the distance to the border.
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the demilitarized zone and their neighbours, a dummy for new municipalities
created during the sample period, as well as one for the municipalities they
belonged to. These controls correspond to Xi,j,t in equation (3.1).
The error term, i,j,t, is two-way clustered in all regressions by municipality
and department-year, following Cameron et al. (2011).
I check that the results are robust to the use of an alternative metric of
proximity to the border by estimating a modified version of equation (3.1),
where I interact the Cha´vez dummy with dummies based on distance to the
border. I confirm the existence of a non-linear increase in FARC activity at the
border by including the interactions between year dummies and the distance
to the border as additional controls.
I test for heterogeneous effects over time (and the parallel trends assumption)
by estimating the following modified version of equation (3.1), where I interact
the ‘Border’ and ‘Neighbour’ dummies with dummies for pairs of years (∆t)
instead of with the ‘Cha´vez’ dummy:
yi,j,t =
07/08∑
t=94/95
βt(∆t ×D(Border Ven.)i) + ηt(∆t ×D(Neighbour Ven.)i)
+ αi + δj,t + γXi,j,t + i,j,t (3.2)
I similarly test for heterogeneous effects along the border by interacting the
Cha´vez dummy with department-specific ‘Border’ and ‘Neighbour’ dummies.
I check that the results are robust to the inclusion of a quadratic trend
specific to municipalities at the border with Venezuela and their neighbours. I
verify that the results are not driven by guerrilla activity increasing in their
traditional strongholds by adding the interaction between the year dummies and
the intensity of guerrilla activity in 1998. Although adding a similar interaction
with a dummy for coca crops in 2000 could lead to a problem of “bad controls”,
I do so to ensure that this is not driving the results (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
I also check that the results are robust to the use of municipalities at the other
borders (Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, coasts) as controls.
As a placebo check, I estimate a modified version of equation (3.1), where I
interact the ‘Cha´vez’ variable with dummies for municipalities at the ‘Border’
with Ecuador, and their ‘Neighbours’. I also use these Ecuador ‘Border’ and
‘Neighbour’ dummies interacted with a ‘Correa’ time variable (year≥2007) to
look for evidence of increased guerrilla presence in Ecuador after Rafael Correa
comes to power in that country.
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I deal with the possibility that the paramilitary expansion may be
confounding the results in three different ways. First, I look for increased
paramilitary activity near the border after 1999 by estimating equation (3.1)
with AUC events as the dependent variable. Second, I return to FARC events
as the dependent variable in (3.1), but add AUC events (contemporary) as an
additional control. Third, I include the interaction between year fixed effects
and a dummy for municipalities that had non-zero AUC events at any point in
the sample period as additional controls.
I also check that the results are not driven by changes in Armed Forces
activity due to a change of policy during the Uribe administration or to extra
resources from Plan Colombia. Like with AUC, I estimate equation (3.1) using
Armed Forces events as dependent variable or as control (with FARC events
on the LHS). I additionally estimate an enlarged version of (3.1) where I
include the interaction between the ‘Border’ and ‘Neighbour’ dummies with the
aggregate yearly number of FARC losses (captured+demobilized). This way I
can check whether the results are driven by FARC retreating to the border in
years when they are hit particularly hard by government forces. I also estimate
a similar modification where I include the interaction between the ‘Border’ and
‘Neighbour’ dummies with the yearly amount of U.S. foreign aid received by
Colombia.
I further modify equation (3.1) to control for the possibility that economic
conditions are changing differentially near the border during the years of the
Cha´vez administration. This could be particularly worrying if we believe that
economic conditions in Venezuela have a spill-over effect on the border economy
in Colombia. To assuage these concerns, I first add as control the interaction
between the ‘Border’ and ‘Neighbour’ dummies with Venezuela’s GDP growth
rate, plotted in Figure 3.7a. I do likewise with the price of oil. I also include
as an additional control the most geographically disaggregate GDP measure
available for Colombia, which is at the department level. Finally, I include the
contemporary values of local public finance indicators (property and business
tax revenue, transfers, natural resource royalties) as controls.
I look for changes in local political conditions near the border over time by
estimating a modified version of equation (3.2), where only election years are
included and the dependent variable is some electoral outcome of interest.26
These outcomes are the vote share for the Liberal party and for the main left-
26Presidential elections took place in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006. Mayoral
elections took place in 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007.
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wing party in presidential elections, as well as the vote share for the traditional
parties (Liberal and Conservative) and for the winning candidate in the mayoral
elections.27 This way I can look at changes in both political preferences and
the competitiveness of elections specific to municipalities near Venezuela. I also
check that the results from (3.1) are robust to the inclusion of political controls.
3.5. Results
3.5.1. Main Results
The first column in Table 3.2 shows estimates of equation (3.1) using FARC
events as the dependent variable. The point estimates indicate that after Cha´vez
comes to power in 1999 the intensity of FARC activities in border municipalities
increases by 0.32 standard deviations (SD). Not only is this estimate statistically
significant at the 1 % level, but it also represents quite a large effect: 1.16 extra
FARC events per 10,000 inhabitants, relative to a sample mean of 1.11. Column
8 provides additional evidence of the human cost of the increase in insurgent
activity, as the murder rate is found to increase by almost 20 extra homicides
(per 100,000 inhabitants) in border municipalities when Cha´vez comes to power,
a very large increase (35 %) relative to the sample mean of 56.
Panel (a) in Figure 3.8 shows estimates of equation (3.2), exploring the
variation in FARC activity at the border region over time. The plot shows
that the difference in FARC activity between the border region and the rest
of the country before 1999 was statistically indistinguishable from zero, which
provides support to the parallel trends assumption underlying the empirical
strategy. The graph also indicates that FARC activity increased as soon as
Cha´vez came to power in 1999 (0.25 SD) and that it remained roughly constant
until 2004. FARC activity in border municipalities further increased in the
period 2005-2006 (0.60 SD), which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence on
renewed collaboration from the Cha´vez administration around this time. The
drop of the point estimate for border municipalities to 0.19 in the final period
(2007-2008) is surprising given the low level of bi-national cooperation at the
time but may be related to Chavez’ increased prominence in the Colombian
conflict after 2007 and to the Colombian raid on Raul Reyes’ camp in Ecuador
in March 2008.
27I focus on the Liberal party in the presidential elections as it is the only party that
always presented a candidate of its own during the sample period. As main left-wing party I
use UP in 1986, M19 in 1990-1998, PDI in 2002 and PDA in 2006.
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Figure 3.8: Yearly variation in border activity by illegal armed groups
(a) FARC Events (b) ELN Events
(c) AUC Events (d) FARC Events (Ecuador)
Note: The graph shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for the interaction
between dummy variables for each pair of years (e.g. 1995 and 1996) and the dummies for
municipalities at the “Border” with Venezuela (Ecuador in panel (d)) and their “Neighbours”.
The omitted pair is 1993/1994. The regression includes municipality and region-year fixed
effects. It also includes a full set of year interactions with fixed municipality characteristics.
The standard errors have been clustered two-way by municipality and department-year. The
dependent variable is the standardized sum of 19 indicators of activity by the group in the
caption divided by 1993 population.
The point estimate for neighbour municipalities is positive in column 1
of Table 3.2, but smaller than for border municipalities and not statistically
significant at conventional levels. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the strategic advantage resulting from the cross-border provision of refuge is
decreasing in the distance to the border. The results in columns 2 and 3 show
that the increase in FARC activity is negatively related to distance to the border
up to 30 km, with no statistically significant difference between municipalities
30-100 km from the border and those further away. The fact that FARC activity
only increases in the area immediately next to the border provides evidence in
favour of FARC’s increased ability to operate inside Venezuela as the driving
mechanism and against less geographically-constrained forms of support like
100
money or weapons.
Panel (a) in Figure 3.9 shows results from a modified version of equation
(3.1) that includes separate Border and Neighbour dummies for each Colombian
border Department.28 The graph shows that the increase in FARC activity
during the Cha´vez years is observed in all border Departments, with the
exception of Vichada and Guainia in the southernmost section (Figure 3.2a).
This heterogeneity may be driven by FARC already being quite strong in this
area before Cha´vez (Boraz, 2007), or by conflict data being less accurate in
this scarcely populated jungle area. The coefficients for Guajira, Cesar and
North Santander are all around 0.25, with the estimate for the latter being
noisier (p=0.106). Border municipalities in Arauca, as well as their neighbours,
experience a much larger increase in FARC events of 0.71 SD when Cha´vez is
in power.
We can relate these findings to the anecdotal evidence on FARC activity
in Venezuela. The maps in Figure 3.3 show that FARC activity in Cesar and
Guajira expands from the point where these two Departments meet with
Venezuela. It is in a nearby area, twenty kilometres inside Venezuela, where
the Colombian government claimed that four FARC camps were located at the
OAS summit in 2010 (El Espectador, 2010a; IISS, 2011a). In fact, coordinates
of FARC camps in this area had already been divulged seven years before
(Robinson, 2003). The other locations mentioned in the accusation made by
the Colombian Government in 2010 were spread through the Venezuelan state
of Apure, which borders with Arauca and Vichada (See Figure 3.2a).
Columns 4-7 of Table 3.2 replicate the previous analysis but using ELN
events as the dependent variable. According to column 4, there is a very small
and insignificant increase in ELN activity in border municipalities during the
Cha´vez years and a decrease in neighbouring ones, which is also insignificant.
Columns 5 and 6 show that ELN events decreased in the area 30-100 km away
from the border, consistently with the results on neighbour municipalities.
These findings are consistent with the group retreating towards the border and
into Venezuela during this period, without having the resources with which to
launch attacks from across the border.
Figure 3.8 provides a more nuanced picture. The estimates of equation (3.2)
in panel (b) show how ELN activity actually increased in border municipalities
in the period 2001-2004 and collapsed afterwards. This can be explained by
28I join Boyaca´ with Arauca and Vichada with Guain´ıa due to the small number of
municipalities in these departments.
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Figure 3.9: FARC activity at different segments of Venezuelan border
(a) FARC Events (b) ELN Events
(c) AUC Events
Note: The graphs shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for the interaction
between dummy variables for “Border” and “Neighbour” municipalities in each border
department with the Cha´vez (post-1999) dummy. The regression includes municipality and
region-year fixed effects. It also includes a full set of year interactions with fixed municipality
characteristics. The dependent variable is the standardized sum of 19 indicators of activity
by the illegal armed group in the caption, divided by 1993 population. The standard errors
have been clustered two-way by municipality and department-year.
102
the large increase in FARC activity in ELN’s stronghold in Arauca and the
conflict that erupted between the two organisations after 2005 (Avila, 2012).
Panel (b) of Figure 3.9 confirms that ELN activity decreased drastically in the
Arauca border region after 1999, but this graph also shows that ELN events
rose 0.3 SD in the group’s other traditional stronghold, the North Santander
border region, during the Cha´vez administration. Column 7 of Table 3.2 further
stresses the influence of FARC expansion on ELN activity , as it shows that
controlling for FARC activity changes the sign of the coefficient for border
municipalities, although it remains very small and statistically insignificant.
3.5.2. Guerrilla Activity at the Border with Ecuador
Table 3.3 examines the evolution of insurgent activity at the border with
Ecuador during the Cha´vez administration in Venezuela. Column 1 shows
estimates of equation (3.1) using border and neighbour municipalities in Ecuador
instead of Venezuela. The results indicate that there is a large increase of 0.69
SD, significant at the 10 % level (p=0.075). However, panel (d) of Figure 3.8
shows that FARC events increase in municipalities at the border with Ecuador
only after 2003 and then decrease somewhat in the period 2007-2008. That is
why the estimates in column 2 of Table 3.3 fail to support the hypothesis that
FARC activity increased at the border with Ecuador after Rafel Correa came
to power in 2007.
These findings are consistent with the anecdotal evidence on FARC not
being provided with protection by President Rafael Correa nor by any of his
recent predecessors, but nevertheless being able to exploit the weak presence of
the Ecuadorian State in the border region and its low levels of cooperation with
the Colombian government (ICG, 2004; IISS, 2011a). For example, Secretariat
member Raul Reyes is believed to have moved to Ecuador in 2003, when the
Uribe administration intensified military operations in the former DMZ (El
Tiempo, 2004b; Boraz, 2007), which could explain the documented rise in FARC
activity after this year. The fact that Reyes was able to remain in the area
until his death in 2008, although constantly forced to change location and shut
down communications, further illustrates the ambiguity of FARC’s situation in
Ecuador (IISS, 2011a).
Although FARC activity only increased in Ecuador after 2003, I assuage
concerns about a generalized increase in FARC activity across Colombian border
regions in the Cha´vez years by estimating equation (3.1) with a restricted
sample that only includes municipalities that are located at any of Colombia’s
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Table 3.3: Guerrilla activity at the border with Ecuador
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FARC FARC FARC ELN ELN ELN
VARIABLES Events Events Events Events Events Events
Chavez x D(Border Ecu.) 0.687* -0.00291
[0.386] [0.0805]
Chavez x D(Neighbour Ecu.) 0.0216 0.106
[0.107] [0.0731]
Correa x D(Border Ecu.) 0.348 -0.149
[0.222] [0.0971]
Correa x D(Neighbour Ecu.) 0.0471 -0.0882
[0.144] [0.0658]
Chavez x D(Border Ven.) 0.280** -0.119
[0.111] [0.108]
Chavez x D(Neighbour Ven.) 0.111 -0.152
[0.116] [0.151]
Observations 17,338 17,338 3,343 17,338 17,338 3,343
Number of municipalities 1,099 1,099 213 1,099 1,099 213
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality and department-year in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects. They also include a full set of
year interactions with fixed municipality characteristics. The dependent variable is the standardized sum
of 19 indicators of activity by the illegal armed group in the header divided by 1993 population.
borders and their neighbours. The results in column 3 of Table 3.3 indicate
that FARC events rose in municipalities at the border with Venezuela, relative
to municipalities near to any of the other borders, with the point estimates
being very similar to the ones from the full sample in Table 3.2.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.3 show that there is no evidence of changes
in ELN activity near the border with Ecuador at any point after 1999. The
estimates in column 6 suggest that ELN events at the border with Venezuela
decreased relative to other borders after 1999, but the coefficients are not
statistically significant. These results are consistent with the evidence on ELN
activity near Venezuela being relatively high during the Caldera administration
and collapsing in the final years of the sample.
3.5.3. Robustness Checks
The results presented in the previous section provide evidence of a large,
sustained and costly increase in FARC activity at the border with Venezuela
after Cha´vez came to power in 1999. In this section I test the robustness of
this main finding, taking equation (3.1) with FARC events as the dependent
variable as the baseline specification.
I begin by disaggregating FARC events into five sub-categories of activity
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to see whether one particular type of activity is driving the results. This
decomposition also provides more information on the relative importance of the
increase in FARC activity, as not all events have the same human or material
costs. The estimates in Table 3.4 show a statistically significant increase for all
types of FARC activity in municipalities at the border with Venezuela during
the Cha´vez administration, with the exception of murder.
Table 3.4: Categories of FARC activity at the border with Venezuela
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FARC FARC FARC FARC FARC
VARIABLES Terrorism Roadblocks Attacks Murder Kidnap
Cha´vez x D(Border Ven.) 0.244** 0.302*** 0.286*** 0.0769 0.129*
[0.106] [0.0938] [0.0866] [0.0531] [0.0693]
Cha´vez x D(Neighbour Ven.) -0.00264 0.214 0.135 -0.000139 0.113
[0.103] [0.143] [0.134] [0.0879] [0.0724]
Observations 17,338 17,338 17,338 17,338 17,338
Number of municipalities 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality and department-year in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects. They also include a full set
of year interactions with fixed municipality characteristics. “Terrorism” includes explosive, incendiary
and other terrorist acts. “Roadblocks” includes assaults to private property, roadblocks, terrestrial piracy
and illegal checkpoints. “Attacks” includes armed contact, ambush, siege, incursion, attacks against
installations and massacres. “Murder” includes failed and succesful political assasination plus murder of
civilians. “Kidnap” includes politicians, military and civilians.
Figure 3.6a plots the evolution of each of these categories of FARC activity
over time. A comparison with Figure 3.5 indicates that “Attacks”, which rises
dramatically between 1999 and 2003, is the main source of variation in FARC
events over time, followed by “Terrorism.” The results in Table 3.4 thus suggest
that FARC’s increased ability to hide in Venezuela after 1999 was a significant
contributor to the intensification of the war in Colombia that took place at the
time.
I test next whether the main result is robust to the use of a different dataset
on the Colombian conflict. Column 1 in Table 3.5 shows estimates of equation
(3.1) with Guerrilla events, constructed using the replication data from Dube
and Vargas (2013), as the dependent variable. Although data from this source
is available for a smaller number of municipalities and for a shorter time period
(1993-2004), the estimates are remarkably similar to those obtained using the
CEDE conflict dataset.
We can get a sense of the magnitude of the increase in guerrilla activity
at the border by comparing these results to the findings of Dube and Vargas
(2013). If I estimate equation (3.1) using the number of guerrilla attacks as
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Table 3.5: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Guerrilla FARC FARC FARC FARC
VARIABLES Events Events Events Events Events
Chavez x D(Border Ven.) 0.391*** 0.266*** 0.345*** 0.298*** 0.205*
[0.140] [0.0897] [0.0944] [0.0941] [0.121]
Chavez x D(Neighbour Ven.) 0.0529 0.0498 0.139 0.123 0.00459
[0.0944] [0.128] [0.128] [0.130] [0.0820]
Observations 11,508 17,338 17,338 17,338 17,338
Number of municipalities 959 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099
Coca crops in 2000 x Year FE No Yes No No No
Distance to Venezuela x Year FE No No Yes No No
FARC events in 1998 x Year FE No No No Yes No
Border/Neighbour quadratic trend No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality and department-year in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects. They also include a full set
of year interactions with fixed municipality characteristics. The dependent variable in column 1 is the
standardized sum of unilateral attacks, massacres and political kidnappings by guerrilla groups, from
Dube and Vargas (2013), divided by 1993 population. In the other columns it is the standardized sum
of 19 indicators of FARC activity divided by 1993 population. Columns 2, 3 and 4 include as additional
controls yearly interactions with a dummy for presence of coca crops in 2000, the distance to Venezuela
(km) and the value of the dependent variable in 1998, respectively. Column 5 includes a quadratic time
trend specific to municipalities at the border with Venezuela and their neighbours.
the dependent variable (without normalizing for population or standardizing),
the point estimate for “Cha´vez x Border (Ven.)” is 0.96 (p=0.012). This is a
very large increase in guerrilla activity relative to the one of 0.09 that Dube
and Vargas (2013) find for the average coffee-growing municipality in Colombia
following a 50 % drop in coffee prices between 1997 and 2003.
I next address the concern that the growth in coca cultivation that took
place in the 1990s, which was particularly high in border regions, may be
confounding the results (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). In column 2 I include as
additional controls in equation (3.1) the interactions between year dummies and
a dummy for municipalities with coca crops in 2000, which is the earliest date
for which municipality-level data is available. I leave these set of controls out of
the main specification as they could lead to a “bad control” problem, since the
location of coca crops in 2000 is potentially affected by FARC’s increased ability
to move in Venezuela from 1999 on (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, the
fact that the estimates are very robust to the inclusion of this set of controls
indicates that increased coca cultivation is not the mechanism leading to more
insurgent activity at the border with Venezuela.
In column 3 I include a similar set of interactions between year dummies
and the distance to Venezuela (See Figure 3.2b). This way I can test whether
the estimates are picking up variation in FARC activity far from the border,
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though correlated with the distance to it. The results suggest this is not the
case.
The estimates in column 4 are obtained when I include the interactions
between year dummies and the value of the dependent variable in 1998 as
additional controls. The results are unaffected by this modification, which
implies that the increase in FARC activity after 1999 is not due to border
municipalities having different levels of FARC activity before Cha´vez (e.g.
regression to the mean).
Lastly, column 5 indicates that the results are robust to the inclusion of a
quadratic time trend specific to border and neighbour municipalities. This is
a particularly stringent test, as the trend is likely to capture a large share of
the variation in FARC activity near the border over time, but still the point
estimate for border municipalities remains relatively high at 0.2 SD, although
it is much noisier than before (p=0.091).
3.5.4. Alternative Explanations
In this section I provide evidence against four possible alternative
explanations for the increase in FARC activity at the border with Venezuela
during the Cha´vez administration. The first one is the expansion of the
paramilitary organization AUC after 1997. The second one is the strengthening
of the Colombian Armed Forces during the Pastrana and Uribe administrations,
thanks partly to increased U.S. military assistance. Third, I explore the
possibility that the results may be driven by variation in economic conditions
in the border region during the Cha´vez years. Finally, I use data on electoral
results to see if Cha´vez’s election somehow spilled over to local politics in the
border region.
As discussed in section 3.2.1, several atomized paramilitary groups combined
to form AUC around 1997. This move was driven to a large extent by
FARC’s military success at the time, making the defeat of the leftist guerrillas
AUC’s main objective. I explore next whether AUC’s intense counterinsurgent
campaign (Figure 3.5), which roughly coincided with the start of the Cha´vez
administration, can explain the previous results.
Column 1 of Table 3.6 shows estimates of equation (3.1) using AUC events
as the dependent variable. The results indicate that AUC activity decreased
in border municipalities after 1999 but increased in neighbour municipalities,
which is consistent with FARC having a military advantage at the border,
although the estimates are statistically insignificant. Panel (c) in Figure 3.8
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shows that this result is not driven by AUC’s demobilization after 2003, since
at no point in the sample period is there a statistically significant change in
AUC activity near the border with Venezuela, with the exception of neighbour
municipalities in 2001-2002.
Panel (c) in Figure 3.9 reveals that the increase in paramilitary activity
in neighbour municipalities took place in Cesar, which is consistent with the
anecdotal evidence on the control that AUC’s North Bloc, led by ‘Jorge 40’,
had on this department (Boraz, 2007; Avila, 2012). The graph also reveals
that AUC activity decreased in the southern half of the border, providing
further evidence on the hegemony of FARC’s Eastern Bloc in the border areas
of Arauca and Vichada after Cha´vez came to power.
However, the main result on FARC events could still be driven by the
intensification of paramilitary activity in the interior of the country after 1999.
Column 2 in Table 3.6 shows that the results are robust to controlling for AUC
activity, suggesting this is not the case. Column 3 provides further evidence
against this alternative explanation, as it shows that the results are robust to
the inclusion of yearly interactions with a dummy for municipalities that have
non-zero AUC events at any point in the sample period.
Another alternative explanation for the increase in FARC activity at the
border with Venezuela after 1999 has to do with the changes in counterinsurgent
activities by the Colombian security forces that occurred around the same time.
This concern is particularly relevant since the U.S. started disbursing the “Plan
Colombia” military aid package in 2000 (Figure 3.6b) and the breakdown of
peace talks in 2002 led to an increase in military actions against FARC during
the Uribe administration (Figure 3.5).
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The results in column 4 of Table 3.6, obtained from estimating equation
(3.1) with Armed Forces events as the dependent variable, show no statistically
significant change in Armed Forces events near the border during the Cha´vez
years. Column 5 then shows that the increase in FARC activity at the border
after 1999 is robust to controlling for Armed Forces Events, despite the strong
correlation between the intensity of activities by the Armed Forces and FARC.
Column 6 shows that the results are robust to the inclusion as additional
controls of interactions between the yearly nationwide FARC losses (captures
+ demobilizations) and both the Border and Neighbour dummies. This means
that the results are not driven by FARC retreating to the borders in years
when they are suffering higher losses. Column 7 shows that the results are
robust to the inclusion of a similar set of interactions with the yearly amount
of U.S. aid instead. The magnitude of the increase in FARC events at border
municipalities drops but remains quite high at 0.2 SD, while the standard error
gets bigger, which is understandable given the very high correlation between
U.S. aid and the Cha´vez dummy (0.83).
Economic conditions have been found to be important determinants of
insurgent activity both internationally (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Miguel et al.,
2004) and in Colombia (Dube and Vargas, 2013), so I turn next to the possibility
that economic fluctuations specific to the border region may explain the results.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 I look for evidence of economic spillovers from
Venezuela into the border region. Column 1 shows that the results are very
robust to the inclusion of the interactions between Venezuela’s GDP growth
rate and both the Border and Neighbour dummies as additional controls in
equation (3.1). Column 2 shows results after I include the interaction between
the price of oil and both the Border and Neighbour dummies. This regression
is motivated by the high dependency of the Venezuelan economy on oil, whose
price rose dramatically in the period 2002-2008 (Figure 3.7a), and also by the
fact that Colombia’s main oil-producing region is in the eastern departments
of Meta, Casanare and Arauca, which are located near to (or at) the border.
Again, the results are quite robust, suggesting that it is not variation in the
price of oil what is driving the results.
One could still argue that the main mechanism for economic spillovers is
bilateral trade, which may not be properly accounted for by the variation in
Venezuelan GDP. However, while it is true that the Cha´vez administration
imposed restrictions on trade at times of diplomatic tension, this only started
in 2009, after the end of the sample period (BBC News, 2009a). As can be
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Table 3.7: Changes in local economic and political conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FARC FARC FARC FARC FARC
VARIABLES Events Events Events Events Events
Cha´vez x D(Border Ven.) 0.319*** 0.325*** 0.302*** 0.313*** 0.326***
[0.0923] [0.107] [0.0904] [0.0942] [0.0924]
Cha´vez x D(Neighbour Ven.) 0.0828 -0.00346 0.0633 0.113 0.160
[0.117] [0.104] [0.117] [0.132] [0.126]
Observations 17,338 17,338 14,041 17,338 17,183
Number of municipalities 1,099 1,099 1,099 1,099 1099
Final year 2008 2008 2005 2008 2008
Border/Neighbour x Venezuela GDP Yes No No No No
Border/Neighbour x Oil price No Yes No No No
Department DGP No No Yes No No
Local public finance No No No Yes No
Political characteristics No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality and department-year in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects. They also include a full set of year
interactions with fixed municipality characteristics. The dependent variable is the standardized sum of 19
indicators of FARC activity divided by 1993 population. Columns 1 and 2 include as additional controls the
interactions of the dummies for “Border” and “Neighbour” municipalities with Venezuela’s GDP growth rate
and the price of oil, respectively. Column 3 includes log real GDP of the department where the municipality
is located. Column 4 includes as additional controls property tax revenue, business tax revenue, transfers
from the central government and natural resource royalties, all in 1998 pesos per capita. Column 5 includes as
additional controls the vote share for the winning candidate and for the most important left-wing candidate
in the last presidential election. Also included are separate dummies for Liberal and Conservative mayors.
seen in Figure 3.7b, the data on bilateral trade shows a steady increase in
Venezuelan imports from Colombia between 2003 and 2008, which should lead
to less conflict at the border according to the opportunity cost mechanism.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 use the available data on local economic
conditions to further assuage concerns related to this alternative explanation.
In column 3 I include the log of real departmental yearly GDP as an additional
control in equation (3.1). This is the most disaggregate level at which GDP is
available in Colombia and the data is available up to 2005. Again, the results are
quite robust, suggesting that it is not variation in economic conditions, common
to all municipalities in the same department, what is driving the results. I try to
circumvent the lack of municipal GDP data by using the yearly balance sheets
from the municipal governments that are published yearly by DNP (Sa´nchez
and Nu´n˜ez, 2000). I am thus able to include as additional controls in column
4 the yearly amounts of property tax revenue, business tax revenue, transfers
from the central government and natural resource royalties, all in 1998 pesos
per capita. Again the results are unaffected by this further modification.
The previous results indicate that economic conditions across the border,
which were a significant factor in Venezuela’s turn to the left after 1999,
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are not driving insurgent activity at the border. However, it could be the
case that the change in political preferences in Venezuela spilled over to the
border region, making this area fertile ground for insurgent activity. This is a
particularly relevant concern given Cha´vez’s observed willingness to influence
foreign elections in favour of candidates akin to his views, as mentioned in
section 3.2.2.
Figure 3.10 plots results from a modified version of equation (3.2) that only
includes election years. Panels (a) and (b) look at presidential elections, which
take place every four years and where the omitted year is 1986, while panels (c)
and (d) look at mayoral elections, which were more frequent during the sample
period (term length changed in 1994 and 2003) and where the omitted year is
1988.
The results in panel (a) indicate that there is no statistically significant
change in the vote share for the Liberal party (only party to present its own
candidate in all presidential elections) in border or neighbour municipalities for
any presidential election between 1990 and 2006, relative to 1986. Panel (b)
shows a similar result for the main left-wing party taking part in the presidential
race. This finding is particularly illustrative as the main left-wing party in the
1986 presidential election, “Unio´n Patrio´tica” (UP), was created with support
from top FARC cadres in 1985 amid peace negotiations with the government
of Belisario Betancur.
Panel (c) shows that there is no significant change in the vote share for
the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) in the elections for
municipal mayor between 1990 and 2007, relative to 1988. This provides further
evidence against systematic shifts in political preferences in the border region.
Finally, panel (d) explores the possibility that the competiveness of elections
was what changed by using as dependent variable the winner’s vote share in
the mayoral election. The graph shows that the difference in winning mayor’s
vote share between border/neighbour municipalities and interior ones seems
to be fairly stable over time. Column 5 in Table 3.7 shows that the results on
FARC events are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for time-varying
political characteristics such as the vote share for the main left-wing party in
the last presidential election and dummies for the party in control of the local
government.
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Figure 3.10: Electoral results in municipalities near Venezuela
(a) Liberal party (President) (b) Main left-wing party (President)
(c) Traditional parties (Mayor) (d) Winning party (Mayor)
Note: The graphs shows point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for the interaction
between dummy variables for each presidential (mayoral) election year and the “Border” and
“Neighbour” dummies. The omitted year is 1986 for presidential elections, 1988 for mayoral
ones. The regression includes municipality and region-year fixed effects. It also includes a
full set of year interactions with fixed municipality characteristics. The standard errors have
been clustered two-way by municipality and department-year. The dependent variable in
panel (a) is the share of votes (0-1) for the candidate of the Liberal party in that year’s
presidential election. In panel (b) it is the share of votes (0-1) for the candidate of the main
left-wing party in that year’s presidential election: UP (1986), M19 (1990-1998), PDI (2002),
PDA (2006). In panel (c) it is the share of votes (0-1) for the two traditional parties (Liberal
and Conservative) in that year’s mayoral election. In panel (d) it is the share of votes (0-1)
for the winning party in that year’s mayoral election.
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3.6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This chapter documented a sharp increase in FARC activity at the border
with Venezuela after Cha´vez became president in 1999. This effect is robust to
the inclusion of a broad set of control variables as well as to the use of different
data sets on the Colombian conflict. Additional robustness tests suggest that
this differential increase in guerrilla activity was specific to the border with
Venezuela, only occurred after Cha´vez came to power and was not the result
of some time-varying heterogeneity of border municipalities. The additional
insurgent activity at the border had a high cost, as a large part of it was attacks
and terrorist acts, which led to an increase in homicide rates in the affected
municipalities.
This finding is consistent with a growing body of evidence in support
of the hypothesis that the Cha´vez administration actively collaborated with
Colombian insurgent groups. However, it is clear that the ability of the central
governments of either country to control activity in the border is limited by
agency problems, the size of the border and its geographic characteristics
(Boraz, 2007; Avila, 2012). Hence, FARC (and to some extent ELN) could
have exploited the worsening of border security that took place during the
Cha´vez administration without having received any active collaboration from
Venezuelan authorities. Incidents such as the murder of seven Venezuelans by
FARC in 2004 certainly suggest that not all of the group’s activities inside
Venezuela were coordinated with the Cha´vez government. But even leaving
aside the qualitative evidence on FARC-Cha´vez ties, the fact that the increase
in activity is so specific to this insurgent group (relative to ELN, AUC and the
Colombian Armed Forces) is hard to reconcile with worse border security being
the underlying mechanism.
Accepting that collaboration from the Venezuelan government is what
drives the results, an additional question that arises is what specific type of
collaboration led to the increase in FARC activity at the border. The available
evidence suggests that FARC received assistance from the Cha´vez government
in various different ways, ranging from the provision of intelligence to the
supply of weapons and possibly even money. But, as discussed above, of all the
plausible ways in which Cha´vez could have helped FARC, the provision of refuge
and safe passage through Venezuela is the one that is most consistent with
the fact that guerrilla activity only increases in the area less than 30 km from
the border, as it is the one that provides the most geographically constrained
benefits. The rough coincidence between the results on the segments of the
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border where FARC activity increases and the available information on the
location of FARC camps in Venezuela further supports this explanation.
Independently of the way in which the Cha´vez government helped FARC, the
final question left to be answered is why did Cha´vez help the rebels? Although
answering this question is beyond the scope of this study, there are several
possible motives. There was a clear ideological affinity between the two parties,
one that FARC repeatedly referred to in their communications with Venezuelan
officials and to which Cha´vez corresponded occasionally. Hence, aiding the
rebels would fit with Cha´vez’s documented use of “petro-diplomacy” to see
groups sharing his ideology gain political power throughout Latin America
(Corrales, 2009; Ortiz, 2011; Clem and Maingot, 2011). Additionally, Cha´vez’s
fear of a U.S. conspiracy apparently led him to consider FARC as a useful ally
should an invasion occur (Avila, 2012).
These motivations allow us to understand the different treatment received
by FARC in Cha´vez’s Venezuela relative to Correa’s Ecuador, as the latter
lacked both the agressive diplomatic aims and the fear of U.S. intervention
that characterized Cha´vez (IISS, 2011a). These motivations also fit with
the conclusion from previous research on affinity but mainly geo-political
considerations as being the main drivers of support to insurgent movements by
foreign governments (Byman et al., 2001).
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A.1. Theoretical Appendix
A.1.1. Set-up of the Model and Equilibrium
This is a two-period model in which a citizen/voter obtains utility from
private consumption of her disposable income and also from consumption of a
public good. At the end of the first period an election between the incumbent
and a random opponent takes place. The incumbent as well as his opponent
are drawn from a pool of potential politicians, each endowed with some level of
ability θi > 0. The ability of all politicians is unknown to everyone but there is
a common prior that is normally distributed with mean m and precision h.
The citizen receives a constant income yt = y each period. She pays a tax
on the fraction of her income η ∈ (0, 1) at an exogenous rate τ ∈ (0, 1). The
citizen’s private consumption is equal to her disposable income: ct = (1− τη)yt.
Her utility function is Ut = U(ct, gt), where gt is the amount of the public good
that is supplied that period. U(·) is increasing in both of its arguments.
Government revenue (Rt) is equal to tax revenue (amounting to τηyt) plus
revenue from an external source (Tt) such as royalties from the extraction of
natural resources or transfers from another level of government. I assume that
operational expenditures eat up the constant share of revenue 1 − µ, so the
amount of revenue available for public good provision is µRt, µ ∈ (0, 1).
The amount of public good provided by the mayor with ability level θ at
time t ∈ {1, 2} is given by the function
gt = θ + µRt + et (A.1)
where Rt = τηyt + Tt and et ≥ 0 is the amount of effort put in by the mayor,
which is unobservable to the citizen.1 The cost of effort borne by the mayor is
given by the increasing and strictly convex function γC(e), γ > 0. The mayor
also gets a benefit E > 0 from being in power each period, which includes
financial rewards and “ego rents”. Total per-period utility for the mayor is then
E − γC(e).
At the end of the first period the citizen observes the amount of public good
provided. She also receives a noisy signal (R˜t) on the total amount of revenue
(Rt). I assume that the signal is equal to the actual revenue minus a mean-zero
normally distributed noise term: R˜t = Rt + 
R
t where 
R
t ∼ N [0, 1/hR] Based
on this information and a conjecture on effort she updates her beliefs on the
1See Dewatripont et al. (1999) for a discussion of more general versions of this type of
model.
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incumbent’s ability. She then votes for the candidate of her liking.
Before making additional assumptions about the link between the sources of
revenue and the noisy signal that the citizen receives, I summarize the timing
of the game (I will drop the time subscripts for everything that is not changing
over time):
1. The incumbent (with ability θI unknown to all) receives revenue R =
T + τηy and chooses the amount of effort e1.
2. A quantity of public goods g1 is provided according to equation A.1.
3. The citizen observes g1 and receives the noisy signal R˜. She uses this
information to update her beliefs on the incumbent’s ability: θˆI .
4. The citizen votes either for the incumbent or for a random opponent with
the same prior ability (m).
5. The winner of the election chooses e2 and this determines g2.
We can find the PBE in pure strategies using backwards induction. The
winning candidate (with ability θ2) solves the following problem in the second
period:
max
e2≥0
E − γC(e2)
Since γC(·) is an increasing function, the second-period mayor will set
e?2 = 0 and will get utility E that period. Therefore, the amount of public
good provided will be g?2(θ2) = θ2 + µR, which is an increasing function of
the ability of the second-period mayor. If the voter chooses a candidate with
believed ability θˆ, her second period utility is U(c2, g
?
2(θˆ)) = U(1− τηy, θˆ+µR).
Since U(·) is increasing in g2, the incumbent will be re-elected only if the voter
believes him to have higher ability than the opponent. That is, if θˆI ≥ m.
The citizen updates her beliefs on the incumbent’s ability based on the
amount of first-period public goods (g1), her conjecture on the level of effort put
in by the incumbent (eˆ1), and the noisy signal on revenue (R˜). The problem that
the citizen faces is that the discrepancy between the observed amount of public
goods and the amount she expected, which I will label Z1 ≡ g1 − µR˜− eˆ1, is
equal to the incumbent’s ability (θI) minus the noise term’s impact on expected
public goods (µRt ). Given that θI and µ
R
t are two independent normally
distributed random variables, the solution to the signal extraction problem is:
θˆI = E[θI |Z1] = mh+ Z1hR
h+ hR
(A.2)
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This expression says that the posterior belief on the incumbent’s ability is a
weighted average of the prior m and the discrepancy Z1, where the respective
weights are given by the precision of the prior (h) and of the noise term
(hR = h

R/µ
2). As the signal gets noisier (hR → 0), it becomes less informative
and the posterior gets closer to the prior. Similarly, as the signal gets more
precise (hR →∞) it perfectly reveals the incumbent’s ability and full updating
occurs (all the discrepancy is attributed to ability). Equation A.2 implies that
the re-election condition simplifies to Z1 ≥ m.
From the incumbent’s perspective, his probability of re-election is:
pI(e1) = prob(g1 − µR˜− eˆ1 ≥ m)
= prob(θ + µR + e1 − µR− µRt − eˆ1 ≥ m)
= prob(θ − µRt ≥ m+ eˆ1 − e1)
= prob(Z1 ≥ m+ eˆ1 − e1)
= 1− ΦZ(m+ eˆ1 − e1)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normally distributed
Z1, which has mean m and precision hZ ≡ h·hRh+hR . The expression above tells
us that the incumbent can increase his probability of re-election by increasing
the amount of effort (e1) relative to the voter’s conjecture (eˆ1). Therefore, the
problem solved by the incumbent in period 1 is:
max
e1≥0
E − γC(e1) + (1− ΦZ(m+ eˆ1 − e1)) βE
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition of this problem is:
γC ′(e?1) = φz(m+ eˆ1 − e?1)βE
where φz is the probability density function of Z1. Given that in equilibrium
eˆ1 = e
?
1, the first-order condition characterizing optimal first-period effort
simplifies to:2
γC ′(e?1) =
βE√
2pi/hZ
(A.3)
As equation A.3 shows, e?1 does not depend on revenue. Hence, a $1 increase
from either source has a mechanical and homogeneous effect of size µ on public
2The equilibrium re-election probability is thus 1− Φz(m) = 1/2 since m is the mean of
the normally distributed Z1.
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good provision.3 Equation A.3 also shows that e?1 is an increasing function of
hZ (since C(e) is strictly convex), which is itself an increasing function of the
precision of the revenue signal hR. Hence, as the signal becomes more precise,
the voter becomes more attentive to public good provision and the incumbent
provides more effort in equilibrium.
A.1.2. Taxes as a Source of Information
Having solved the model, I now examine two extensions that link the source
of revenue to the precision of the revenue signal and yield predictions of a
heterogeneous effect of revenue from different sources on incumbent effort and
public good provision. I start by assuming that the share of exogenous revenue
amplifies the noise in the voter’s signal:
Assumption 1. R˜t = Rt − Rt where Rt = t ×
(
T
T+τηy
) 1
2
and t ∼ N [0, 1/h]
Hence, the precision of the revenue signal is hR =
(
T+τηy
T
)
h
µ2
. This
assumption captures the idea that citizens are better informed about changes
in tax revenue than about changes in external revenue. Now, as tax revenue
increases, the signal becomes more precise and the citizen becomes more
attentive to the amount of public goods provided in her assessment of the
incumbent’s quality. This in turn makes it optimal for the incumbent to increase
effort in order to influence the election in his favour. By the same logic, an
increase in exogenous revenue makes the revenue signal noisier and the citizen
less responsive, so the incumbent reduces effort.
As before, the functional form of the production function for public goods
implies that revenue from any source has a mechanical effect on public good
provision. However, the total or net effect of a revenue increase depends
also on the indirect effect through incumbent effort. Under assumption 1,
an increase in tax revenue has a larger effect on public good provision than
an equivalent increase in external revenue due to the opposite indirect effect
through incumbent effort. The following proposition formalizes this result.
3In a modified version of the model, in which the incumbent’s choice is over private
rents rather than effort, revenue does have a positive effect (the electoral cost of a fixed
amount of rents decreases as revenue increases), but this effect is still homogeneous across
sources. See Persson and Tabellini (2000), Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Brollo et al. (2013)
or Matsen et al. (2015) for examples. If the incumbent is unconstrained on the amount he
can appropriate, extra revenue has the additional effect of increasing the value of staying
in power. This mechanism is at play in the model of the resource curse in Robinson et al.
(2006). Still, this does not give rise to any heterogeneity across sources.
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Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, the equilibrium first-period effort of the
incumbent is increasing in tax revenue and decreasing in external revenue.
Hence, public good provision in the first period increases by more than the
mechanical revenue effect when there is an increase in tax revenue and by less
than the mechanical revenue effect when there is an increase in external revenue.
Demostracio´n. Using the implicit function theorem and noting that C(·) is a
strictly convex function, when we differentiate (A.3) with respect to τηy we
obtain:
γ
∂2C
∂e?1
2
∂e?1
∂τηy
=
∂φZ
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂τηy
βE (A.4)
From φZ =
√
hZ/2pi we can see that ∂φZ/∂hZ > 0. Using the definitions
of hZ and hR we find that
∂hZ
∂τηy
=
(µh)2hT
(h(T + τηy) + µ2hT )
2 > 0
Since all other terms on both sides of equation A.4 are positive,
∂e?1
∂τηy
> 0.
Hence, the overall effect of a tax revenue increase on first-period public good
provision, based on equation 1.1, is given by
∂g?1
∂τηy
= µ+
∂e?1
∂τηy
> µ
where µ is the mechanical revenue effect.
Using again implicit differentiation on equation (A.3) but with respect to
T we get
γ
∂2C
∂e?1
2
∂e?1
∂T
=
∂φZ
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂T
βE (A.5)
The argument works the same as in the case of taxes, except that now
∂hZ
∂T
=
−(µh)2hτηy
(h(T + τηy) + µ2hT )
2 < 0
Since all the other terms on both sides of equation A.5 are positive,
∂e?1
∂T
< 0.
Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in exogenous revenue on first-period
public good provision is given by
∂g?1
∂T
= µ+
∂e?1
∂T
< µ <
∂g?1
∂τηy
where again µ is the mechanical revenue effect.
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A.1.3. Taxes as an Incentive for Information Acquisi-
tion
I now substitute Assumption 1 with the following three assumptions:
Assumption 2. R˜t = Rt + 
R
t , where 
R
t ∼ N [0, 1/hR]
Assumption 3. Ut = U(ct + αgt) where U(·) is a strictly concave function
and α ∈ (0, 1/µ)
Assumption 4. At the start of the game, the voter can choose how much effort
(f1 ≥ 0) to spend on the improvement of the revenue signal. Effort increases
the precision of the revenue signal according to the linear function hR = λf1,
λ > 0, but has a cost given by the strictly convex function K(f1)
Under assumptions 2-4 the model is essentially unchanged: the incumbent’s
first-period effort is still determined by (A.3) and is increasing on the precision
of the revenue signal.
If we substitute the public good production function and the voter’s budget
constraint into her first-period utility function we can see that the problem the
voter solves is
max
f1≥0
U1 = U(c1 + αg1)−K(f1)
= U [(1− τη)y + α (θI + µ(τηy + T ) + e?1(hZ))]−K(f1)
= U [y + (αµ− 1)τηy + αµT + αθI + αe?1(hZ)]−K(f1)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal amount of voter effort is implicitly
defined by the following first-order condition:
U ′[y + (αµ− 1)τηy + αµT + αθI + αe?1(hZ)]α
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
λ = K ′(f ?1 ) (A.6)
Just like before, the voter is more responsive to public good provision in
her assessment of the incumbent’s quality the better she is informed about
revenue. In turn, the incumbent puts in more effort as the voter becomes more
responsive. Under the new assumptions, what sets this mechanism in motion is
information acquisition by the voter, which depends on the marginal utility of
public goods. When tax revenue increases, private consumption mechanically
decreases. Although public good provision also increases due to the mechanical
revenue effect, assumption 3 ensures that the marginal utility of the public
good increases as well, which raises the benefit the voter gets from additional
138
incumbent effort.4 External revenue, on the other hand, has a negative effect on
the marginal utility of the public good due to the positive mechanical revenue
effect and the fact that it does not affect the voter’s disposable income. Hence,
extra taxation provides an incentive for more information acquisition while the
opposite holds true for external revenue. The following proposition formalizes
this result:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 2-4, the equilibrium first-period effort
of the voter and the incumbent are increasing in tax revenue and decreasing
in external revenue. Hence, public good provision in the first period increases
by more than the mechanical revenue effect when there is an increase in tax
revenue and by less than the mechanical revenue effect when there is an increase
in external revenue.
Demostracio´n. Using the implicit function theorem we can differentiate both
sides of (A.6) with respect to τηy to obtain:
αλ
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
U ′′(·)
(
(αµ− 1) + α ∂e
?
1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
λ
∂f ?1
∂τηy
)
= K ′′(f ?1 )
∂f ?1
∂τηy
⇒ αλ ∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
U ′′(·)(αµ− 1) = ∂f?1
∂τηy
(
K ′′(f ?1 )− α2λ2
(
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
)2
U ′′(·)
)
(A.7)
Since U(·) is a strictly concave function while K(f1) is strictly convex, the
LHS in equation A.7 is positive and the term in brackets on the right is also
positive. Hence, ∂f ?1 /∂τηy > 0. This implies, from equation 1.1, that the overall
effect of an increase in tax revenue on public good provision is given by
∂g?1
∂τηy
= µ+
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
λ
∂f ?1
∂τηy
> µ
Using implicit differentiation on equation A.6 but with respect to exogenous
revenue (T ) yields:
αλ
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
U ′′(·)αµ = ∂f
?
1
∂T
(
K ′′(f ?1 )− α2λ2
(
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
)2
U ′′(·)
)
(A.8)
4Assumption 3 implies that taxation for the purpose of public good provision is inefficient
in a setting where overhead costs are relatively large. This is consistent with the findings of
Pritchett and Aiyar (2014), who report that the median cost of one pupil in public elementary
school in India is twice as high as in a private school, but educational achievement is much
lower.
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Now the LHS in equation A.8 is negative, while the term in brackets on
the right remains positive. Hence, ∂f ?1 /∂T < 0. Using again equation A.1, we
can see that the net effect of an increase in exogenous revenue on first-period
public good provision is
∂g?1
∂T
= µ+
∂e?1
∂hZ
∂hZ
∂hR
λ
∂f ?1
∂T
< µ <
∂g?1
∂τηy
140
A.2. Empirical Appendix
Figure A1: Percentage of properties with up-to-date cadastres
Note: The figure shows the percentage of properties in the sample located in urban/rural
areas of municipalities that had a cadastral update in the last five years (up to date). The
sample does not include Bogota, Cali, Medell´ın and the department of Antioquia, which
have their own cadastral agencies.
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Figure A2: Medium-run impact of oil price shocks for the top two quartiles
of oil abundance
(a) Royalties (b) Expenditure
(c) Educational enrolment (d) Infant mortality
(e) Health insurance (f) Water quality
Note: Graphs show point estimates and 95 % confidence intervals from two separate regressions
of the variable in the caption on a set of year interactions (2006-2011) with a dummy for
municipalities with positive oil royalties between 2000 and 2004. Sample period: 2005-2011.
Sample includes municipalities with no oil royalties or municipalities in the relevant quartile of
the 2000-2004 oil royalties distribution. All regressions include municipality and department-
year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by province.
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Table A1: Social indicators in Colombia and Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP Primary Secondary Infant Female Improved Improved
COUNTRY per enrolment enrolment mortality life water sanitation
capita rate rate rate expectancy source facilities
(USD) ( %) ( %) (h) (years) ( %) ( %)
Argentina 4,696 99 - 16 78 98 94
Bolivia 978 92 72 46 67 94 53
Brazil 3,598 - - 22 75 98 84
Chile 6,324 - - 8 81 99 97
Colombia 2,740 92 63 19 76 97 84
Ecuador 2,709 97 51 25 77 89 82
Mexico 7,115 95 63 17 78 95 84
Panama 4,349 97 61 20 79 98 80
Paraguay 1,409 94 57 25 73 94 87
Peru 2,445 97 68 23 75 90 77
Uruguay 4,117 97 - 13 79 99 95
Venezuela 4,273 92 61 16 76 94 94
Notes: GDP per capita in current USD. Percentages of improved water source and improved sanitation facilities
refer to urban population. Data from 2004 (2003 or 2005 if 2004 unavailable). Source: World Development
Indicators (World Bank).
Table A2: Cadastral updates and statutory tax rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Property tax rate ln Property tax rate
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.0964 0.176 0.0103 0.0185
[0.151] [0.160] [0.0201] [0.0203]
Time fixed effects year dpt-year year dpt-year
Observations 799 799 799 799
Number of municipalities 211 211 211 211
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. All regressions include municipality fixed
effects. Columns 1 and 3 include year fixed effects while columns 2 and 4 include
department-specific year fixed effects. Sample period: 1999-2002. Average tax rate is
8.4 h. Standard errors clustered two-way by municipality and by department-year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Heterogeneous effects of oil-price shocks by FARC activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Royalties Educational Infant Health Water
VARIABLES enrolment mortality insurance quality
PANEL A: NATURAL LOG
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t -0.266 0.00884*** 0.00300 0.0116 0.124**
[0.896] [0.00335] [0.00206] [0.00847] [0.0561]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt 0.831*** 0.000164 8.12e-06 -0.000458 0.0117*
[0.173] [9.10e-05] [7.72e-06] [0.000738] [0.00657]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt × FARC eventsi,05−10 0.0568 -0.000133** 3.14e-05 0.000111 -0.00149***
[0.0939] [6.74e-05] [2.49e-05] [0.000117] [9.12e-05]
PANEL B: D(TARGET ACHIEVEMENT)
D(post-cadastral-update)i,t 0.0134 -0.00123 0.0324* 0.0762***
[0.0134] [0.0109] [0.0173] [0.0219]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt 0.00143** 6.19e-05 -0.00177 0.00290
[0.000715] [6.22e-05] [0.00143] [0.00365]
royaltiesoili,00−04 × priceoilt × FARC eventsi,05−10 -0.000197 2.62e-05 -1.28e-05 -0.000398
[0.000329] [4.25e-05] [0.000611] [0.000291]
Observations 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,684 4,453
Number of municipalities 966 966 966 966 934
Notes: Dependent variable in the header. In panel A, the dependent variable is in natural log, while in panel B it is a dummy for
target achievement. Money variables in tens of thousands of 2004 COP per capita. All regressions include municipality-term and
department-year fixed effects (sample period: 2005-2011, except column 4: 2007-2011). Standard errors clustered two-way by
municipality and department-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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